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A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 44, Number 3, Summer 2000

Harvey Sicherman
On the Rest of Reagan

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George W. Grayson on Mexico's Election

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Editor's Column

Given the long lead times from which quarterly journals suffer, their editors must not only try to anticipate what subjects will still be of interest (or become of interest) three or four months down the road, but also occasionally go out on a limb with predictions that may be disproven before they even appear in print. Having anticipated that the two major candidates for president would be decided by the time the spring issue of *Orbis* appeared, we accordingly had a few nervous weeks during Senator John McCain's surge in the early primaries. But having been vindicated on Super Tuesday, we are emboldened to augur again. By midsummer 2000, when you read this, the Bush camp will be making a major pitch for that large and growing block of voters known variously as Latino, Hispanic, Chicano, Spanish-speaking, or Latin or Ibero-American. He will do so by indirection and implication, so as not to violate the speech codes of political correctness, but the message he will deliver is this: immigration is not a "problem," but a badge of honor for the United States; Hispanics are not a threat to American values and unity, but a mighty potential source of support for them; if they fail to achieve their promise, the blame will lie with those who seek to make of Hispanics a welfare-dependent "victim group" rather than the self-reliant, entrepreneurial, family-based people they aspire to be; and finally (most subtle of all) the way in which mainstream America addresses the rising tide of Hispanic America will be one of a piece with U.S. foreign relations toward Latin America as a whole. In short, this domestic issue is also a serious foreign policy issue, and U.S. diplomacy toward Latin America will in turn go far to define the future of America's multiethnic society in the century ahead.

But whether or not this prediction proves out, the assumptions underlying it seem unassailable. Unless and until a major strategic challenge to U.S. security and prosperity appears, Latin America will command more and more attention from Washington. The question is only whether that will be the result of shocks and crises "south of the border" or preemptive American initiatives to forge pan-American partnerships sufficient to forestall shocks and crises.

In These Pages

Accordingly, *Orbis* asked a squad of experts to report on current trends in Latin America and how they could impact on U.S. di-

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plomacy. The most immediate variable, of course, is the fact that not only Yankees, but Mexicans choose a new president this year. George Grayson examines the political trends in Mexico and how that country's painful struggle toward multiparty democracy may advance or perversely stymie cooperation with the United States. Juan López turns a steely eye on Cuba and argues, contrary to the clichés of American hawks and doves alike, that while the unilateral sanctions against Castro's regime do in fact "work" quite effectively, they cannot bring the dictatorship down all by themselves. Michael Radu, a veteran observer of South American insurgencies, targets the most volatile nations of all, Colombia and Peru, beset by drug cartels and Marxist revolutionaries. William Perry explains where gigantic Brazil is headed, and whether the United States can do aught to turn its perennially promising past into a promising future. Last but not least, Marc Falcoff surveys Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, suggesting provocatively that the leaders in the Southern Cone may promote regional unity not in order to forge closer links to North America, but precisely to resist dependency on the "colossus of the north."

Whatever regional or thematic issues the new U.S. president decides to push, he will have no choice but to overhaul the executive branch's decision-making apparatus. That is because the table of organization established a half-century ago through the Military Establishment Act of 1947 is long of tooth and increasingly dysfunctional absent the Cold War that drove its evolution. President Clinton, to his credit, tried to elevate a National Economic Council to the rank of the National Security Council, but his experiment failed the tests of efficiency and bureaucratic survival of the fittest. In these pages, Carnes Lord goes back to first principles by asking how and why the White House policymaking structure for defense and foreign policy developed in the ways that it did, what in it needs fixing in light of the challenges of the century to come, and which fixes are the best bets to work. The camps of both George W. Bush and Al Gore would do well to "listen up" and test their own ideas against Lord's. A critical and related subject is the performance of the All-Volunteer Force and whether the failure of the armed services to meet their targets for recruitment and retainment will eventuate in the deployment of women in combat or a return to a draft. Anna Simons says no to the first; Doug Bandow says no to the second.

Finally, our own Harvey Sicherman completes his cycle of reviews targeting books on recent presidential administrations with a stab at Edmund Morris's notorious biography of Ronald Reagan. And Christopher Gray skillfully adumbrates the import of five books covering two thousand years of papal influence on culture and politics.

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Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

For two weeks this February a small but determined group of student activists held a sit-in at the office of University of Pennsylvania president Judith Rodin. They protested on the grounds that apparel bearing the university logo was stitched in overseas sweatshops, and they demanded that the campus disaffiliate from its "labor watchdog" consortium and join another deemed to be tougher on foreign suppliers such as China. I observed the affair with bemusement, but also with sympathy for President Rodin, because I was one of just five people at Penn who knew that President Clinton would be coming on February 24 to deliver a speech on the global economy. And the last thing the two administrations—the one in College Hall and the one in the White House—desired was a "Seattle-type" protest against globalization and free trade. In the event, the activists were mollified and Clinton's visit went without incident. As director of the International Relations Program at Penn, I was named a co-sponsor of the lecture and was proud to be able to provide tickets for two hundred undergraduates.

For security reasons we were all obliged to take our seats in the auditorium an hour before the scheduled start, and to make matters worse Clinton was forty minutes late. But when the Secret Servicemen at the exits suddenly tripled in number, an aide attached the presidential seal to the podium, and the sound system struck up "Hail to the Chief," the impatient kvetching and wry jokes were swept away by the electric field that surrounds the American presidency (whatever one may think of the president). The speech itself was not newsworthy, save for a predictable appeal on behalf of the upcoming legislation to admit China to the World Trade Organization. It was mostly a rehash of the economic portions of the State of the Union address delivered in January, and the only moment of humor was unintentional. Wanting to make a local reference, Clinton joked that he was disappointed about not being able to stay for dinner because he had looked forward to gorging on Philly cheesesteak—only it came out "cheesecake." Talk about a Freudian slip.

The dry and mostly self-congratulatory text notwithstanding, Clinton's speech was a success. He does radiate a certain charisma, his command of facts is impressive, and he knows how to work a crowd, which is to say he would shake seven or eight hands without even making eye contact, and then zero in on one eager admirer (always a student, in this setting) to offer idealistic exhortation, avuncular counsel, or "feel your pain" empathy. Thus does a president connect with the masses and spread thrills and good will while preserving an air of unapproachable distance and dignity. I know that because David Eisenhower, seated

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next to me, told me that's how it's done.

I doubt many students can recall anything specific that Clinton said, but all came away with "positive vibes." Foreign policy speeches, however, are another matter entirely, for the reason that foreign governments hang on every phrase an American president utters. They may assume that he says what he means, and so pore over his text to discern U.S. policy, or they may judge 90 percent of his remarks to be boilerplate, but look closely for "signals" of a new tilt or twist. After all, a president must have some reason for making a speech in the first place.

What can foreigners and Americans alike conclude about the Clinton foreign policy legacy from what he has said over the years? To be sure, it is far too early to render an historical judgment about this administration's diplomacy. But it is not too early to parse the president's words and render a pundit's judgment, if only because Clinton himself is in full "legacy mode." And I am happy to say we are able to do so thanks to the appearance of an extraordinarily useful volume edited by veteran political scientist and Russia specialist Al Rubinstein and his colleagues.[1] In it they have compiled the most pertinent excerpts from no less than fifty key speeches delivered by Clinton (or, in a few cases, his chief foreign policy advisers), divided thematically into eight sections covering overall strategy, relations with Russia, NATO enlargement, relations with China and Taiwan, the United Nations and multilateralism, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. What is more, each section is introduced by a narrative and pithy, insightful, nonpartisan commentary. It should prove a valuable reference work for foreign policy analysts, teachers, and students of American foreign policy and presidential rhetoric.

So let's take a first stab at deconstructing the words of this administration in world affairs, and ask whether Clinton and his advisers have been as rudderless as their critics have claimed, or whether they kept to their course, however much it became necessary to tack with the wind.

Rubinstein's preface asserts that "President Clinton has set in motion a pattern of U.S. policy initiatives and responses that will affect U.S. foreign policy for years to come," in large part because the issues he faced were "new, unresolved, troublesome, far-reaching, and present challenging moral and political dilemmas" (p. xi). The first assertion remains to be seen, but the second is already clear: for instance, it has proven more difficult to help Russia than it was to contest and harm the Soviet Union, and more difficult to change China's regime than it was to align with it to

[1] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayevich, and Boris Zlotnikov, eds., *The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches With Commentary* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000). Subsequent footnotes refer to this volume. Pages cited in the text are from the authors' introductory sections.

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balance Soviet power in Asia. Winning the Cold War may in the fullness of time prove to have been easier than winning the peace. Rubinstein accordingly compares the international environment inherited by Clinton to that of the 1920s, and the comparison may be more apt than he realizes. For far from lurching into "isolationism," as the mythmakers would have it, the Republican administrations of the 1920s pursued vigorous diplomatic agendas in Europe and Asia, invoked Wilsonian principles such as collective security, disarmament, free markets, and democracy, and did so largely through economic and financial means. What is more, Charles Evans Hughes, Herbert Hoover, Frank B. Kellogg, and the others acted in the firm belief that America's domestic prosperity depended in good part on a stable and open world.

Clinton was unaware of that history, and in his first major foreign policy speech he began by asserting that "Twice before in this century, history has asked the United States and other great powers to provide leadership for a world ravaged by war. After World War I that call went unheeded. Britain was too weakened to lead the world to reconstruction. The United States was too unwilling. . . . And the result was instability, inflation, then depression and ultimately a second World War." But if engagement was needed then, he continued, how much more is that true today when trade, capital, services, and information ("the king of the world economy") have all become global. "And so I say to you in the face of all the pressures to do the reverse, we must compete, not retreat." Finally, not only prosperity, but democracy, freedom, and peace are at stake in such places as Somalia and Bosnia. "If we could make a garden of democracy and prosperity and free enterprise in every part of this globe, the world would be a safer and a better and a more prosperous place for the United States and for all of you to raise your children in." Clinton concluded by listing the five steps America must take to grow that global garden: put our own economic house in order; make trade a *security* priority; coordinate the leading financial powers; promote growth in the developing world; and help democracy succeed in Russia and the other new states.[2]

Rubinstein reminds us, however, that as "smart, articulate, impressively informed, and energetically involved as Clinton could be in domestic matters, he seemed unfocused, almost unengaged, and ad hoc in his response to foreign policy issues" (p. 4). So Clinton, Warren Christopher, Anthony Lake, and Madeleine Albright sought to demonstrate that they had "vision," unlike George Bush, through a series of speeches in the autumn of 1993 that named enlargement of the zones of democracy and the market economy the goal of American strategy, and free trade, engagement, and assertive multilateralism the

[2] Speech at American University, Feb. 29, 1993, pp. 8–13.

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means. Lake boldly insisted that Americans' values were universal and that "we should not oppose using our military forces for humanitarian purposes" (p. 5). And Clinton, before the U.N. General Assembly, said in effect that U.S. foreign policy was an expression of the nation's own inner nature: "In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies. . . . As a country that has over 150 different racial, ethnic, and religious groups within our borders, our policy is and must be rooted in a profound respect for all the world's religions and cultures."[3]

Finally, in July 1994 the White House codified the new strategy (now tempered by the debacle in Somalia) according to four principles: national interests would determine the pace and extent of military engagements; the United States would seek the help of its allies or multilateral institutions; no military commitments would be made before consideration of whether peaceful options were exhausted, force was suited to our political goals, domestic support was assured, and an exit strategy was identified; and all engagements would "meet reasonable cost and feasibility thresholds."[4]

Assertive multilateralism had a short and unhappy run, and after the Republican takeover of the Congress the administration hedged its bets. The White House's annual report for 1995 read: "When our national security interests are threatened, we will, as America always has, use diplomacy when we can, but force if we must. We will act with others when we can, but alone when we must. We recognize, however, that while force can defeat an aggressor, it cannot solve underlying problems. Democracy and economic prosperity can take root in a struggling society only through local solutions carried out by the society itself. We therefore will send American troops abroad only when our interests are sufficiently at stake" (p. 6).

The country where American interests were most glaringly at stake, but where "sending troops" was no option, was Russia. As Rubinstein recalls, the Bush administration seemed indifferent to the challenge of post-Communist Russia until former president Nixon warned that "if Yeltsin fails, the alternative is not going to be somebody better—it's going to be somebody infinitely worse" (pp. 43–44). But not only was Clinton's own package of aid insubstantial, his drift toward a policy aimed at NATO expansion made a mockery in Russian eyes of the president's claim of "strategic partnership." The first step, a Partnership for Peace to include all the states of the former Soviet bloc, was announced in January 1994 just a month after the red/brown parties won the Duma elections. Yeltsin turned testy, warned

[3] Address to the United Nations, Sept. 27, 1993, p. 16.

[4] "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," July 1994, pp. 28–35.

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of a Cold Peace, and then attacked his own province of Chechnya in December. Clinton in turn angered the Russians with the NATO air strikes in Bosnia in August 1995 and his election-driven announcement of NATO expansion in October 1996. Yelstin later agreed to the NATO-Russian Founding Act of May 27, 1997; what Clinton called "a voice not a veto" in NATO affairs was the best he could get prior to the NATO summit in Madrid that voted to induct Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The Duma, having deferred ratification of the START II arms control treaty, used the expansion as yet another reason for delay. Then, on August 17, 1998, the ruble was devalued 80 percent, exposing the failure of Russia's economic reforms, and in March 1999 NATO's bombing of Serbia commenced. Yeltsin denounced this "NATO aggression," whereupon U.S.-Russian relations "reached an impasse" (p. 50).

Needless to say, none of this was what Clinton intended. At the start of his first term it is safe to say that he took Russian democratization and economic progress for granted, for how else could he justify an overarching priority on domestic policy and sharp reductions in the defense budget? And yet upon taking office he solemnly confessed, "I know and you know that ultimately the history of Russia will be written by Russians."[5] Likewise, his spin on NATO expansion was that "this new NATO will work with Russia, not against it. . . . We are determined to create a future in which European security is not a zero-sum game."[6] Yet it remained so as far as the struggling Yeltsin administration was concerned, because the latter had nothing to show for its accommodation of the West except a shaky and corrupt democracy, a central government that barely functioned beyond Moscow, diplomatic humiliations, and economic catastrophe. To be sure, if Clinton was correct that Russians had to work out their own destiny, they had only themselves to blame. But that hardly demonstrated the robustness of Clinton's campaign for enlargement. Either U.S. policy toward Russia was an abysmal failure, or else enlargement was irrelevant in the country where it mattered most.

What, after all, was the purported justification for NATO enlargement (beyond the winning of East European ethnic votes)? It was, Clinton told a campaign rally in Michigan, because, "As we enter the twenty-first century, we must make a commitment to remain true to the legacy of America's leadership, to make sure America remains the indispensable nation, not only for ourselves, but for what we believe in and for all the people in the world. That is our burden. That is our opportunity. And it must be our future."[7] Albright had first referred

[5] Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Annapolis, Apr. 1, 1993, pp. 51–56.

[6] Remarks at Signing of NATO-Russia Founding Act, Paris, May 27, 1997, pp. 65–66.

[7] Remarks at a Rally, Detroit, Oct. 22, 1996, pp. 90–94.

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to the United States as "the indispensable nation"; now the president declared it imperative that it remain so—remain, that is, the sole superpower, the hegemon. What is more, the Pentagon's own long-range plan underscored the priority of working to prevent any other nation from challenging American dominance. That hardly sounded like non–"zero-sum" thinking in Moscow (or Beijing or Paris). Rather, Clinton's assertion that NATO must expand eastward "to meet the security challenges of the next century" (to contain Russia again?), secure democracy in Eastern Europe (while it falters in Russia?), encourage the new members to resolve differences peacefully (absent Russian influence?), and "erase the line that Stalin drew" (to make room for the one Clinton drew?) played into the hands of Russia's nationalists and Communists.[8]

That is not to say that Clinton was wrong when he named NATO expansion "the right thing to do," but the fact that American-Russian relations descended by 1999 to their lowest level since the pre-Gorbachev years does call into question Clinton's assertion that "the success of Russia's renewal must be a first-order concern to our country" (p. 52).

A similar story is told, in the president's own words, about China. Hopeful of building a strategic partnership with Beijing (for the usual four to six reasons: almost every Clinton speech has a list of bullets), Clinton soon throttled back his human rights crusade begun in the 1992 campaign against President Bush, stressed the importance of trade and engagement, and in Rubinstein's words "dealt with the Taiwan problem cautiously but flexibly" (p. 106). Hence Clinton's policies were crafted with two domestic constituencies in mind: big corporations with investments in the China trade whom Clinton hoped to peel off from the Republican camp, and Congress, which perversely fell under the control of Republicans eager to hoist Clinton on his own petard for softening U.S. support for Taiwan and human rights on the mainland. The result has been a series of apparent flip-flops aggravated by equally maladroit flip-flops by the Chinese themselves.

As in the Russian case, the Clinton administration's posture toward China may *faute de mieux* have been the most prudent. But it also seems as if the United States and China, after the Cold War, are still feeling each other out, bobbing and weaving, testing each other's flexibility, probing for weakness, and attempting to gauge how willing the other may be to sacrifice values and interests on the altar of greed (read trade and investment). In short, neither of them can decide whether the other really prefers to dance or to box.

That said, the themes of a genuine strategy toward China come across clearly in Clinton's

[8] Commencement Address, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, May 31, 1997, pp. 95–97.

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public rhetoric. In 1994, for instance, he granted that human rights abuses continued in China, not least in Tibet. But he concluded that "extending MFN will avoid isolating China and instead permit us to engage the Chinese with not only economic contacts but with cultural, educational, and other contacts and with a continuing aggressive effort in human rights. . . . I am moving, therefore, to delink human rights from the annual extension of most-favored-nation trading status for China."[9] He warned of "isolation" repeatedly: "But we cannot walk backward into the future. We must not seek to isolate ourselves from China. We will engage with China, without illusion."[10] And again: "Most important, choosing isolation over engagement would not make the world safer."[11] And again: "We will not change our policy in a way that isolates China from the global forces that have begun to empower the Chinese people to change their society and build a better future."[12] So it is clear that Clinton believes in the same tactics of détente embraced by Nixon and Carter (he even invokes them by name), specifically, that open commercial and cultural exchanges and constant diplomatic "jawboning" are more effective than confrontation in bringing around, or bringing down, a Communist system. And yet, when the Chinese are listening, he is careful to say, "Of course, China will choose its own destiny."[13]

The bottom line is that Sino-American relations are certainly no better than they were when President Bush left office, and may be worse for the missed opportunities. Again, that is not to say that Clinton's efforts to cooperate with Beijing were misguided, or that the Chinese do not bear much of the blame for the serial crises and tensions. The Communist hierarchs must know, or perhaps just fear, that Clinton is right about the power of global contacts to undermine their authority. But there's the rub. If Clinton believes his own talking points (as candidates George W. Bush and Al Gore seem to do), then engagement is precisely what was known during the Cold War as a rollback strategy, albeit through the medium of "soft" commercial and cultural power rather than "hard" military might, and Beijing can be expected to resist it. If, on the other hand, Clinton does not believe his own rhetoric, but is acting from domestic political and economic motives, then engagement may well amount to appeasement.

One theme that dominated the first measures of Clinton's for-

[9] Press Conference, Washington, D.C., May 26, 1994, pp. 112–13. I was stopped at a traffic light recently in Wynnewood, Pennsylvania, behind a car with two bumper stickers that said all one need know about a certain strain of American liberalism. The first sticker read "Free Tibet!" The other read "Clinton/Gore 1996!"

[10] Remarks to Pacific Basin Economic Council, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1996, p. 114–18.

[11] Speech to the National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C., June 11, 1998, pp. 127–31.

[12] Speech to the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., Apr. 7, 1999, pp. 132–38.

[13] Speech on the eve of President Jiang Zemin's visit, Oct. 24, 1997, pp. 119–26.

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eign policy sonata, but which has enjoyed no reprise, is multilateralism, specifically where the United Nations is concerned. It was central to his 1993–94 strategy documents, and in 1995 he implored Americans not to "reject decades of bipartisan support for international cooperation. Those who would do so, these new isolationists, dismiss fifty years of hard evidence." There followed the customary six-point list of things the U.N. must do to make a more perfect world.[14] But the administration distanced itself from the U.N. after Somalia and Bosnia, maneuvered to oust Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and was loath to consult the Security Council at all on Haiti and Kosovo, wherein the Organization of American States and NATO, respectively (with Washington at the controls), exercised a less universal brand of multilateralism. Rubinstein concludes that the long-term effect of Clinton's choices "may be the marginalization of the United Nations itself" (p. 144).

The Balkans, indeed, may be recorded as the scene of the Clinton administration's most egregious and enduring blunders: "egregious" because there the United States—whether for humanitarian reasons or the national interest—did not lead, entered the fray reluctantly and too late to prevent the worst suffering, and reverted to the same sort of utopian state building the administration swore off after Somalia; and "enduring" because the commanding generals in Bosnia and Kosovo are now on record predicting that NATO forces will remain there for at least a decade. How did Clinton justify his shifting strategy regarding the violence in the former Yugoslavia? In 1995, at the time of the Dayton accords, he boasted of having resisted those who "were urging immediate intervention in the conflict" because "I decided that American ground troops should not fight a war in Bosnia because the United States cannot force peace on Bosnia's warring groups, the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims." But now that an accord had been reached, he would contribute 20,000 American troops to serve as peacekeepers ("In the choice between peace and war, Americans must choose peace") with a promise that they would stay only eighteen months and cost no more than $1.5 billion per year. In fact, the cost would be twice that, and by the end of 1997 it was already clear that so far as "forcing peace" on the Bosnians was concerned, there was no light at the end of the tunnel. Accordingly, Clinton began his confession to that effect with an echo of Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam speeches: "I want to speak with you today about the progress we have made toward a lasting peace in Bosnia," followed by a list of six criteria he claimed to have met in deciding to prolong the occupation.[15]

When the Serbs' "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo became intol-

[14] Speech on the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, San Francisco, June 26, 1995, pp. 155–59.

[15] White House Addresses on Bosnia, Nov. 27, 1995, pp. 174–79, and Dec. 18, 1997, pp. 183–87.

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erable in late winter 1999, however, the administration offered the opposite spin. Addressing the nation on television to announce the commencement of NATO air strikes against Serbian targets, Clinton spoke of the need for swift action precisely to stop the killing before it escalated, and to impose peace on the bleeding province: "Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I began. World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region. In both wars, Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die. We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago. . . . This was genocide in the heart of Europe, not in 1945 but in 1995. . . ."

Leaving aside his historical analogies, which were judged inaccurate and irrelevant by many critics (Milosevic does not equal Hitler, Serbia does not equal Germany, the Europe of 1999 does not equal the armed camps of 1914, and far *more* Americans would have died in the world wars had the United States entered at once), the president explicitly admitted that his dilatory response to the previous Bosnian crisis was in error and went on to list three initiatives whereby the NATO powers would "put in place a plan for lasting peace and stability in Kosovo."[16] But as of mid-2000, the ethnic hatreds there appear to be as intractable as ever, the Kosovo Liberation Army (once damned as a terrorist organization by Washington) is still determined to purge the province of Serbs and attach it to Albania, and Slobodan Milosevic continues to rule in Belgrade. Rubinstein's epitaph for U.S. policy in the Balkans is a quotation from the strategist Karl von Clausewitz: "War can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this occurs anywhere, all the threads of the different relations are in a certain sense broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object" (p. 173).

There is much more rich material in this volume. But let us venture some tentative conclusions. First, Clinton's foreign policy speeches have been formulaic to a striking degree. Almost invariably he identifies a grave problem that Americans would ignore at their peril (thereby invoking fear), exhorts Americans to lead the world toward a solution because only they can do it (thereby invoking shame), cites historical "lessons" proving the need to act (thereby invoking deference), demonizes the enemy (thereby invoking righteous indignation), disparages domestic opponents of his initiative (thereby invoking contempt), offers a vision of perpetual peace and prosperity (thereby invoking hope), and con-

[16] White House Address to the Nation, Mar. 24, 1999, pp. 190–93.

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cludes with a four-, five-, or six-point program for the realization of a dream he knows his audience shares (thereby invoking trust). It is an extraordinarily effective template, and Clinton's speech writers have skillfully captured the temperament, cadence, and themes that have served the president so well in domestic campaigns and policy. What is more, all "great communicators" from Woodrow Wilson to Ronald Reagan practiced similar techniques in their public addresses.

Secondly, Clinton's foreign policies, and the rhetoric used to sell them at home and abroad, seem beset by myriad contradictions. He has said over and over again that the strategic aim of American policy is to enlarge the global sphere of democracy and markets, and yet he has also said repeatedly (with reference to Russia and China, but also to Iraq, Iran, Serbia, and Cuba) that societies cannot be changed from without and must write their own history. He has called with pathos for intervention to stop humanitarian disasters, and yet he has often said that force cannot solve the underlying issues that spawn such disasters. He has called for humanitarian missions, but only when the national interest is at stake. He has implied that the U.S. national interest is *always* at stake, because the spread of democracy is the best way to secure and prosper America, and because peace and freedom are indivisible, and yet he has repeatedly promised to subject decisions about intervening abroad to severe, multi-point checklists. He insists that the United States must remain "the indispensable nation," and yet he says that America's goal is to work toward a world of cooperative democratic partners in which the culture and interests of all are respected and burdens equally shared. He has rued isolation of all sorts as the roadblock to peace and freedom, yet he told the U.N. that its "first and foremost" task is "to isolate states and people who traffic in terror" (p. 158). Above all, he insists that the United States respects all religions and cultures, but repeatedly expresses the hope and expectation that forces of globalization will overcome cultural divides until people everywhere embrace the universal values upheld by Americans.

That brings us to a third observation, which I believe allows Clinton to indulge in such apparent contradictions in matters of tactics. For all his alleged tergiversation in foreign policy, Clinton does exhibit a solid core of conviction, to be read in the lines, or between the lines, of almost all his addresses. He believes that foreign and domestic policy are inseparable, that America and the world are functionally coterminous, and that Americans' moral and material interests are functionally identical. We face, he said last year, many dangers ranging from regional wars to terrorism to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to global environmental crises and deadly diseases to global financial turmoil, any one of which "will undermine open markets, overwhelm open societies, and un-

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dercut our own prosperity." Some Americans would prefer to batten down the hatches rather than confront such dangers, but such isolationism is impossible. Hence, "we must work hard with the world to defeat the dangers we face together and to build this hopeful moment together, into a generation of peace, prosperity, and freedom."

Some Americans insist that the United States lead only when its national interests are engaged. "It's easy, for example, to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this or that valley in Bosnia or who owns a strip of brushland in the Horn of Africa or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread? We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and interests are at stake, and where we can make a real difference, we must be prepared to do so. *And we must remember that the real challenge of foreign policy is to deal with problems before they harm our national interests*" (italics added).[17] In sum, America must lead *everywhere*, either because her interests are at risk, or because they soon will be if a given conflict is permitted to metastasize.

Clinton also believes that while the United States cannot, even with the help of its allies, solve the root causes of every problem on earth, it can, with the help of like-minded nations, create the conditions under which the causes of conflict can be rooted out by ordinary people empowered by globalization. Speaking at the U.N. in 1997 he did *not* say that the world organization was the hope of the future. He said this instead: "Armed with photocopiers and fax machines, e-mail and the Internet, supported by an increasingly important community of nongovernmental organizations, [people denied human rights] will make their demands known, spreading the spirit of freedom, which as the history of the last ten years has shown us, ultimately will prevail."[18] Half the ambassadors seated in the General Assembly, not to mention the governments that credentialed them, must have shuddered when they heard that threat. Add to the Information Revolution the global marketplace of goods and ideas and the "soft power" of American culture and you arrive at Clinton's formula for "the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere" (to borrow a phrase from Woodrow Wilson). Just open up China and Russia, the Muslim world, and rogue states everywhere to the spirit of freedom soaring on the wings of technology, and sooner or later the people will triumph. In short, human rights as

[17] Speech on Foreign Policy, San Francisco, Feb. 26, 1999, pp. 36–42.

[18] Speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Sep 22, 1997, pp. 160–62.

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well as peace and prosperity will take care of themselves, if only "isolation" and "isolationism" of all sorts can be purged.

The next president, even (perhaps especially) if it is Gore, will have cause to rue the fact that Bill Clinton inherited numerous post–Cold War problems and solved none, be it the future of Russia's democracy, nuclear arsenal, and pathetic economy, relations with China and Taiwan, the survival of Castro and Kim Jong-il, the wasting stalemate with Iran and Iraq, the Indian-Pakistani conflict, the drug cartels and insurgencies in Colombia, illegal immigration from Mexico and elsewhere, the correct size and posture of the U.S. military, and the quagmire of humanitarian interventions (when, where, for what, and by whom?). But if Clinton is right, the way to manage such issues is precisely to temporize in the belief that a crisis that neither sparks a war nor wrecks the economy is a crisis surmounted, because, thanks to globalization, the days of all bad guys are numbered.

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Latin American Challenges

Sanctions on Cuba Are Good, But Not Enough

by Juan J. López

Whenever the question is raised as to whether the unilateral U.S. embargo on the Cuban government "works," scholars and political critics usually answer no.[1] A common argument is that it has failed to destroy Fidel Castro's dictatorial regime and imposes unjustifiable costs on American firms in terms of forfeited businesses with Cuba. Critics of the embargo argue that engagement would be a more effective means to accomplish political liberalization and ultimate democratization in Cuba.

The question of whether economic sanctions work, however, cannot be answered without considering their objectives, which is to say the foreign policy goals that the sanctioning state expects to achieve. Although an imposer of sanctions may have more than one objective in a given case, the purposes of economic sanctions can be classified according to the main foreign policy goal sought.[2] For example, Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliott have classified sanctions according to five categories depending on whether they are designed: (a) to change the target country's policies in a modest way; (b) to change the target country's policies in a major way; (c) to destabilize the target government; (d) to disrupt a minor military adventure; and/or (e) to impair the military potential of the target country.[3] Additional objectives of economic sanctions noted by Lawrence Brady in-

[1] For examples of the scholarly literature, see Lawrence Brady, "The Utility of Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument," in *The Utility of International Economic Sanctions*, ed. David Leyton-Brown (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 298; and William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, *International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 3, 16. For examples of political criticism of the U.S. embargo, see the arguments cited in William R. Hawkins, "Big Business Vs. National Security?" *The Weekly Standard*, Jan. 18, 1999; and Jacob Heilbrunn, "The Sanctions Sellout," *The New Republic*, May 25, 1998.

[2] The main purpose of the sanctioner in a given case can change through time.

[3] Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 38.

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clude: (a) to signal a target country of a resolve to resist its aggression; and (b) to signal a target country that its conduct is considered unacceptable and to raise the possibility that others will condemn it as well.[4]

Currently, the most salient objectives mentioned in the discussion of U.S. sanctions against the Castro regime are to signal disapproval of Cuba's violations of human rights and other reprehensible behavior, to change Cuban policies, to destabilize the Castro regime and hasten a transition to democracy, and perhaps to impair the military potential of Havana. The mere fact of the embargo is sufficient to fulfill the first and last goals. But what of the rest? Is there evidence to measure progress toward destabilizing Castro's rule? The answer is yes, although critics and supporters of the embargo on Cuba have barely, if ever, addressed the relevant scholarly literature that provides important theoretical insights and empirical findings germane to whether the U.S. embargo should be maintained.

While the international relations literature about economic sanctions in general can help us to assess the utility of the U.S. embargo against Cuba, the Cuban case in turn provides data to help evaluate the effectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions.[5] Two previously isolated bodies of theory and data can be brought to bear: the literature on economic sanctions as a means of fostering change in political regimes, and the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on transitions to democracy.

The argument here is that any critique of the U.S. embargo in terms of the usual ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions to change policies or behaviors is misdirected for the simple reason that the U.S. embargo does not have this aim. Rather, its aim now is to bring about a regime change, i.e., to foster a transition to democracy in Cuba. And consistent with previous findings on the successes of economic sanctions in destabilizing target governments, the U.S. embargo is weakening the Castro dictatorship and thereby contributing to its eventual demise. To explain why the Castro government has not fallen would require a separate discussion beyond the scope of this article. However, a key factor in explaining its survival has been the unwillingness of the Clinton administration to complement the embargo with measures to intensify regime destabilization. Moreover, it is unreasonable to believe that engagement, that is, the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with the Cuban government, will lead to political liberalization. Indeed, the hypothesis of the engagement thesis to the effect that economic development brings about democracy is refuted by strong evidence, and the assumption that foreign enterprises would promote political change in the host country is untenable.

[4] Brady, "The Utility of Economic Sanctions," p. 298.

[5] This paper is concerned with economic sanctions for non-economic purposes. Economic sanctions can also be applied for economic reasons in trade disputes between countries.

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Why Engagement Cannot Topple Regimes

Changing a target state's policies or behavior as an objective of economic sanctions is important in the discussion of the U.S. embargo because this goal is implicit in one of the main criticisms of the embargo.[6] For example, when USA Engage argues that unilateral economic sanctions are ineffective, the putative ineffectiveness is evaluated in terms of the utility of economic sanctions in changing the target's policies.[7] This is inevitably so because the hope for success is placed on inflicting high economic costs on the target. But such costs are not likely to be high in situations of unilateral sanctions, because other countries may readily supply the targeted state with the trade or loans denied it by the sanctioning state.[8]

However, it is utterly unfounded to criticize the U.S. embargo of Cuba on these grounds because the major goal of the U.S. embargo at present is not behavioral change, but *regime* change. That goal was made explicit in the enactment and implementation of the Cuba Libertad (or Helms-Burton) Act of 1996. A key mechanism by which Helms-Burton is supposed to contribute to a democratic transition is by tightening the economic embargo and thus reducing the hard currency available to the Castro government. President Clinton, members of his administration, and congressional supporters of the measure have all emphasized the same justification.[9]

Even if one accepts that the U.S. embargo should be judged in terms of its contribution to promoting a transition to democracy, its critics insist that engagement would be a more effective policy to achieve the same end.[10] So let us first consider whether their contention bears examination.

The nature of the Cuban regime is such that it is unjustified to think that engagement can induce the Castro government to implement political

[6] For the common view that economic sanctions have as their goal to pressure targets into policy changes, see for example, William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "The Problem and Promise of Sanctions," in *Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post–Cold War World?* ed. David Cortright and George A. López (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 61, 63; Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 4; Brady, "The Utility of Economic Sanctions," p. 298.

[7] Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. USA Engage is an association of American firms that carries out political campaigns and lobbying efforts against economic sanctions.

[8] Brady, "The Utility of Economic Sanctions," p. 298; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, *International Economic Sanctions*, pp. 3, 16.

[9] White House press release on Mar. 12, 1996. See also the statement by Michael Ranneberger, then director of the Cuba desk at the State Department, in Armando Correa, "EU protegerá activistas en Cuba" (US will protect activists in Cuba), *El Nuevo Herald*, Mar. 1, 1997.

[10] Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Horst Fabian, "Analogies Between East European Socialist Regimes and Cuba: Scenarios for the Future," in *Cuba After the Cold War*, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 370. Liberalization is allowing individuals to have certain rights, including freedom of speech, movement, and association, and the right to a fair trial under rules of preestablished laws. Liberalization is not the same as democratization, which would entail, at least, the holding of free and fair elections to select candidates to the national government.

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liberalization.[11] Havana is controlled by hardliners, led by Fidel Castro himself, who oppose any change in the status quo. There are no regime "softliners" (those who believe that some degree of political liberalization is necessary for the dictatorship to endure) with sufficient power and autonomy to conduct negotiations concerning political liberalization with members of the moderate opposition. Were softliners in fact to emerge and display a willingness to negotiate with democratic moderates, they would be quickly eliminated or demoted by hardliners.[12] It is important to add that the standard conception of softliners in the literature on transitions to democracy involves those advocating political liberalization, not economic reform, because some scholars attempting to conjure up moderates in the Cuban ruling elite count advocates of market reforms (even if very limited ones) as softliners. But a cogent example demonstrating that economic reformers in Cuba are not *political* softliners is Carlos Lage, Cuba's minister of economy, who stated on September 2, 1999, that there is already a democracy in Cuba while at the same time advocating the influx of foreign investment.[13]

The fact that the U.S. embargo has been in place since 1962 and the Cuban dictatorship has endured is taken by critics of the embargo as an indication that the economic sanctions have failed. Those who make this argument disregard the fact that, for a long time, Cuba has had diplomatic and commercial relations with most other countries. Not only have Latin American and European countries engaged the Cuban government in diplomatic and trade relations, but some leaders from these countries have tried many times to persuade the Cuban government to take steps toward political liberalization without the least success.[14] In short, the Cuban government has failed to respond to positive inducements. For example, Havana has not accepted the offer of the European Union to establish an economic cooperation agreement that would facilitate trade, investments, and aid in exchange for Cuba's respecting human rights and moving toward political liberalization.[15] Both Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl, the second in command in the ruling elite, have consistently rejected any negotiations to improve relations

[11] For the association between types of dictatorships and the modes of transition, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

[12] For a more elaborate classification of the regime type in Cuba and a more extensive discussion of modes of transition, see Juan J. López, "Implications of the U.S. Embargo for a Political Transition in Cuba," *Cuban Studies*, vol. 28 (1999), pp. 42–45.

[13] EFE, Sept. 2, 1999, cited in Cuba-L e-mail news service.

[14] José Miguel Vivanco, executive director of Human Rights Watch/Americas, stated in 1996 that while Europe's dialogue with Cuba has led to the periodic release of some political prisoners, European Union policy toward Cuba has had no effect whatsoever on the repression of basic liberties by the Castro regime. Christopher Marquis, "Rights group: EU economic policy in Cuba unjustified," *Miami Herald*, Sept. 21, 1996.

[15] Juan O. Tamayo, "Europeans get tough in policy on Cuba," *Miami Herald*, Dec. 3, 1996.

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with the United States that would include preconditions involving Cuba's domestic policies.[16]

Likewise, the visit of Pope John Paul II to Cuba, while it may have inspired slightly more tolerance for religious expression, has had no political impact to date. Nor have visits by government officials from many countries and other signs that "the world was opening up to Cuba" (as the pope observed) translated into political liberalization. On the contrary, in March 1999 the Cuban government established a law imposing up to twenty years in prison and other punishments on people who dared to exercise their rights of free speech.[17] In the same month, the Cuban government tried four dissidents in a secret trial and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from three and one-half to five years. Their crime, for which they were first imprisoned in July 1997, was to author a document, "The Homeland Belongs to All," that criticized the Castro government.[18]

The engagement thesis also claims that economic development tends to promote democracy, an old hypothesis dating from the 1950s work of Seymour Martin Lipset.[19] But the empirical evidence of the past fifty years suggests that this hypothesis is also false. Countries under dictatorial regimes are not more likely to experience a transition to democracy as they reach higher levels of economic development.[20] Nevertheless, the idea that development generates democracy continues to be presented as if it were true and is one of the key arguments used by USA Engage to justify its opposition to the U.S. embargo.

Samuel Huntington has also argued that economic development produces democracy by creating new sources of wealth and power outside state control. However, if one considers the intervening mechanism between development and democracy in Huntington's reasoning, one finds that, whatever its validity elsewhere, it does not hold up in the Cuban case. If increased wealth simply accrues to the state, as in Cuba, then (as Huntington himself acknowledges) the additional revenue merely increases the power of the state and makes no contribution to democratization.[21]

Foreign investment in Cuba occurs through joint ventures between

[16] For Raúl's comments see Reuters News Service, Nov. 18, 1995, cited in Cuba-L. For Fidel's position, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Cuba's Economic Policies and Strategies for the 1990s," in *Cuban Communism*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1995), pp. 196–97.

[17] "Cuba cracks down, new attack launched on dissent," *Miami Herald*, Feb. 17, 1999; Anita Snow, "Cuba crackdown on US collaboration," Associated Press, Feb. 16, 1999, from CubaNet (http://www.cubanet.org); "US rights groups assail 'scandalous' new Cuban law," *Miami Herald*, Feb. 18, 1999.

[18] "Cuba announces jail sentences for dissident four," Reuters, Mar. 15, 1999 (CubaNet).

[19] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, Mar. 1959, pp. 69–105.

[20] See Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics*, Jan. 1997, pp. 155–83.

[21] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 60–61, 65.

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multinational firms and local state enterprises, which, with rare exceptions, are the majority shareholders. Joint ventures employ only 1.3 percent of the working-age population, and the Cuban workers in these enterprises are subjected to special exploitation by the state. First, foreign firms cannot hire workers directly, because the state provides the work force through a special government employment agency (ACOREC). Secondly, the Cuban state exacts revenue from foreign investment through wage confiscation to the tune of $361 million per year, one of the largest (if not the largest) sources of government revenue. On average, the state receives from foreign investors $450 per month per worker but pays workers in Cuban pesos the equivalent of approximately $10 per month, an amount that hardly suffices for subsistence.[22] Hence, foreign investment is not a mechanism for the generation of wealth and power among the population, but rather a subsidy that merely abets Havana's exploitation of virtual slave labor and provides it with an important source of hard currency.

Such capitalism as Castro has been forced to accept since the halt of Soviet assistance, therefore, is strictly confined to enclaves in which the key actors and beneficiaries are foreign capitalists and the state. The very limited space that the government allowed, starting in 1993, for Cuban citizens to engage in private entrepreneurship has been substantially stifled since 1996.[23] A crackdown on Cuban private businesses has driven thousands of these enterprises to close and intensified the difficulties for those who manage to continue operating.[24] The Cuban government is free to permit more private-sector activity, for instance, among farmers, and the U.S. embargo does not prevent it from doing so. But the government refuses to do so for political reasons. Lifting the U.S. embargo would not lead to a significant expansion of market reforms in the domestic economy.[25] It would only provide the state more windfall profits while fostering very little diffusion of wealth among citizens at large.

[22] Maria Werlau, "Foreign Investment in Cuba: The Limits of Commercial Engagement," in *Cuba in Transition*, vol. 6, ed. Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (Washington, D.C.: ASCE, 1996), p. 481.

[23] Only very small private enterprises were allowed for Cubans after 1993. For example, a restaurant could not have more than twelve chairs.

[24] For examples of government attacks against private enterprise in the general population see Juan O. Tamayo, "Cuban inspectors crack down on home businesses," *Miami Herald*, Mar. 27, 1997; Gustavo Rafael Rodríguez, "Aumenta represión contra actividad privada en Villa Clara" (Repression increases against private enterprise in Villa Clara), CubaNet, Sept. 15, 1997; and David Abel, "Cuba's control over capitalism," *Orlando Sentinel*, Jan. 24, 1999.

[25] This is a common observation among scholars who follow Cuban economic affairs. For example, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Cuban Economy in 1997–1998: Performance and Policies," in *Cuba in Transition*, vol. 8 (1998), p. 1.

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Foreign Capitalists as Promoters of Democracy

So much for the thesis that diplomatic and economic relationships "automatically" promote economic development and democracy. But there is a third aspect to the engagement thesis, which is that foreign enterprises serve directly to promote political change in the host country. Much was made, for instance, of the more liberal labor and racial policies of U.S. multinationals operating in South Africa during apartheid. But William Hawkins has argued in a recent article that foreign companies investing in countries ruled by dictatorships in fact tend to *defend* the dictatorships as a way of protecting their business interests.[26] This phenomenon would seem to be even more likely in countries such as Cuba where foreign investment takes the form of joint ventures with the government. And foreign investors in Cuba do indeed seem to receive substantial concessions from the government, such as repatriation of 100 percent of profits. Foreign firms operate with a labor system that grossly exploits Cuban workers, and some enterprises have used property confiscated by the government from Americans and Cubans. Moreover, joint ventures violate laws to protect the natural environment—and do so with government consent. Thus, one likely result of the end of the dictatorship and the advent of a democratic government would be that foreign investors would find the agreements they made with the Castro regime changed or nullified. It is also possible that large fines would be imposed on foreign investors to clean up the environment and compensate workers for past wage confiscation. In addition, disappropriated Americans and Cubans would confront such investors with extensive claims.[27]

In Cuba, foreign enterprises are not breeding grounds for democracy.

Finally, foreign investors in Cuba would, after a political transition, likely face an angry political backlash.[28] Many Cubans, both in exile and on the island, consider foreign investors to be collaborators of the dictatorship who help to lengthen the life of the Castro government and are partially responsible for prolonging the suffering of the Cuban people. One example indicating such resentment is a pamphlet dated March 1999 addressed to all foreign enterprises and circulated by a pro-democracy group in Cuba. Among the points made are that: (a) the foreign businesses are illegal and perpetuate the regime in power; (b) when the change toward democracy occurs, such businesses will be taken to court because of their illegal actions in alliance with Castro's government; (c) businesses should not assume that the Cuban

[26] Hawkins, "Big Business vs. National Security?"

[27] Werlau, "Foreign Investment in Cuba," pp. 458, 468, 475–79. For environmental degradation in Cuba, see also Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López, "Socialism and Environmental Disruption: Implications for Cuba," in *Cuba in Transition*, vol. 8.

[28] On the resentment by Cubans on the island against foreigners, see Werlau, "Foreign Investment in Cuba," p. 476.

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Communist regime can offer them any kind of security, because none of the documents signed by the present regime, their entities, or authorized third parties will be of any value after democracy exists; and (d) after being taken to court to clarify businesses' legality, they will be free to operate on the island when there is a democratic legal system. In June 1999, Cuban-American lawyers went so far as to file a class-action suit in Florida against foreign investors in Cuba for violating international labor laws.[29]

In sum, foreign entrepreneurs seem to have tied the fate of their businesses in Cuba to the survival of the dictatorship, prompting the observation by Jesús Zúñiga that every foreign investor there ends up being a lobbyist for the Cuban government abroad.[30] Moreover, in Cuba, foreign enterprises are not breeding grounds for democracy. Data from 1,023 interviews of recent exiles show that 75 percent of them consider that workers in foreign enterprises are subject to more control by the political police than is usual for the country.[31]

Sanctions Designed to Force Regime Change

Economic sanctions meant to destabilize foreign governments often involve a superpower as the sanctioner and a small country as the target. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott conclude that economic sanctions, accompanied by other policies, can be quite successful in undermining governments. In over half of the cases they considered, destabilization efforts were successful, but they emphasize that economic sanctions alone, unassisted by complementary measures, seldom succeed in this objective. Moreover, international cooperation is not important in determining the success of sanctions in destabilizing target governments.[32] Hence, the unilateral nature of U.S. sanctions would not destroy their ability to undermine the Castro government. One is therefore justified in asking not only what effect the U.S. embargo has had, but also whether other American policies toward Cuba reinforce the impact of the embargo so as to bring about the demise of the dictatorship.

A corresponding observation exists in the literature on transitions to democracy, which indicates that dictatorships tend to fall when faced with crises, including economic ones.[33] In a cross-national statistical study involv-

[29] Rui Ferreira, "Demandan a inversionistas por violar derechos" (Law suit filed against investors for violating rights), *El Nuevo Herald*, June 25, 1999.

[30] Jesús Zúñiga, "Cuba, inversiones y embargo" (Cuba, investments, and the embargo), Cooperativa de Periodistas Independientes, *CubaNet*, Jan. 18, 1999.

[31] Churchill Roberts, Ernesto Betancourt, Guillermo Grenier, and Richard Scheaffer, *Measuring Cuban Public Opinion: Project Report* (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1999), pp. iv, 70.

[32] Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, pp. 6–7, 40, 51–52.

[33] Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 57; Samuel Huntington, "How Countries Democratize," *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter 1991, p. 593.

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ing 139 countries from 1950 to 1990, the authors found that dictatorships are more likely to survive when their economies grow and more likely to be destabilized when they face economic distress.[34] Another study found that in a data set of twenty-seven dictatorships, twenty-one experienced economic decline prior to transitions to democracy. All communist dictatorships in the set (Poland, Nicaragua, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia) experienced economic deterioration or stagnant, low rates of growth in the years before the demise of the dictatorships.[35]

A widespread observation among scholars of Eastern European politics is that a key factor underlying the pressures leading to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe was economic deterioration. A declining standard of living decreased people's tolerance for the regimes. As their situations grew worse, the populations became more aware of the failure of their own regimes to provide an acceptable level of prosperity.[36] The connection between deterioration of economic performance and transitions to democracy has also been observed in Latin America, where decreases in standards of living preceded the wave of democratization during the 1980s.[37] Poor economic performance contributes to the demise of dictatorships by provoking latent or active opposition to the regime among citizens and groups within civil society who blame the government for their poverty. It also reduces the benefits enjoyed by active supporters of the regime and its coalition allies.[38] Even in cases where economic crises are not the main source of factional conflicts within the ruling elite, deterioration of economic performance tends to widen cleavages among the rulers.[39]

Before the end of the Soviet subsidies to Cuba, economic pressure on the Castro government as a consequence of the embargo was not a significant challenge to the stability of the regime.[40] Today, the economic embargo significantly reduces the amount of resources available to Havana, and the lower a country's gross national product, the greater the impact of a setback.[41] Carmelo Mesa-Lago estimates that in 1985 Cuba's gross domestic

[34] Przeworski and Limongi, "Modernization."

[35] Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 33–34.

[36] For example, see Lazlow Bruszt, "1989: The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary," *Social Research*, Summer 1990, p. 383; Tony R. Judt, "Metamorphosis: The Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia," in *Eastern Europe in Revolution*, ed. Ivo Banac (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 96–97; and J. F. Brown, *Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 209.

[37] Karen L. Remmer, "The Process of Democratization in Latin America," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Winter 1992, pp. 10–12.

[38] Barbara Geddes, "Games of Intra-Regime Conflict and the Breakdown of Authoritarianism," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995, pp. 24, 27; Haggard and Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transition*, pp. 29–32.

[39] Haggard and Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transition*, pp. 31–32.

[40] See Mesa-Lago, "Cuba's Economic Policies and Strategies for the 1990s," p. 197; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, p. 7.

[41] Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, pp. 36, 47.

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product per capita was $334, similar to that of impoverished Haiti. By 1996, however, the Cuban GDP per capita had dropped to just $61.[42]

With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Cuban economy plummeted. From 1989 to 1993, Cuba's global social product decreased by 45 percent. Cuba lost socialist economic aid of more than $6 billion annually. After 1994, the tumble of the economy stopped. From the low level at which the economy found itself in 1993, the government reported 0.7 percent growth for 1994, 2.5 percent for 1995, 7.8 percent for 1996, and 2.5 percent for 1997. Since then, the Cuban economy has stagnated. Despite some economic growth since 1994, the living conditions for the population have not improved and seem to have deteriorated further.[43]

Searching for data on costs to the Cuban government from the U.S. embargo since the end of non-market economic relations between Cuba and Eastern European countries, one finds a number of indications that the costs are significant. Juan Triana Cordoví, the director of the Center for Studies of the Cuban Economy in Havana, says that the direct costs of the embargo on the Cuban economy for 1998 was $700 million—an amount larger than the net revenues to the government from tourism.[44] According to a study by a European Union think tank, the Cuba Democracy Act of 1992 cost Cuba about $1 billion in its first year on the books.[45] The 1996 Cuba Libertad Act has also discouraged investment in Cuba from countries other than the United States, with the result that foreign firms have canceled, frozen, or quietly deferred planned projects there. Firms that have ended their business in Cuba since the signing of that law include the Spanish firms Occidental Hotels and Paradores Nacionales; the Mexican firms Cemex, Grupo Domos, PEMEX, and Grupo Vitro; the Canadian firm Redpath; and the South African mining company Gencor.[46] Carlos Lage, the economy minister in Cuba, acknowledges that Helms-Burton has slowed down foreign investment.[47] The embargo also has curtailed income from U.S. sources. Despite the problems that Cuba continues to have in attracting foreign investment due to political and economic problems unrelated to the embargo, it is to be expected that if the United States were to lift its embargo a number of American firms would

[42] Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The State of the Cuban Economy: 1995–1996," in *Cuba in Transition*, vol. 6, p. 5.

[43] Mesa-Lago, "The State of the Cuban Economy: 1995–1996," p. 4; Mesa-Lago, "Cuba's Economic Policies and Strategies for the 1990s," p. 187; Mesa-Lago, "The Cuban Economy in 1997–1998: Performance and Policies," pp. 1–2; Dalia Acosta, "Food Shortfall Continues," InterPress Third World News Agency, Sept. 23, 1996; Juan O. Tamayo, "Cubans fear a recurrence of 'old days,'" *Miami Herald*, Sept. 25, 1996.

[44] Wilfredo Cancio Isla, "Académicos debaten el futuro económico de Cuba" (Academics debate the economic future of Cuba), *El Nuevo Herald*, Mar. 20, 1999.

[45] Cited in Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Cuba," in *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, ed. Richard N. Haass (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), p. 46.

[46] Juan González Yuste, "Una cadena de hoteles española se retira de Cuba" (A Spanish hotel chain leaves Cuba), *El Periódico*, June 12, 1996; "Cemex leaves Cuba to avoid U.S. sanctions," Reuters News Service, May 29, 1996; *Cuba Brief*, Apr. 12, 1996.

[47] Time News Service, Mar. 7, 1996; *CubaHoy*, Mar. 27, 1996.

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invest there.[48] Lifting the embargo would also provide significant hard-currency earnings from American tourists to the Cuban government. It is estimated that an end to the embargo could quickly double the number of tourists traveling to the country.[49]

Economic Decline and the Weakening of the Dictatorship

As the Cuban economy shrank in the 1990s, the loyalty to the regime among its own cadres and the quiescence of the population at large decreased as well. A report from the Central Commission of Cadres, created to help the Council of Ministers evaluate the work of the top levels of the *nomenklatura*, stated that problems with salaries continued to impair the motivation of cadres.[50] In meetings to discuss the party's platform for the fifth national congress held in the fall of 1997, Communist Party members in Havana reported that a surprising number of cadres openly criticized the platform, rather than rubber-stamping it as in the past, on the grounds that it had no solutions to the economic problems Cubans face every day. According to one party member, "People are saying they don't see the government admitting anything wrong or taking any real steps to get us out of our crisis; they are at the end of their ropes, depressed."[51] The regime also appears to be having problems motivating the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). In a meeting of CDR leaders held in Santiago de Cuba on April 1997, the national leader criticized local cadres for abandoning their mission of maintaining surveillance in their blocks and neighborhoods.[52]

Most ominous of all for the regime are indications of concern over the loyalty of military officers. With the deterioration of the economy, a key role for the Cuban military has been to run agricultural and business enterprises such as department stores and tourist resorts.[53] Since 1991, the size of the Cuban military has been reduced by about half, most of its equipment is unusable, and about 70 percent of soldiers' time is devoted to non-military labor.[54] A colonel in the Cuban air force who defected to the United States in 1994 testified to a growing discontent among professional officers in the

[48] Werlau, "Foreign Investment in Cuba," pp. 458–59; Mimi Whitefield, "Bill Puts Damper on Foreign Investment Initiatives," *Miami Herald*, Apr. 1, 1996.

[49] Don C. Becker, "Cuba," *The Journal of Commerce*, Feb. 28, 1996; Frances Kerry, "U.S. travel executives meet Cuban tourism minister," Reuters News Service, Dec. 12, 1995.

[50] "Raúl Castro arremete contra dirigentes políticos" (Raúl Castro attacks political leaders), *El Nuevo Herald*, Apr. 10, 1997.

[51] Juan O. Tamayo, "Will Albright make a move on Cuba policy?" *Miami Herald*, June 19, 1997.

[52] Tomás Regalado, "Redoblan la vigilancia a los cubanos" (Surveillance of Cubans is reinforced), *Diario Las Américas*, Apr. 30, 1997.

[53] Cathy Booth, "The Surprising Emergence of Raúl," *Time*, Nov. 14, 1994.

[54] Andres Oppenheimer, "Cuban forces cut in half, general says," *Miami Herald*, Feb. 21, 1998. The reduction in the resources available to the military seems to be due to the decline in government revenues rather than a policy decision to give less priority to military expenditures. Cuba has devoted more than 5 percent of its national product to the military, even during the 1990s; see Jorge F. Pérez-López, "Cuban Military Expenditures: Concepts, Data and Burden Measures," in *Cuba in Transition*, vol. 6, pp. 137, 141.

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Cuban military because they have been forced to work in the agricultural sector. The view of this defector is consistent with other evidence of poor morale and disillusionment with the regime within the armed forces.[55]

The economic decline during the 1990s also correlates with a surge of open opposition from civilian groups and the general population. Compared with the 1980s, for example, the development of civil society is remarkable in terms of the number of independent groups and the challenges they present to the government. One striking indicator was a fast held by several democratic activists for forty days in Havana during June and July 1999 to demand respect for human rights. In solidarity with those in Havana, fifty-four other fasting sites were established throughout Cuba, and 143 independent groups declared their support. About 2,000 other activists and 136 individuals from the general population visited the Havana site during the fast, and across the island 6,288 individuals signed visitors' registers at the fasting centers.

This growth of civil society is not due to the implementation of enclave capitalism in Cuba. Members of independent groups are routinely fired from their jobs in state institutions or enterprises, cannot obtain employment in joint ventures, and are denied licenses to operate as individual entrepreneurs. Activists depend for their subsistence on family members, friends, and support from abroad. Survey data show widespread dissatisfaction with microeconomic conditions, which is leading to louder criticism of the government.[56] Many activities of opposition, including food riots, have arisen spontaneously from civil society as people have reacted to deprivation. Neighborhood residents have joined together to demand that the government provide them with resources to alleviate critical shortages of food, water, medical supplies, or other essential needs.[57] Government workers, as well as self-employed individuals, have resorted to collective action to defend their economic interests from government abuses.[58]

The Clinton administration seeks to *avoid* a political transition in Cuba.

Existing Complementary Measures Are Inadequate

The U.S. embargo thus weakens the Cuban dictatorship and is contributing to its eventual demise. But the embargo has to be supplemented by other measures to bring about a political transition. It is beyond the scope of this article to explain in depth Castro's staying power,[59] but one key factor is

[55] Richard L. Millett, "From Triumph to Survival: Cuba's Armed Forces in an Era of Transition," in *Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition*, ed. Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold-Biss (Miami, Fla.: University of Miami, North-South Center Press, 1996), p. 142.

[56] Edward González and David Ronfeldt, *Storm Warnings for Cuba* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994), p. 12.

[57] "Reclamo popular obliga al Partido Comunista a tomar medidas" (Popular demands force the Communist Party to implement measures), *CubaNet*, Apr. 21, 1998.

[58] For example, see Pablo Alfonso, "Cuba por dentro" (Inside Cuba), *El Nuevo Herald*, Mar. 5, 1997.

[59] For a fuller account, see Juan J. López, "The Nontransition in Cuba: Problems and Prospects for Change," in *Cuban Communism*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki, 10th ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, forthcoming).

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quite simply the Clinton administration's desire to *avoid* a political transition in Cuba driven by groups in civil society and the population. That is, the administration does not want a messy, spontaneous political transition in Cuba along the lines of East Germany or Romania. Yet a transition from below is the only feasible mode of transition under the current regime.

The argument that the success of economic sanctions in destabilizing target governments depends on complementary measures concurs with the findings of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, who consider covert actions and quasi-military activities.[60] But still more possibilities exist, including provision of enough material assistance to encourage the growth of civil society and provide independent channels of news and information to most of the population. The Clinton administration has done none of the above.

There is evidence that the diffusion of news and information from independent sources played a pivotal role in Eastern European transitions. Pronouncements from democratic activists directed at the population (dissidents were interviewed by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [RFE/RL], and their *samizdat* publications were used in broadcasts), information about activities of opposition groups, and news about the initial demonstrations must have been crucial in generating a widespread feeling of political efficacy among citizens that encouraged them to participate in protests demanding democratization.[61]

East Germans had ready access to West German television and radio broadcasts. In Czechoslovakia, Radio Free Europe was jammed in the cities, but the BBC, Radio Free Europe, and other Western radio stations were easily received outside the cities, and sometimes it was possible to listen to foreign broadcasts within cities. In Czechoslovakia, Western radio broadcasts ceased to be jammed before the surge of demonstrations in November 1989.[62] In Romania, foreign radio broadcasts were not jammed.[63]

In comparison with Cuba, independent channels of communication in Eastern European countries had a much more extensive reach. Concomitantly, one finds a low sense of political efficacy in the Cuban population, something that constitutes a key obstacle to a transition. One possible channel of independent communication is independent publications produced and distributed within Cuba. However, such publications are practically nonexistent at present, probably due to the extreme shortages of money, equipment, and paper in the hands of democratic activists.

To be sure, section 170 (g) of the Cuba Democracy Act and section

[60] Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, pp. 6–7, 40, 51.

[61] López, "The Nontransition in Cuba: Problems and Prospects for Change."

[62] Helsinki Watch, *Toward Civil Society: Independent Initiatives in Czechoslovakia* (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 1989), pp. 1–2.

[63] U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on International Relations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Authorizing Additional Appropriations for the Board for International Broadcasting and Grants to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981," Hearings, 96th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 26 and Apr. 16, 1980.

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109 of the Cuba Libertad Act call for appropriations to support democratization in Cuba. The budgeted allocation is about $3 million per year, administered by the USAID Cuba Program, but activists in Cuba receive only a fraction of the assistance. Substantial amounts are spent on projects in the United States that are irrelevant for bringing about a transition, such as the planning of free elections once a transition takes place. Moreover, the amount of funds the U.S. government provides for assistance to democracy-building efforts in Cuba is tiny by comparison to other cases of U.S. support for such efforts. Consider that the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 allocated $1.5 million per year to provide assistance to political prisoners and their families and promote human rights, and an additional $40 million per year to finance activities to end the apartheid system.[64]

Besides *samizdat* publications, another source of independent communication is foreign radio and television broadcasts. In Cuba, almost everyone has a radio or television at home. Yet, the reception of foreign television broadcasts is practically nil. Of the foreign radio stations that manage to reach Cuba, the U.S.-sponsored Radio Martí has by far the largest audience, but its broadcasts are severely jammed. Interviews in four Cuban cities in September 1998 indicated that only 9 percent of the population listened regularly to Radio Martí.[65] It is possible to improve its reach substantially at a modest cost, for example, by increasing the power of transmitters and broadcasting in more frequencies.[66] But at present, Radio Martí broadcasts on just one AM frequency and three short-wave frequencies. By contrast, RFE/RL used as many as thirty short-wave frequencies to broadcast in Russian during the evening and usually twelve frequencies at other times. For broadcasts in Polish and Czech, RFE/RL typically used eight frequencies for each language.[67]

The transmitters of Radio Martí are also much weaker than those of RFE/RL. Until November 1999, Radio Martí's AM broadcasts used two transmitters of fifty kilowatts each, and only at night was it allowed to combine the two AM transmitters to use 100 kilowatts. In November 1999, it was announced that the AM broadcasts of Radio Martí would start using a 100-kilowatt transmitter.[68] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty used a 150-kilowatt transmitter for AM broadcasts to Poland and Czechoslovakia. For short-wave broadcasts, Radio Martí uses 250-kilowatt transmitters. Since the 1980s, the

[64] Public Law 99-440 (October 1986), especially title II, section 202, and title V, section 511.

[65] Pablo Alfonso, "Instalan un campo de antenas que interfieren a Radio Martí" (A field of antennas is installed to jam Radio Martí), *El Nuevo Herald*, Apr. 20, 1999; Ramón Alberto Cruz-Lima, "Continúa interferencia de Radio Martí" (Interference of Radio Martí continues), *Diario Las Américas*, May 5, 1999; Kathy Glasgow, "Nobody's Listening," *Miami New Times*, Jan. 28–Feb. 3, 1999.

[66] For technical means of surmounting jamming, see Board of International Broadcasting, *Annual Report* (1985), pp. 23 and 25; Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997), pp. 219–20.

[67] I obtained some of the information about RFE/RL broadcasts from personnel at RFE/RL in Washington, D.C.

[68] *El Nuevo Herald*, Nov. 9, 1999.

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international trend has been to use 500-kilowatt transmitters for short-wave frequencies. In an initiative under the Reagan administration, Congress in 1985 authorized funding to install six 500-kilowatt transmitters, and RFE/RL started to use 500-kilowatt transmitters before 1989. The use of 500-kilowatt transmitters can achieve at least 50 percent channel effectiveness in a jammed environment, which is considered a reliable broadcast signal.[69]

The ineffectiveness of Radio and TV Martí has therefore resulted from a deliberate policy decision of the U.S. executive.[70] This is an instance of a long-term pattern in the policies of the Clinton administration toward the Castro government, a pattern that points to a desire to maintain stability in Cuba rather than to foster a transition to democracy. During his first term, Clinton was moving toward the lifting or weakening of the U.S. embargo. He opposed the Helms-Burton bill, but then decided to back it after the Cuban air force shot down two small, unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft in international air space on February 24, 1996, killing the four men who piloted the planes. Title III of the Helms-Burton Act has never been implemented, and Title IV only in desultory fashion. Together, they aim at hindering foreign investment in properties confiscated from Americans or Cubans by the Castro government. Manifold evidence of the involvement of Cuba in drug trafficking has been dismissed, and the Clinton administration has sought a "partnership" with the Cuban government in the fight against drugs.[71] The Clinton administration has looked favorably on efforts to improve the relations between the United States and the Castro regime. For example, when Illinois governor George Ryan went to Cuba in October 1999 with the intention of helping to end the U.S. economic embargo, the director of the Office of Cuban Affairs at the U.S. State Department sent a message to him saying that the State Department was "very pleased" with his visit. Likewise, the Cuba point man on the National Security Council told him that President Clinton was "delighted" with his visit to Cuba.[72]

Statements by Clinton administration officials match their actions and indicate their desire to prevent the collapse of the dictatorship in Cuba. Nor is it unprecedented for American administrations to prefer stability to democracy in Latin America.[73] On September 28, 1998, Michael Kosak, then the principal officer at the U.S. Interest Section in Havana, had this to say about U.S. policy toward Cuba:

[69] Board of International Broadcasting, *Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: Board of International Broadcasting, 1985), p. 21; (1986), p. 5; (1988), pp. 1, 51. Channel effectiveness is the percentage of the audience that can receive a clear, audible signal at any given time.

[70] Personal interviews of individuals very familiar with the operation and politics of Radio and TV Martí.

[71] See "U.S. Officials To Visit Cuba, Discuss Cooperative Efforts in Drug War," *Miami Herald*, June 19, 1999; Robert Novak, "Panel targets Cuba's aid to drug-runners," *Chicago Sun-Times*, Feb. 1, 1999; Jerry Seper, "Clinton ignores Cuba drug trade, lawmakers find," *Washington Times*, June 21, 1999.

[72] Rick Pearson, "Ryan blasts embargo in Cuba report," *Chicago Tribune*, Dec. 12, 1999.

[73] For example, stability has taken precedence over democracy in U.S. foreign policy toward Mexico and Brazil. Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin American Democracy," p. 277.

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> Today, however, our primary concern is the one that did not exist twenty years ago. That is the issue of stability. If there is instability in Cuba, United States interests are directly implicated. The geography of the two countries is such that economic failure, political discord or civil disorder in Cuba produces potentially hundreds of thousands of migrants in the Florida straits in a very short period of time.[74]

In his remarks, Kosak stated that chaos can only be avoided if there is negotiation between political reformers in the regime and members of the opposition. But there are no political reformers in the regime. Thus, the apparent conclusion that emerges from Kosak's remarks is that a push by civil society for a transition to democracy, as occurred in East Germany and Czechoslovakia (where there were no political reformers in the regime to negotiate a transition with members of the opposition), would be chaotic in Cuba and should not be promoted by the U.S. government. Similarly, Michael Ranneberger, then head of the Cuba desk at the State Department, stated in a speech given at Tulane University in November 1998 that an unstable and chaotic transition in Cuba would be against the interests of the United States.[75]

Conclusions

The debate over the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo on Cuba has paid little attention to the scholarly literature on economic sanctions and transitions to democracy. One consequence is that critics of the embargo base their arguments on hypotheses that are empirically wrong or that misconstrue scholarly findings. Supporters of the embargo, in turn, do a poor job of exposing the flaws in the anti-embargo arguments. But in fact, the hypotheses used by engagement advocates to criticize the U.S. embargo are untenable. There is strong historical evidence that economic development does not lead to democracy. Foreign investors in Cuba are more likely to become supporters of the dictatorship rather than agents of political change. Foreign capitalists at the time of the transition to democracy will face legal and political problems that will likely entail considerable financial losses and impair their ability to continue to do business in Cuba. And the desire of some American firms to establish businesses in Cuba now, seeking to get a hold on the market in preparation for the post-transition period, is shortsighted and apparently based on misunderstandings of the economic and political factors involved.

Given the nature of the Cuban dictatorship, neither engagement nor

[74] "The Prospects for a Peaceful Transition in Cuba: Six Months after the Papal Visit," remarks by Michael Kosak at the *Dallas Morning News* conference on "Cuba in Evolution," Sept. 28, 1998 (http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/CUI/wwwh0035.html).

[75] "Text: Ranneberger Tulane Speech on Cuban Transition Process" (http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/ran9.htm).

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the embargo by itself will move the Castro government toward political liberalization. But unilateral economic sanctions can be effective by reaffirming a commitment to international norms of democracy and justice and by weakening the Castro government and promoting a change of regime. The U.S. sanctions impose serious economic costs on the Castro dictatorship, and the deterioration of the Cuban economy in the 1990s can be clearly linked both to the marked development of independent groups that challenge the government and to the increase in overt opposition on the part of the general population. Moreover, there is reason to believe that Cuba's economic problems have generated serious discontent within the Communist Party's own cadres, including military officers.

Still, the U.S. embargo itself is not sufficient to bring about the demise of Castro. It is apparent that supplementary measures are needed to achieve a political transition along the lines urged by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott. The bottom line, therefore, is that communism survives to this day in large part because of the unwillingness of the U.S. executive to implement those supplementary measures that would foster the development of civil society there and spark public protests to demand democratization. On the contrary, officials in the Clinton administration have labored actively to avoid such a collapse, in stark contradiction to their public discourse.

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Latin American Challenges

The Perilous Appeasement of Guerrillas

by Michael Radu

The collapse of East European communism in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later had an immediate impact on the fortunes of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups in Latin America. They lost not only their rear bases in Nicaragua (because of a regime change) and Cuba (because Castro abruptly lost the resources to promote revolution elsewhere), but their discredited ideological underpinnings as well. All this seemed to spell the end of Marxism-Leninism as a military threat in Latin America. Conservatives and liberals agreed that communism was dead.[1] Hence the decisions of El Salvador's Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional—FMLN) and Guatemala's National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca—URNG) in 1992 and 1996, respectively, to make their peace with the government and become "normal" political parties. Even earlier, the remnants of the Argentine Montoneros and the Uruguayan Tupamaros had made similar transitions, but only after they were already militarily defeated and saw legal acceptance as their only chance for survival. All of these groups participated in elections and, with one exception, fared poorly at the ballot box in 1999. The URNG was a poor third in the Guatemalan elections, the Tupamaros and assorted allies narrowly lost the Uruguayan presidential race, and Gladys Marín, the unreconstructed Stalinist candidate of the Chilean Communist Party, received 3 percent of the vote in that country's presidential contest. Only the main splinter faction of the FMLN has had some success: after losing two consecutive presidential elections, the party won the race for mayor of the capital and, in March 2000, won a plurality in the Salvadoran legislature.

[1] See, for instance, Jorge G. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993).

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The Exceptions

Against this background of renounced violence and disavowed ideologies across Latin America, three countries appear anomalous. In Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, Marxist-Leninist organizations continued to thrive and wage deadly insurgent campaigns long after most others had disappeared or been defeated. Peru was for years plagued by the Communist Party of Peru (better known as Shining Path—Sendero Luminoso, henceforth Sendero) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).[2] Next door, Colombia continues to struggle with the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, known as FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación—EPL). Mexico faces the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), the People's Revolutionary Army (EPR), and the Insurgent People's Revolutionary Army (ERPI).[3]

Several preliminary observations can be made about these groups.[4] First, Marxism-Leninism is far from dead in Latin America, regardless of its fate elsewhere, because the politics of the Latin American Left do not always mirror its West European and American counterparts. Secondly, the persistence or public appearance of insurgent groups cannot be explained by a country's lack of democratic political systems. Although opinions differ as to the real level of democracy, the three countries in question were at least as democratic as most of the other states in the region, which do not now face armed insurgencies. Indeed, some facts suggest that democratic practices coincided with, even if they did not facilitate, violence by groups seeking a totalitarian solution to social, economic, or political problems. Sendero's first violent action took place on May 17, 1980, in the Andean village of Chuschi, on the same day that electoral politics returned to Peru after a seventeen-year

[2] The Communist Party never used the term Sendero Luminoso, and in fact has rejected it repeatedly. The Peruvian and international media, however, found it irresistible—the former for convenience (there is also a "traditional" Peruvian Communist Party), and the latter perhaps for its exotic sound and lack of the direct association with Cold War Communism. The MRTA is the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru.

[3] The respective Spanish names of the three Mexican groups are Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, Ejército Popular Revolucionario, and Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente. For further information on their ideologies and propaganda, see (http://www.ezln.org/) and (http://www.pengo.it/PDPR-EPR/). There were 11 other Marxist groups advocating violence in Mexico by 1998, but they were mostly known through pamphlets and rumors rather than violent actions.

[4] For the backgrounds and motivations of various groups, see Bertrand de la Grange and Maite Rico, *Marcos, la genial impostura* (Marcos, the brilliant impostor) (Mexico City: Aguilar, 1997); Maria José Moyano, *Argentina's Lost patrol: Armed struggle, 1969–1979* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997); Yvon Grenier, *The Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh University Press, 1999); David Stoll, *Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Pablo Giussani, *Montoneros: La soberbia armada* (Montoneros: Armed Arrogance) (Buenos Aires: Tiempo, 1992); and Michael Radu, "Introduction," *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods*, ed. Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu (New York: Pergamon Press, 1990).

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interruption. The EZLN made its first public appearance the day Mexico formally renounced economic nationalism by joining the North American Free Trade Agreement, and during the campaign for what was the most open, fair, and closely contested election in Mexican history.

The present analysis is limited to Colombia and Peru, two neighboring Andean countries that at different times during the past two decades faced similarly grave revolutionary challenges. Mexico is beyond the scope of this paper because the EZLN, EPR, and ERPI are not, and never were, serious military threats or nationwide movements.

The insurgents in Peru and Colombia share a similar ideology, the main enemy of which is democracy. Sendero consistently described leftists who participate in elections as "parliamentary cretins" and proudly admitted that the date of the Chuschi attack was selected because the organization wanted to "expose the whole 'return of democracy' as a patent fraud, a sham manipulated by the US."[5]

That Peru won its war against Latin America's most vicious communist insurgency is indisputable. In addition to the Sendero threat, Lima also had to deal with the Castroites of the MRTA and a large drug production and trafficking network. Colombia, faced with a similar constellation of threats, has failed to defend itself and is now desperately seeking outside military and diplomatic help. The question immediately arises as to why Peru, with a shorter history of uninterrupted electoral politics than Colombia and a considerably smaller population, was successful in prosecuting its war, while Colombia is close to defeat. Perhaps the different outcomes can be traced, at least in part, to practical and cultural differences between the two countries. Specifically, two matters seem essential: different perceptions, among both the elite and the general population, of the nature and seriousness of the threat, and differing assumptions as to whether the population is hostile to, and thus could be mobilized to resist, Marxist rebels.

Why was Peru successful in its war, while Colombia is close to defeat?

Resolve in Peru

In 1990, Peru was under siege. Enormous areas in the hinterland were devoid of any state presence, the police were consistently being routed in

[5] Central Committee Communist Party of Peru, *Revolution in Peru* (n.p.: May 1985), p. 10. For the most extensive single text on the party's ideology, see *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo* (n.p.: Red Banner Editorial House, 1989; reproduced by People's Movement Peru of France). A collection of theoretical pronouncements is to be found in Luis Arce Borja, ed., *Guerra Popular en el Peru: El Pensamiento Gonzalo* (People's War in Peru: Gonzalo Thought) (Brussels: n.p., 1989). The most readily available primary sources on the organizations' ideology, propaganda, and history are their web sites. See FARC (http://burnucsd.edu/~farc-ep/); ELN (http://www.voces.org/); and MRTA (http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiv/mrta/). Factions of the Partido Comunista del Perú have their own sites at (http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp) and (http://www.csrp.org/pcp.htm).

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small-town skirmishes, and Sendero insurgents openly controlled neighborhoods in Lima. Many of the country's roads were cut, severely curtailing movement in provincial cities (particularly at night), and the economy was collapsing because of governmental incompetence and the damage inflicted by insurgents. Entire universities, such as San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho and La Cantuta in Lima functioned as indoctrination and training camps for the rebels. Reputable analysts in the United States predicted imminent victory for Sendero. In light of the civil war's death toll of at least 25,000 since 1980, direct economic damages of $25 billion, and the regime's clear inability to cope with the challenge, such estimates seemed entirely realistic.[6]

Prior to 1990, Peruvian political leaders failed to perceive the nature of the threat posed by the Communists. Between 1980 and the end of 1982, President Belaunde Terry and his government derided Sendero as "cattle rustlers" and "bandits"—a criminal problem, not a serious political danger.[7] The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), a left-of-center party with ties to the MRTA, advocated dialogue with Sendero.[8] Alan García of the APRA, Peru's president from 1985 to 1990, publicly expressed admiration for the Senderistas' commitment and willingness to sacrifice themselves, and his prime minister, Armando Villanueva, professed his belief in "convincing" the rebels to see the light of peace. The García administration appointed a peace commission in September 1985 that included Bishop Augusto Beuzeville, whose nephew, Edmundo Beuzeville Cox, was a known Sendero military leader in Puno.[9]

By the end of the García regime, however, things started to change—not because the government reassessed the threat, but because the insurgent groups rejected APRA's peace offerings. The MRTA, after declaring a cease-fire upon García's election in 1985, reopened its war against the state a year later and assassinated a retired admiral and Peru's first defense minister. In 1986, Sendero embarrassed President García by staging a violent prison riot

[6] Gordon H. McCormick, "The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism," RAND Corporation Paper P-7297 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Jan. 1987); and Gordon H. McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, R-3781-DOS/OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Mar. 1990). The alarmist conclusions of these studies were in fact used by Sendero's own propaganda to show the party's progress toward the conquest of power.

[7] For details, see Gustavo Gorriti, *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru*, trans. and with an introduction by Robin Kirk (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 77–82. For quotations from the contemporary Peruvian press, see DESCO, *Violencia Politica en el Peru, 1980–1988* (Political Violence in Peru, 1980–1988), vols. 1–2 (Lima: n.p., Sept. 1989.) In an interview with this author on Jan. 12, 1990, former president Belaunde was still convinced that Sendero was a foreign intrusion and could be dealt with by the police.

[8] Victor Polay Campos, MRTA's supreme leader, was the son of an APRA founder and senator, brother of an APRA congressional candidate, and roommate of García himself while in Spain and France.

[9] Captured again in 1993, Beuzeville Cox is now serving a life sentence for treason, with no chance of release, at least as long as Fujimori or his present policy remains in control. See *Violencia Politica en el Peru*, vol. 1, pp. 441–92.

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when APRA was hosting a Socialist International meeting. Sendero also murdered APRA leader Rodrigo Franco and made it clear that it had no interest in negotiations with "imperialist puppets" such as APRA (which was, in fact, one of the most anti-American governments in Peru this century). But despite this unquestionable hostility toward the government, when MRTA supreme leader Victor Polay was captured for the first time in 1989, he was visited by the prime minister (an old friend of his father) in prison. A year later most MRTA leaders, Polay included, escaped from prison. Clearly, the APRA never understood the nature of the Marxist threat and never fought adequately against it.

With the arrival of President Alberto Fujimori in 1990, the fight against the Communists took a decisive turn. Civilian administration in most departments of the country was replaced with politico-military rule under army generals. The government in Lima abruptly stopped all talk of negotiations with Sendero and the MRTA. Both groups were treated as treasonous, tried in military courts before anonymous judges, afforded limited appeal opportunities, and given lengthy sentences in isolated and well-guarded prisons. Innumerable Sendero and MRTA members are now serving life terms. Members of front groups and other associates of the rebels, including a former member of the national legislature, were also tried and sentenced, and the military was given a free hand to deal with insurgency. Only a few, isolated negotiations took place: with the imprisoned Sendero leader Abimael Guzmán in 1993 (which improved his jail conditions in exchange for a call to remaining followers to lay down arms), with MRTA during the Japanese hostage crisis (which was cut short by military attack), and with one of the remaining Sendero factions in 1999 (in a failed attempt to obtain its surrender). What is important to note is that these instances did not constitute a policy to negotiate with armed rebels.

By 1992, the top leaders of both Sendero and the MRTA had been captured, and incidents of terrorism declined dramatically. In 1997, the last MRTA leader, Nestor Cerpa Cartolini, was killed by security forces after holding hostages for four months at the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima.[10] In June 1999, the last active Sendero founder, Oscar Alberto Ramirez Durand ("Comrade Feliciano") was captured, summarily tried, and jailed for life. By the beginning of 2000, the MRTA was defunct, and Sendero was confined to a few territorial pockets in the drug-producing areas in Alto Huallaga and jungle regions in Junín and Ayacucho. The Peruvian population, now freed of the fear of terrorism, has turned to other concerns—crime,

[10] For details on this event, see Federico Prieto Celi, *Rescate en Lima* (Rescue in Lima) (Lima: Realidades, S.A., 1997). One of the official (and often contradictory) versions is Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Rios, "Operación Chavin de Huantar," *Rescate en la Residencia de la Embajada de Japón* ("Operation Chavin de Huantar," Rescue in the Japanese Embassy Residence) (Lima: n.p. [Peruvian intelligence], 1997). I was present in Lima during much of the episode.

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inflation, and freedom of the press. Peru's Marxist-Leninist terrorism outlasted most of its regional counterparts, but is for all practical purposes finished.

Colombia on the Verge

The picture in Colombia could not make a sharper contrast. During 1999, according to the military, 2,465 persons were kidnapped—more than six per day—mostly attributable to the insurgents, for whom ransom is a major and growing source of income. A special thousand-member unit of FARC based near Bogotá specializes exclusively in the taking and keeping of hostages.[11] The total number of Colombian military and police personnel held captive by Marxists reached a staggering 1,632.[12] By comparison, the Colombian military claimed to have killed 1,019 guerrillas and captured 786, and to have confiscated nineteen tons of coca and fourteen tons of heroin.[13] These accomplishments, however, ultimately amount to very little, given that the number of Marxist combatants in Colombia is estimated to be between 17,000 and 20,000, of which perhaps 15,000 belong to FARC, 5,000 to the ELN, and 500 to the EPL.[14] The two larger groups control between them 40 to 60 percent of Colombia's territory and have sufficient strength to launch offensives against major military installations in even the largest cities.

The insurgents are far from united, however. While sharing a general ideology, the three major guerrilla groups are competitors, generally operate in different areas, and seldom cooperate militarily. ELN and FARC, despite their formal membership in the so-called Bolivarian National Coordination Board, are at times deadly enemies. In December 1999, five ELN commanders were shot by FARC in Antioquia, and the latter regularly tries to attract ELN's members and trespass upon the lands it controls.[15]

By 1998, FARC and the Colombian security forces were waging quasi-conventional warfare, with some engagements involving thousands of combatants. The government forces, facing an enemy whose weaponry and communications are often superior, are losing ground and unable to turn the tide. The ratio of regular combat forces to insurgents is close to three to one, whereas the generally accepted minimum needed for a successful counter-

[11] *El Colombiano* (Cali), Sept. 29, 1998.

[12] "Siete personas fueron sequestrados cada dia en Colombia durante 1999, según el Ejército" (Seven persons were kidnapped every day in Colombia during 1999, according to the Army), *El País* (Madrid), Jan. 8, 2000.

[13] "F.M. deben superar su efectividad" (Armed forces must increase their effectiveness), *El Espectador* (Bogotá), Jan. 7, 2000.

[14] Estimates based on reports including: Center for International Policy, "Information about the combatants" (http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm); and the State Department's 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Colombia (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1999-hrp-report/colombia.html).

[15] "Guerra de guerrillas entre Farc y ELN" (Guerrilla warfare between FARC and ELN) and "Choques de frente" (Open clashes), *El Tiempo* (Bogotá), Jan. 9, 2000; "Choques armados entre las guerrillas colombianas" (Armed clashes among Colombian Guerrillas), *ABC* (Madrid), Jan. 11, 2000.

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insurgency campaign is ten to one. As a result, the guerrillas have achieved tactical superiority across a vast area. They are also rich. FARC was estimated to have taken in $350 million in 1998 alone—a sum comparable to any of Colombia's largest enterprises—from extortion, drug trafficking, cattle rustling, kidnapping, and bank robberies.[16]

Tracing the Origins of Success and Defeat

In 2000, the difference between the fortunes of Peru and Colombia is striking. Peru is now enjoying the benefits of relative stability and increasing economic vigor, while Colombia is on the brink of collapse under the joint assault of Marxist guerrillas and drug traffickers. To be sure, the divergent outcomes cannot be reduced to any simple algorithm, but it is clear that the political and military decisions of the governments, the attitude of the population at large, and the tactical and strategic choices made by the insurgents are all significant factors.

There is no question that the Marxist insurgents in both countries enjoyed little popular support. Although opinion polls prior to the capture of Abimael Guzmán in 1992 suggested some sympathy for Sendero's goals, and he has been rated among the most powerful Peruvian political figures, these data indicate Sendero's undeniable impact on the country rather than support for its goals and methods.[17] In Colombia, FARC promised in 1985 to participate in elections under the banner of the Patriotic Union (UP), but the party's best electoral result was a paltry 4.5 percent for its presidential candidate in 1986.[18] If impressions of popular support often indicate otherwise, that is because many academics and journalists have mistaken the guerrillas' military prowess for the backing of the population. It is precisely the matter of political skill, however, that is an important key to FARC's success and Sendero's failure. FARC generally succeeded in infiltrating the legitimate political scene by using legal allies or fronts such as the Colombian Communist Party and the UP, adopting the language of human rights causes, and manipulating some domestic human rights groups (a tactic first used during the mid-1970s by Nicaragua's Marxists). FARC was thus assured of support among a segment of the (mostly rural) population. Similarly, the ELN has long influenced the leadership of some trade unions, particularly in the oil industry. To be sure, such tactics tend to give an exaggerated impression of the

[16] "Los negocios de las Farc" (FARC's businesses), *La Semana* (Bogotá), Mar. 8, 1999.

[17] In 1991, Sendero enjoyed 7 percent "favorable" views in Lima. See Cynthia McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 78. It should also be pointed out that "favorable views" do not equate to active support.

[18] John Coggins and D. S. Lewis, eds., *Political Parties of the Americas and the Caribbean* (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 1992), pp. 97–98. The Unión Patriotica was controlled by the pro-Soviet Communist Party, an old ally of FARC.

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groups' actual political strength because the union leaders' politics are not representative of their members, and the links with insurgents are not openly admitted.

Rather than cultivating pockets of support, Sendero did the opposite, and this decision contributed substantially to its defeat. Abimael Guzmán miscalculated badly when he declared Peru's "legal" Marxist Left an enemy before he had won the military conflict against the government, instead of following Lenin's pattern of forming alliances with others on the Left first and eliminating them later. The murders of prominent local leaders (e.g., Elena Moyano in Lima in 1992) deprived Sendero of important support it would have otherwise enjoyed. At the international level, instead of appealing to the sympathies of human rights groups, Sendero condemned notions dear to them. For example, Alfredo Crespo Bragayrac, leader of the Democratic Lawyers Association, a Sendero front, explicitly disavowed the concept of human rights as a goal: "[W]hat we assume is the defense of the rights of the people. We consider human rights as a bourgeois concept, and people's rights as those won by our people with its struggles, blood and dead. . . ."[19] Through such expressions of contempt for widely accepted legal and moral categories, Sendero isolated itself abroad and at home. Its small support groups in Spain, Sweden, and California never ceased to attack every leftist group not openly dedicated to the form of Maoism known as "Pensamiento Gonzalo" (literally "Gonzalo Thought," after Guzmán's *nom de guerre*).

Sendero's error was especially damaging because the leftist parties held far more political power in Peru than did their counterparts in Colombia. Indeed, in the mid-1980s, the Marxist Alfonso Barrantes was elected mayor of Lima and in 1985 came close to victory in the presidential election against Alan García. After long denying the existence of a Sendero problem (or, as during Barrantes's campaign, advocating negotiations), the Left only joined the state campaign against the guerrillas when it became the main target of their aggression.[20] As a result, Sendero had no broad support in Peruvian civil society. Ultimately, this proved decisive because the resolve to fight terrorism was not forthcoming from the political establishment, which consistently underestimated the challenge confronting the state. But the Peruvian establishment and its mistakes were not so firmly entrenched that they could not be dislodged—which Fujimori, a newcomer to national politics, did in 1990. Sendero itself also pushed the middle classes from relative indifference to active hostility toward the rebels by means of a bombing campaign in the fashionable part of Lima in 1992.

[19] Hernando Calvo and Katlijn Declerq, eds., *Peru, Los Senderos posibles* (Peru, Possible paths) (Tafalla: Txalaparta, Oct. 1994), p. 122.

[20] The Socialist Left's election manifesto in 1990 devoted only two pages (out of 37) to national security, and even those were basically promises for marginal improvements in police and intelligence operations. *Programa de Gobierno de la Izquierda Socialista (Resumen), 1990–1995* (Government Program of the Socialist Left [Summary], 1990–1995) (Lima: n.p., Feb. 1990).

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Colombian politicians seem to have learned nothing from their neighbors to the south. Their insurgents benefited not only from alliances with legitimate political actors, but also from the defeatism of a conservative oligarchy that has failed to wage war decisively against them and even lent them credibility on the national stage. Perhaps nothing encapsulates better one of the main reasons Colombia is losing its war than the following headline in the Bogotá daily *El Tiempo*: "FARC again uses cylinders against civilians: In Santander and Metá civilians, among them two minors, were once again victims of FARC. Meanwhile, in San Vicente del Caguán 'Tirofijo' met with the president of America Online."[21] The American visitors—AOL's Jim Kimsey, and Joe Robert, the founder of a major real estate firm—"invited the guerrillas to their country and offered them support so that they could travel in safety."[22] Such contacts are hardly unique: in 1999, the chairman of the New York Stock Exchange, Richard Grasso, and Congressman William Delahunt (D-Mass.) also visited FARC's headquarters. All of these meetings took place with the *encouragement* of the government in Bogotá. Indeed, Kimsey explicitly stated that prior to his trip he had contacted Victor G. Ricardo, President Andres Pastrana's confidant and high commissioner for peace. And in February 2000, the Pastrana administration underwrote and organized a trip to Western Europe by FARC leaders, ostensibly to have them learn what Grasso, Kimsey, and Robert failed to teach them: the virtues of "democratic capitalism."[23] Instead, the FARC leaders were quite clear that they went abroad in order to reinforce their position.[24]

If the Colombian government and numerous outsiders have failed to appreciate the danger posed by FARC, it is hardly surprising that the mainstream opposition (mostly the Liberal Party) has done no better. Daniel Samper Pizano, a prominent Colombian journalist, brother of former president Ernesto Samper, and a Liberal stalwart, had only criticism for President Pastrana's "Plan Colombia," the request for U.S. aid: "We all know it—Plan Colombia is a war proposal, intended to settle a problem that could only be truly corrected with economic, social, and peaceful solutions." He went on to suggest that the proposed $1.6 billion in U.S. assistance be distributed among the FARC and ELN guerrillas "in exchange for their laying down arms and

[21] Carlos Julio Martinez, "Cilindros de Farc contra civiles: En Santander and Metá, los civiles, entre ellos dos menores, fueron otra vez victimas del Farc. Mientras tanto, en san Vicente del Caguán 'Tirofijo' se reunió con el presidente de America online," *El Tiempo*, Mar. 4, 2000. Catapulting butane cylinders indiscriminately against civilian and police targets is a common FARC tactic. "Tirofijo" is the *nom de guerre* of FARC's supreme leader and founder, Manuel Marulanda Velez.

[22] Milton Diaz, "Wall Street sigue en coqueteos con el Caguán" (Wall Street continues to flirt with Caguán), *El Tiempo*, Mar. 4, 2000. Both American businessmen were described as "friends of Bill Clinton."

[23] "Colombian rebels visit Scandinavia," *Washington Post*, Feb. 3, 2000; and Alejandro Clabbs, "Clase de Historia para la paz" (History class for peace), *El Espectador*, Feb. 4, 2000.

[24] "Los guerrilleros colombianos llegan a España para reforzar su posición politica" (Colombian Guerrillas arrived in Spain to reinforce their political position), *El País*, Feb. 21, 2000.

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dedicating themselves to peace, which would deactivate the paramilitaries."[25] That, as it happens, is precisely FARC's propaganda theme: the insurgency is legitimated by economic and social problems and will not cease until those grievances are corrected. As Raúl Reyes, FARC's top negotiator, told an interviewer in Spain, "[P]eace will come when people cease to suffer of hunger, when they have jobs, when they are not killed, when they have guarantees to think differently, so that those who dissent are not assassinated or have to exile themselves."[26] He did not mention that for forty years his organization has murdered its political opponents, intimidated and kidnapped journalists, and destroyed economic targets.

But the respectability conferred upon FARC by its international contacts and de facto recognition by Bogotá was hardly proof that the terrorists had turned over a new leaf. To the contrary, they admitted killing three Indian-rights activists in February 1999, and even "declared war on the United States."[27] And if the visiting Americans sought to persuade FARC of the virtues of democracy, Reyes, for one, was unconvinced. In his interview in Spain, he made it clear that "we are revolutionaries, not electoralists," and that the guerrillas intend to dispute the power of the traditional parties "in the streets and plazas," not at the ballot box.[28]

As for FARC's remedies to the ills plaguing Colombia, a hint was evident in FARC's demand, made in discussions with the government on economic policy, that half of the national budget be spent on social welfare—employment, housing, health, wages, education, and recreation.[29] But details aside, the very fact that the elected president held talks with terrorists about such matters as the employment policies of his own administration is indicative of the degree to which Bogotá has given up any pretense of controlling the agenda.

At heart, a major part of the problem is that Pastrana, the rest of the establishment, and most of the media underestimate the threat to their country. Pastrana managed to give an hour-long interview on American television without once mentioning the words "communism" or "Marxism," and made the same omission in an opinion piece in *El País*, probably the most widely read Spanish language newspaper in the world.[30] Victor Ricardo,

[25] Daniel Samper Pizano, "Cambalache. No es un plan: es una guerra" (Exchange: It is not a plan, it is a war), *El Tiempo*, Mar. 10, 2000.

[26] Alfredo Molano, "Raúl Reyes—comandante de las Farc: La paz en Colombia vendrá quando la gente tenga empleo" (Raúl Reyes, commander of FARC: Peace in Colombia will arrive when people have jobs), *El País*, Mar. 2, 2000.

[27] The quotation is from Reyes, in response to Plan Colombia. See "Rebelión" (http://www.eurosur.org/rebelion/internacional/farcgueah.htm).

[28] Molano, "Raúl Reyes."

[29] "Desempleo será el primer tema" (Unemployment will be the first topic), *El Espectador*, Mar. 2, 2000.

[30] Andrés Pastrana, "El Plan Colombia," *El País*, Feb. 21, 2000.

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the government's peace negotiator, thinks that "FARC are a peasant guerrilla movement."[31]

His government and many elites also appear ambivalent about communism, as demonstrated by the reactions to the death in March 2000 of Gilberto Vieira White, the secretary general of the Colombian Communist Party between 1947 and 1990. In the early 1990s, Vieira stated, "I am a communist, will die a communist, and socialism is the future of the world," and reacted to the collapse of the European communism by saying, "I am re-reading my Marxist library to see where the error was." He admired Stalin, lived in Mao's China, and was instrumental in the formation of FARC, which he also controlled until the late 1970s. Pastrana's own government called him "the symbol for many who saw in him a talented statesman who fought to his last days for his political ideals, using democratic channels."[32] Colombian media from across the political spectrum eulogized him as a "good citizen" and "gentleman," apparently overlooking his ties to a group threatening to overthrow the state.[33]

Certainly, a strong current of defeatism—or, at the very least, an unwillingness to confront the real problem directly—runs through the Colombian elites as well. The case of Francisco Santos, a member of one of Colombia's wealthiest families and editor of *El Tiempo*, is instructive. He recently decided to leave the country, and in a moving address to his readers avoided any mention of the reason for his self-imposed exile. His newspaper, however, made it clear that a notorious FARC expert on kidnapping planned to murder him for organizing a peace march in 1999.[34] Santos's own notion of peace included criticism of FARC atrocities, and his newspaper has been more critical of the government's capitulationist approach than most other Colombian media outlets.

A strong current of defeatism runs through the Colombian elites.

The lack of resolve pervading the Colombian establishment became crystal clear in 1998, when FARC actually *supported* Pastrana's presidential campaign because he offered more concessions than his opponent. But his electoral victory also suggests that the Colombian populace bears a heavy responsibility for thinking that peace could be reached by surrender rather than struggle. In October 1999, millions of Colombians demonstrated in favor of peace, proving that they are ready to countenance defeat in order to see

[31] Victor Ricardo, "Peace for Colombia: A Great Alliance against Crime" (http://www.igc.org/colhrnet/newsletter/y1999/winter99art/victorr.htm).

[32] "El último camarada" (The last comrade), *La Semana*, Mar. 5, 2000.

[33] "El muro que nunca cayó" (The wall that never fell), *Cambio* (Bogotá), Mar. 6, 2000; Gustavo Vasco, "Gilberto Vieira, un intellectual marxista," *El Espectador*, Mar. 2, 2000; Hernando Corral, "Testimonio. Vieira: comunismo y Farc" (Testimony: communism and FARC), *El Tiempo*, Feb. 29, 2000.

[34] Francisco Santos Calderón, "Porque me voy" (Why I am leaving), *El Tiempo*, Mar. 12, 2000. Santos was also held hostage for nearly seven months in 1988 by drug trafficker Pablo Escobar.

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the war ended, no matter the cost.[35] The Colombian elites and electorate have failed to realize that in this war, their country's democracy is under a deadly threat, and that the solution must be unambiguous victory rather than surrender.[36]

If the rebels' shrewd politics, support from within society for their movement, and defeatism among broad segments of the population all played roles in the insurgents' success, Colombia's *coup de grâce* may have been delivered by Pastrana himself, for his first decision upon being elected in 1998 was a strategic blunder of gross proportions. He ordered the withdrawal of all police, troops, and even civilian administrators from five counties in central Colombia—an area the size of El Salvador—in effect conceding it to FARC. This "demilitarized zone" was supposed to be a haven for insurgents during negotiations with the government. Instead, predictably, it became a state within a state, with its own police, courts, and administration. From this large and secure base, the guerrillas launched attacks in other regions and established new coca plantations.

Unsurprisingly, once the ELN perceived the advantages FARC enjoyed as a result of the demilitarized zone, it sought similar treatment—specifically, four counties in the south of the Bolivar department. That area, particularly the San Lucas mountains, had long been the ELN's logistical center and emotional stronghold. But there were important differences from the region abandoned to FARC. Whereas in the largest of its five counties FARC already had some control and considerable influence even before the government relinquished it, the ELN had been expelled from San Lucas by the anticommunist paramilitaries of the United Self-Defense of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—AUC) during fighting in 1998–99. The AUC leader Carlos Castaño made it clear that, regardless of the government's decision, his organization would not allow the ELN to take over the area. Furthermore, local mayors and the governor of the Bolivar state all opposed demilitarization and let Bogotá know it. The president's response was to accuse the governor of being an "enemy of peace."[37]

Military effectiveness has been curtailed in other ways as well. In 1998, when General Harold Bedoya, commander of the armed forces, challenged the government's anemic approach to the rebels, he was dismissed. Additionally, the government has decided to destroy its landmines. In some contexts that may be a laudable decision, but when the ELN has been staging regular attacks against oil pipelines that security forces are patently incapable

[35] "Doce millones de personas se lanzan a las calles para pedir la paz" (Twelve million people march on the streets to demand peace), *El Nuevo Herald* (Miami), Oct. 25, 1999.

[36] One of the best recent analyses of the Colombian situation and the U.S. role is Tom Marks, "Slip, Stumble and Fall: U.S. gears-up for war in Colombia," *Soldier of Fortune*, Apr. 2000, pp. 54–57.

[37] For an excellent analysis of the issue, see "El otro desp.·je. El ELN quiere el despeje en el sur de Bolivar pero Carlos Castaño se opone" (The other demilitarization: ELN wants demilitarization in the south of Bolivar but Castaño is opposed), *La Semana*, Jan. 9, 2000.

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of protecting, it will lead to severe economic losses. Finally, by constitutional amendment (enacted after a deal with Marxist groups in the early 1990s), some 16,000 high school graduates are exempt from military service in counterinsurgency operations, thereby depriving the armed forces of much-needed strength. Instead, it is the FARC, ELN, and EPL—and the AUC fighting against them—that still show signs of strength and resolve.

The People Armed

It is certainly ironic, but the Marxists may have had a point after all. Ultimately, it will be "the people" who decide the outcome of wars such as those in Peru and Colombia, although that term may not encompass the revolutionaries who claim to fight in their name. Since the 1950s, the experiences of the Philippines, Malaya, Thailand, Guatemala, Oman, and Peru have demonstrated that governments invariably win when they have the courage and skill to mobilize their populations against guerrillas. Peru and Colombia provide vivid demonstrations of what happens when a government is prepared to do what it takes to win—or when it is not.[38] After Fujimori's election in 1990, he armed the Peruvian population, and Peru won the war against Sendero. Bogotá went in the opposite direction. The government disarmed the population and made criminals of those who defended themselves, even as it welcomed terrorists to the negotiating table.

In the Peru of the early 1990s, huge swaths of the national territory were denied any government presence, let alone control. Terrorism was so pervasive in Lima itself that nobody felt safe—not leftists assassinated in their houses, not prominent military officials murdered by the MRTA, not the previously aloof middle classes who found that their apparently submissive maids were actually Senderistas with machine guns under their beds. The military was incapable of stopping Sendero's descent into the cities. In January 1990, General Howard Rodriguez, just returned from a quasi-dictatorial position as political and military leader in Ayacucho, rejected the very notion of arming civilians.[39]

Yet only a few months later, following Fujimori's election, Rodriguez and his fellow generals began supporting village self-defense units—the *rondas campesinas*—which blended peasant self-defense, military training, and the limited provision of arms to civilians willing to resist Sendero pres-

[38] See, for instance, Carlos E. Salgar, "La carencia del sentido territorial de Colombia" (Colombia's lack of territorial sentiment), *El Espectador*, Feb. 22, 2000. See also Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlot, eds., *Armed Forces and Modern Counterinsurgency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); on Rhodesia, see J. K. Cilliers, *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

[39] Personal interview, Lima, Jan. 10, 1990.

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sures, atrocities, and forced recruitment.[40] This strategy was based on long-extant groups. In the northern department of Cajamarca, peasant vigilantes (long known as *rondas*) had targeted cattle rustlers for decades. In the central jungle areas of Junín and particularly in the Satipo province, native Ashaninka Indians, victimized first by the MRTA and then by Sendero, had also organized resistance movements on their own.[41] Nor was Peru a unique case: peasants in Colombia, Mexico, and Guatemala organized themselves—in the absence of effective administration by the state—according to community rules and enforced their own "laws." To its credit, the Peruvian government recognized the advantage of arming, training, and maintaining military control over these peasants' natural self-interests. In 1991, the government decreed that each *ronda* had to be authorized by the Joint Command of the armed forces and "operate under the control of the respective Military Commands."[42] That policy did spark opposition, of course, from leftists whose interest was not in a government victory, Catholic prelates worried about even more bloodshed, conservative officers, and international human rights groups. But the government had only two choices—coopt the peasants or lose the war against the rebels. By 1991, the self-defense groups served as a major obstacle to Sendero advances in the countryside. The Ashaninkas permanently eliminated MRTA's presence, and Cajamarca never became a favorable area for Sendero. But it was in Ayacucho, Guzmán's original staging point, that the *rondas* made the greatest difference. Traveling through that department at the beginning of 1999, I witnessed first-hand the high level of security, despite the almost total absence of the military.[43] To be sure, some of the armed groups also took the opportunity to abuse their power. *Rondas* in the Apurimac Valley used their weapons and legal status not only to eliminate the terrorists' local presence, but also to engage in drug trafficking once Sendero was unable to impose its own "tax." On balance, however, their transgressions must be weighed against the progress made in defeating Sendero.

In contrast to Peru's relative success, Colombia again was a failure. The administration of César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–94) legalized self-defense groups known as CONVIVIR, but the military never controlled, armed, or trained them at a level sufficient for them to become effective counterinsur-

[40] An excellent and thorough analysis of the *rondas*' role in defeating the PCP-SL, albeit one trying to deny Fujimori's decisive role in making that success possible, is to be found in Carlos Iván Degregori et al., *Las rondas campesinas y la derrota de Sendero Luminoso* (Rondas campesinas and the defeat of Sendero Luminoso) (Lima: IEP Ediciones, Feb. 1996).

[41] For a history of the Ashaninkas' fight against the MRTA and Sendero, see Friar Mariano, with Marilyn Hoffer, *Warriors in Eden* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1993).

[42] Quoted by Orin Starn, "Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central–South Andes," in *Shining and Other Paths*, ed. Steve J. Stern (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 241.

[43] Personal observations in Ayacucho and Vilcashuaman, Jan. 1999. For an analysis of the activities and impact of the *rondas* in Ayacucho, see Carlos Iván Degregori, "Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho," in *Shining and Other Paths*, pp. 128–57.

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gent forces.[44] More importantly, they lacked the support of the political leadership. In 1999, the Pastrana administration allowed the legislature to dismantle the groups, which in any case had already grown weak and ineffective. As a result, the ranks of the AUC swelled as CONVIVIR members joined them.

While communist activity throughout most of the hinterland increased dramatically, the Colombian government's hostility to the population's right to self-defense and its obvious inability to provide protection itself led to a loss of state control over resistance to the insurgents. Innumerable rural Colombian communities with no hope of even minimal government support formed independent paramilitary organizations. The AUC emerged with a nationwide structure, strategy, and, yes, a web site.[45] Carlos Castaño proved to be a talented political organizer and military strategist, and the AUC's membership—conservatively estimated to be between 5,000 and 7,000—became a potent counterinsurgent force.[46] Instead of making use of the organization, however, the government in Bogotá, because of concerns about human rights violations, outlawed it, forcing the beleaguered military to open up another front to curtail it.

The AUC membership, to be sure, includes criminals, and some of the disparate groups filling its ranks pursue legitimate interests, while others have more unseemly agendas. Among them are local groups of peasants who reject FARC/ELN social and economic policies, cattlemen and rural business owners victimized by the costs of the war, and drug traffickers resentful of the guerrillas' "taxes" on their profits. Equally indisputable are crimes committed by the AUC, including drug trafficking that it has even admitted.[47] More serious are AUC massacres of innocent civilians suspected of being insurgent sympathizers or militants. The pattern is always the same: paramilitary members enter villages with lists of Marxist sympathizers or recruiters and they murder them. This tactic, however, is also used by FARC and ELN.

Contrary to the widely held position of human rights advocates, the AUC is not part of the problem, but a *result* of the state's failure to maintain law, order, and its own credibility.[48] It should come as no surprise that some military commanders view the paramilitaries as allies—although they do so at peril of criminal prosecution—for the AUC does not seek to overthrow the

[44] For a different treatment of the issue, see Human Rights Watch, *War without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law* (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 1998), pp. 85–99. CONVIVIR was the name of the Services of Private Vigilance and Security (Servicios de Vigilancia y Securidad Privada).

[45] Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (http://www.colombialibre.org).

[46] See note 14 above. Carlos Castaño himself, in his only television interview (Mar. 4, 2000), claimed 11,200 members for the AUC. The reality may be close to this estimate, considering the group's territorial range of operations and military success.

[47] "Castaño puso a hablar al pais" (Castaño started to talk to the country), *El Tiempo*, Mar. 3, 2000.

[48] Human Rights Watch, Colombia, *The Ties that Blind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links*, Jan. 2000 (http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/2000/colombia/). That report was made public at the very time the U.S. Congress was considering aid to Colombia, and was used in the State Department's human rights report mentioned above.

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government, eliminate democracy or free markets, or make kidnapping an acceptable form of fundraising (as the ELN openly claims to have a right to do).[49] The paramilitaries have also been effective in the field, having done more than the army to weaken the ELN and FARC in crucial regions of Bolivar and Cordoba states, the Middle Magdalena River valley, and the Panamanian border.

It is a paradoxical and even difficult truth, but Peru's experience shows that the legalization and military control of the *rondas* actually helped *reduce* human rights violations. Bogotá's policy of criminalizing the AUC and dismantling the CONVIVIR increased criminality while lowering the morale of the overextended state forces. Combating the paramilitaries when the guerrillas have yet to be defeated will ultimately benefit the enemies of the Colombian state.

Conclusions

On February 6, 1999, speaking at the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, Peruvian president Fujimori stated that Colombia's guerrillas and their links to the narcotics trade were a regional threat. He then undiplomatically offered his opinion on the peace negotiations in that country: "We can't imagine what kind of concessions a state could offer to obtain peace with those who want to destroy it."[50] He was right, although his comments were bitterly criticized in Colombia. Fujimori's government, whatever its other sins, decided from the start to concentrate on defeating Marxist terrorism, and it was ruthless—but successful. Peru's victory, moreover, was achieved with minimal U.S. economic or military aid, but with the overwhelming support of the Peruvian population, as demonstrated by Fujimori's consistently high levels of approval in opinion polls and his landslide reelection in 1995.[51] Only after the Marxist threat was eliminated could Peru address the problem of drug trafficking, whereupon it was able to reduce the area under coca cultivation by half. The political cost of Peru's success was the virtual destruction of its traditional party system, which proved unable to cope with the threat to the state.

In Colombia, by contrast, the political establishment has made concession after concession for almost two decades. It tried—and failed—to negotiate its way out of the civil war and is now obliged to ask for massive outside military and financial aid. At the same time, it has also become the world's largest coca producer. Instead of learning from Peru's experience, the

[49] In May 1996 the ELN Central Command stated: "ELN considers it permissible to impose war taxes and detain persons who have not paid them, as a form of pressure." *Que es humanizar el conflicto colombiano* (What it means to humanize the conflict in Colombia) (http://www.voces.org.ddhh/queeshu.htm).

[50] Quoted in *Miami Herald*, Feb. 9, 1999.

[51] At press time, Fujimori had narrowly failed to win an outright majority in a first-round vote that would have given him an unprecedented third term in office. He won the runoff after Alejandro Toledo withdrew, protesting an unfair election.

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Colombian establishment seems bent on the destruction of the state. Rather than focusing on defeating the Marxist insurgencies that pose the greatest threat, it offers them further concessions, opens a new military front against the organizations that might, in the short term, be useful allies, and pretends that the drug problem can somehow be separated from the rebellion. Worse still, these futile pirouettes receive the active support of the United States.

All this raises the question of what the United States could or should do regarding Colombia. A few issues are clear. For one, considering Colombia's dominant role in world production of cocaine and the export of heroin to the United States, domestic reasons alone would prevent a policy of neglect. Moreover, Colombia's dysfunctional institutions and inability to protect its borders or its citizens also suggest that neglect is out of the question. Its failure has already directly affected the security of Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. (Brazil and Peru are somewhat insulated from the turmoil by the largely impenetrable nature of their border areas.)

On the other hand, massive U.S. military aid to Colombia is unlikely to be effective so long as Bogotá's political elites lack the will and courage to pursue a policy leading to victory. Nor is aid to the police likely to produce results in the fight against drug production and trafficking when the government has lost control over so much territory. Economic aid to a country whose economy is severely harmed by insurgents is costly to taxpayers and holds no hope of success.

In the short term, the United States could probably be most effective by providing military support to Colombia's neighbors in order to contain the war, and by sending helicopters, communications equipment, and intelligence to the Colombian military. More important—and less expensive—forms of aid are political. Above all, Washington must finally understand that the primary problems in Colombia are FARC and the ELN, and that no solution to the drug problem is possible while the insurgents operate at will. The lessons of Peru should be heeded. First, Washington must cease to pressure Bogotá to give priority to narcotics control rather than counterinsurgency. Secondly, the United States (and especially Congress) should understand that unrealistic and occasionally absurd human rights demands are paralyzing the Colombian military. In the midst of a war for national survival, and absent a functioning justice system, that approach can only lead to defeat—and far worse abuses by victorious insurgents. A third, and related, point is that forcing the Colombian state to engage the paramilitaries in yet another war only helps the rebels. Washington should instead encourage Bogotá to reorganize, discipline, and strengthen those natural allies of the state in its ongoing civil war.

Ultimately, the best that Washington can do is to state unequivocally that U.S. aid cannot truly help Colombia until Colombians themselves abandon their futile "peace at all costs" approach.

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Latin American Challenges

The U.S. Stake in Mexico's Political Battle

by George W. Grayson

The campaign leading to Mexico's mid-2000 presidential election has stirred up whitecaps on the surface of U.S.-Mexican relations.[1] In September 1999, the Mexican government unceremoniously returned seventy-two helicopters that the Pentagon had sent to the Mexican army three years earlier to combat drug trafficking. Mexican officials privately scorned the Vietnam War–era aircraft as "junk" and groused about the difficulty of keeping the choppers aloft. Mexico's stridently nationalistic foreign secretary, Rosario Green, emphasized that her country was prepared to fight narco-criminals without U.S. equipment or logistical support.[2]

Three months later, Green sought to deflect criticism of alleged detentions, disappearances, torture, and rapes committed by Mexico's armed forces as they engaged the Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional—EZLN) in the poverty-ridden state of Chiapas. She persuaded United Nations human rights commissioner Mary Robinson to spend part of her five-day stay in Mexico at the U.S.-Mexican border. There, the U.N. official observed a mile-long row of five-foot-high crosses erected by a California foundation to depict the several hundred Mexicans who died attempting to cross the frontier illegally. Robinson appeared indifferent to the fact that the deaths resulted from flagrant law-breaking and that the U.S. Border Patrol had rescued 1,042 stranded migrants. She further observed that "Operation Gatekeeper," designed to obstruct unlawful entry

[1] The author thanks the following individuals for invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this article: Oscar Aguilar Asencio, David Simcox, Roger L. Conner, Otis L. Graham Jr., David L. Morrill, Anne Shepherd, and Aaron Rosenberg.

[2] "Mexico Snubs U.S. on Drug-War Gear," *International Herald Tribune*, Nov. 12, 1999 (http://www.iht.com).

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into the United States, was "deflecting people [from normal routes], at risk to their lives, when they decide to immigrate."[3] She subsequently dispatched a letter to the U.S. State Department lambasting the American program.

The most virulent anti-Americanism burst forth, however, when Attorney General Jorge Madrazo Cuellar invited several dozen FBI experts to investigate a possible mass grave twenty miles south of the Rio Grande. In recent years, approximately 200 people, including twenty-two Americans, have disappeared near Ciudad Juárez, the sister city of El Paso, Texas, and home of the infamously venal Juárez drug cartel. Although the U.S. law-enforcement personnel acted professionally in conducting the grisly tasks of exhuming and identifying bodies, scores of pundits and politicians excoriated Madrazo's kowtowing to Uncle Sam. Colegio de México professor Lorenzo Meyer compared the late-1999 event with the Mexican-American War of 1846 and General John "Black Jack" Pershing's 1916 punitive expedition to capture Pancho Villa following the latter's raid on Columbus, New Mexico. "In the three cases," Meyer argued, "American military and political officials justified their action . . . because Mexican authorities could not handle illegal acts along the border, even as Washington declared its respect for Mexican sovereignty."[4] Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, presidential candidate of the leftist-nationalist Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido de la Revolución Democrática—PRD), thundered, "We don't require any direct intervention from any police force anywhere." To this charge, Madrazo angrily responded: "I'm not selling out any country. Cooperation does not harm sovereignty. What hurts it is drug trafficking."[5] Detractors sharpened their criticism of Madrazo and the FBI when they discovered the remains of only nine humans, two dogs, and a drug-processing laboratory.

Meanwhile, several Zapatista guerrillas showed up at the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to condemn that body as a weapon used by international capitalism to exploit defenseless have-nots. Back in Mexico, striking university students burned the American flag and hurled stones at the U.S. embassy to protest Mexico's integration into the world economy. "We're unhappy with everything that's happening on a global level," said a 28-year-old architecture student in mid-December. "We want ours to be a university of the people, and they want to turn us into technocrats."[6]

Mexico has also endured its share of barbs from American sources.

[3] Quoted in Mark Stevenson, "Top U.N. Human Rights Official Blasts U.S. Border Policy on Mexico," Associated Press, Nov. 28, 1999 (www.ap.org/index.html).

[4] Lorenzo Meyer, "Agenda ciudadana/la nueva expedition punitiva" (Citizen's agenda/the new punitive expedition), *Reforma*, Dec. 16, 1999 (http://www.reforma.infosel.com).

[5] Quoted in "U.S. Agents Assist Mexican Officials in Probe of Graves," *Washington Times*, Dec. 6, 1999 (http://www.washtimes.com).

[6] Niko Price, "Marchers Burn Flag before U.S. Embassy, But No Repeat of Violence," Associated Press, Dec. 16, 1999.

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Former Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) director Thomas Constantine complained of Mexico's unwillingness to imprison drug traffickers. "Nobody ever gets arrested, so they are operating virtually in a sanctuary," he said. "If it turns out now that none of the leading figures are arrested for these [Ciudad Juárez] murders, all that will happen is these traffickers will be all the more powerful."[7] At the same time, landowners from southern Texas and Arizona castigated state and federal officials for failing to curb the "flood" of illegal Mexicans onto their property, describing the Border Patrol as "nothing more than a speed bump for these people."[8] Meanwhile, the Federation for American Immigration Reform and other organizations concerned about the inability to assimilate millions of immigrants decried the adoption of Spanish as the official language in El Cenizo, a squalid Texas border community of 1,700 residents. "We have long predicted that this sort of thing would happen," observed Tim Schultze of US English, a nonprofit organization that lobbies to make English the official language of the United States. "We predicted we would have a dropping out, a linguistic 'ghetto-ization' of the country. We did not think it would happen this soon."[9]

Had Presidents Ernesto Zedillo and Bill Clinton been able to meet as planned in late 1999, they might have shifted attention from these contretemps to key areas of mutual benefit and cooperation. White House scheduling conflicts prevented Zedillo's visiting the White House in conjunction with an early October trip to Canada. Two months later, the Mexican Congress refused to grant him permission to fly to Washington unless he endorsed budget items he found objectionable. Concerned that the media would have inflamed the "narco-grave" issue, some Mexican diplomats were delighted that budget squabbles blocked Zedillo's projected December 9 session with his American counterpart.

Despite an avalanche of newspaper and television reports about the northward flow of narcotics and immigrants from Mexico, Zedillo took several important steps to improve his country's image in the United States. First, he renounced the *dedazo* practice, whereby the chief executive handpicks the presidential nominee of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional—PRI), in favor of an open primary. Secondly, he pursued sound fiscal and monetary policies that cut inflation to 12.3 percent, accumulated $32 billion in hard-currency reserves, and spurred 3.7 percent GDP growth in 1999. To "armor" their nation against the kind of economic upheavals that accompanied the last four transfers of power, Mexico's Finance Ministry and central bank negotiated $23.7 billion in

[7] Michelle Mittelstadt, "Mass Graves in Mexico May Factor in Decertification Debate in Congress," Associated Press, Dec. 6, 1999.

[8] Sam Dillon, "Border 'Nothing but a Speed Bump,'" *New York Times*, Jan. 24, 2000.

[9] Damian Whiteworth, "Texas Town Banks English, Makes Spanish Official," *Calgary Herald*, Aug. 15, 1999 (http://www.calgaryherald.com).

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stand-by credits with international lending agencies. Thirdly, at the Ibero-American Summit held in Havana in mid-November 1999, Zedillo publicly (and in the presence of Fidel Castro) called for a democratic opening in Cuba—a statement bound to win points in Washington because Mexico has long served as an apologist for the Castro regime. Finally, in early spring 2000, Mexican energy secretary Luis Téllez Kuenzler strongly urged oil exporters to increase production lest soaring energy prices destabilize the international petroleum market and chill growth in the United States and other Mexican commercial partners.

Occasional irritants and long-standing sources of tension between Mexico and the United States aside, three predictions can safely be made. First, political dynamics in both countries militate against bilateral clashes this year. Secondly, substantially greater integration of the two economies will occur regardless of who becomes the next chief executive in each country. Thirdly, illegal flows of narcotics and migrants from Mexico will continue to threaten U.S. vital interests in the next century.

Political Dynamics

Like the Mexicans, citizens of the United States will elect a new president in 2000. Since the 1980s, Democratic presidential aspirants have courted and cosseted Chicano voters by symbolic acts and appeals.[10] Candidates have made highly publicized visits to Mexico City, hobnobbed with Mexican American leaders, and vowed to place some of them in top political posts. They have also munched tacos before television cameras and inflicted phrases in fractured Spanish on border-state audiences.

This year's Democratic contenders had more impressive pro-Mexico credentials than most of their predecessors. Apprehensive that they might alienate trade-union and environmental voters, neither Al Gore nor the Clinton White House has raised the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a campaign issue. By effectively countering the opposition of Reform Party candidate H. Ross Perot in a 1993 televised debate, the vice president struck a resounding blow on behalf of the trade pact. Yet, in the Democratic primaries, he homed in on noncommercial themes. As part of his "*Ganamos con Gore*" ("Win with Gore") effort directed at Hispanic Americans, he has stressed several Clinton administration achievements: a $480 million program to help Hispanic students prepare for and remain in school; $2.5 billion in Small Business Administration loans to Hispanic businesses; and disaster relief to Central American towns devastated by hurricanes. In addition, the vice president's entourage has floated the name of Secretary of

[10] I use the terms Chicano and Mexican American interchangeably; "Latino" and "Hispanic American" refer to individuals who trace their roots to any Latin American nation. "Tejano" is Spanish for Texan.

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Energy Bill Richardson, whose mother was born in Mexico, as a possible running mate should Gore capture the nomination.[11]

While less visible than Gore in the NAFTA struggle, Bill Bradley worked tirelessly behind the scenes to round up votes for the controversial accord in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Before bowing out of the contest in March, Bradley actively solicited Hispanic American endorsements, making inroads with some Tejano Democrats. "The question is not 'Is Gore a good guy?' but 'Who is best for the country?'" volunteered Gus Garcia of Austin after meeting with the former New Jersey senator.[12]

Of course, all prominent Democrats, concerned as they are about losing support from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and West Coast environmentalists, have justified delaying the transport provisions of NAFTA, which were scheduled to take effect on December 1, 1995, and would permit Mexican truckers to ship cargoes throughout the United States on their own rigs.

Although generally supportive of productive ties with Mexico, GOP presidential candidates have traditionally shied away from attempting to ingratiate themselves with Chicano voters. Indeed, over the years, several prominent Republicans have earned reputations as Mexico-bashers. In 1986, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) chaired dramatic hearings in which he highlighted the ballot-box stuffing, corruption, and drug crimes that pervaded Mexico. The same year, Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo.) achieved passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, aimed at reducing the influx of illegal aliens. And in the 1990s, California governor Pete Wilson backed Propositions 187 and 209 and other measures to deny most educational, health, and social welfare benefits to unlawful immigrants and their families, as well as to curb bilingual education and affirmative action.

These Wilson-backed ventures galvanized Latino activists, who encouraged members of their community to become citizens and cast ballots. As a result, Democrat Gray Davis collected the lion's share of Hispanic American votes in trouncing his Republican opponent for the statehouse in 1998. Nationally, the Democrats depicted Republicans as "anti-immigrant" and "anti-Latino," with the result that the Democratic share of the Hispanic American presidential vote shot up from 61 percent in 1988 to 69 percent in 1992 to 72 percent in 1996.[13] This trend convinced former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich that his party must extend a friendly hand rather than a balled fist to Hispanic Americans and other minorities. GOP National Committee chairman Jim Nicholson agreed. "We Republicans intend to work

[11] Kalpana Srinivasan, "Gore, McCain Seek Support from Latino Community," Associated Press, Feb. 24, 1999; "More than 80 New York Hispanic Leaders Back Gore," Associated Press, Sept. 15, 1999; and "Top Hispanic Eyed as Gore Running Mate," *Daily News* (New York), Sept. 27, 1999 (http://nydailynews.com).

[12] Mike Crissey, "Bradley Courts Hispanic Democrats in San Antonio," Associated Press, Sept. 26, 1999.

[13] Scott Lindlaw, "Bush Makes Aggressive Pitch for Nation's Fastest-Growing Ethnic Group," Associated Press, June 28, 1999.

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for the Hispanic vote," he averred. "We will stress that Republicans share the same values, like faith, family and freedom, and we will work with candidates all over the United States, from the courthouse to the White House."[14] This reassessment, combined with unparalleled prosperity, has led most Republican officials to join Democrats in preaching the gospel of inclusiveness while downplaying the economic, social, and political strains that unprecedented levels of immigration place on the United States. Nonetheless, while Democrats tend to treat Latinos as poor relations who deserve a hand up through affirmative action and public aid, Republicans are more likely to focus on Hispanic American business groups and stress the need for economic opportunities so that Latinos can become self-reliant.

In 2000, the chief Republican aspirants for the White House, Texas governor George W. Bush and Senator John McCain of Arizona, struck this note by assiduously strengthening contacts with Mexican officeholders and overtly soliciting the support of Chicano groups. As border-state denizens, both men back NAFTA, understand the importance of harmony between the neighboring countries, and covet the blessing of Mexican Americans. Texas shares a 1,248-mile border with Mexico, and as chief executive of the Lone Star State, Bush named Mexican Americans to important posts, including secretary of state. Bush attended Zedillo's inauguration, has visited Mexico frequently since then, and delights in a Mexican-born family member (sister-in-law Columba is married to Florida governor Jeb Bush, and one of the couple's two sons lives in Mexico). And the Texas governor, a Spanish speaker, also appointed Representative Henry Bonilla (R-Tex.), the first Republican Mexican American elected to the House of Representatives, to his presidential exploratory committee. This background helps to account for Bush's garnering almost a quarter of the Chicano vote in his 1995 gubernatorial triumph and 39 to 49 percent in his 1999 reelection.[15]

Mexican Americans display mixed emotions toward Mexico.

Not to be outdone, McCain has won more than half of the Hispanic vote in his last two senatorial elections. "Their support is my honor," the senator told a GOP convention in February 1999.[16] Upon receiving an award from the League of United Latin American Citizens, a national Hispanic American organization, McCain underlined his support for "English plus," pointing out that Spanish was spoken before English in Arizona. No one "should have to abandon the language of their birth to learn the language of

[14] Steve DiMeglio, "Latino Voters Growing in Numbers, Clout," Gannett News Service, Sept. 20, 1999 (http://gannett.com).

[15] The percentage varied between exit polls; see Lindlaw, "Bush Makes Aggressive Pitch."

[16] Ibid.

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their future," he declared. "We don't need laws that cause any American to believe we scorn their contributions to our culture."[17]

Many Mexican American citizens display mixed emotions toward Mexico. Generally speaking, they remember the governing PRI as an authoritarian party suffused with graft and venality, whose leaders demeaned them with the epithet *pocho*, which refers to a low-status individual who has abandoned his homeland, lost many of his Mexican roots, and speaks "Spanglish"—without being assimilated in the United States. Thus, average Chicanos pay scant attention to Mexican politics because of the challenges of earning a living, educating their children, and coping with the problems of daily life. Consequently, Mexican officials have made little headway in fostering a Chicano political presence in the United States that would lobby for Mexico's interests the way that Jewish and Greek organizations back policies important to Israel and Greece. Indeed, many Hispanic Americans, accustomed to driving to Mexico for the Christmas holiday, helped force the Zedillo administration to jettison plans to require a $400 to $800 deposit on American automobiles entering Mexico. Officials had devised this scheme to thwart the illegal, untaxed sale of American-owned vehicles south of the border.

Rank-and-file Hispanic American voters, especially those who trace their roots to Cuba, Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico, evince little knowledge of, or interest in, U.S. dealings with Mexico. In contrast, Chicano political elites pay ever more attention to bilateral affairs as a means to enhance their own potential power. As manifested in their anger over Propositions 187 and 209 in California, they will reward public officials deemed supportive of Mexico's position, penalize those they see as opposed, and zero in on ethnic issues to strengthen their political bases. Democratic and Republican contenders alike realize that four states rich in Latino American citizens—California, Texas, New York, and Florida—account for 144 of the 270 electoral votes required to enter the Oval Office. "That's a 900-pound gorilla," noted Leslie Goodman, a Republican consultant volunteering for Bush's successful campaign for his party's nomination.[18]

As a result, legislators on both sides of the aisle will shy away from advancing tougher immigration laws in 2000, lest such legislation harm the prospects of their parties' standard-bearers. In a similar vein, numerous lawmakers including Senator Helms, House International Affairs Committee chairman Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.), and John L. Mica (R-Fla.), the chairman of the House subcommittee on drug policy, have inveighed against the huge quantities of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana pouring into the United States

[17] Kalpana Srinivasan, "Gore, McCain Seek Support from Latino Community," Associated Press, Feb. 24, 1999.

[18] Lindlaw, "Bush Makes Aggressive Pitch." The breakdown of electoral votes is California (54), New York (33), Texas (32), and Florida (25). The addition of Illinois (22) raises the total electoral vote to 166 in states with large Hispanic American populations.

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from Mexico. However, "decertifying" Mexico, that is, imposing sanctions on the country for its failure to cooperate with the United States in the war against drugs, was a will-o'-the-wisp in an election year during which the Mexicans have acted to bring down oil prices.

Similarly, serious attacks on the trade accord from Democrats and Republicans are unlikely, despite the anti-NAFTA sentiment in the AFL-CIO. The major contenders for the Democratic and Republican nominations strongly backed NAFTA's passage, the agreement impelled a doubling of bilateral trade to $196.6 billion in 1999, and many states that enjoy substantial commerce with Mexico are rich in electoral votes. In addition, the emergence (and disappearance) of new, controversial figures in the riven Reform Party diminishes the chance that its nominee, be it Patrick Buchanan or another, will glean anything near the popular vote won by Perot in 1992 (19 percent) and 1996 (8.4 percent).

For their part, leading candidates for the Mexican presidency have endeavored to cultivate productive ties with U.S. officials through meetings in Mexico and trips to the United States. Yet Mexican politicians have no "Yankee" constituency analogous to Chicanos in the United States with which to ingratiate themselves, and desultory anti-gringo outbursts remain a ritual of any major campaign. One such flare-up took place in late February 2000, when Mexican newspapers alleged that Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow compared Mexico to Sicily and called it one of several narco-trafficking "headquarters."[19] While Davidow claimed to have been misquoted, his putative comment raised hackles across the political spectrum. Even the moderate Francisco Labastida Ochoa took umbrage at the statement. Labastida, a 57-year-old former cabinet member, governor, and legislator, captured the November 7, 1999, PRI primary with 54.9 percent of the 9.7 million votes cast. Although officially neutral in the intramural contest, Zedillo clearly believed Labastida to be the man most likely to deepen and broaden the nation's economic and political liberalization. Unlike Mexico's last three chief executives, Labastida neither speaks English nor earned an Ivy League degree—factors that should immunize him against the "Made in USA" label slapped on many of the PRI's American-educated leaders.

Vicente Fox Quesada, 57, nominee of the center-right National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional—PAN), holds a diploma in senior management from Harvard University and served as president of Coca-Cola Inc. in Mexico and Central America from 1975 to 1979. Since then, he has concentrated his entrepreneurial talents on the Grupo Fox, which is engaged in agribusiness, cattle raising, and shoe manufacturing. A relative newcomer to politics, Fox won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in 1988, three years before he lost the governorship of Guanajuato, a post he finally captured in

[19] Ernesto Núñez and César Romero, "Tiene narco en México su cuartel general.—eu" (Narcotraffickers have their general headquarters in Mexico.—U.S.), *Reforma*, Feb. 25, 2000.

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1995. The economy of Guanajuato, Fox's home state, has expanded thanks to NAFTA, and the PAN candidate has reiterated his desire to enlarge the free-trade understanding. Fox's aggressive, shoot-from-the-hip style, his penchant for blue jeans, open collars, and cowboy boots, and his reliance on the newly formed "*Amigos de Fox*" ("Friends of Fox") rather than National Action's formal structure have alienated many traditional *Panistas*, including the party's popular 1994 presidential candidate, Diego Fernández de Cevallos. Consequently, in early 2000, surveys showed Labastida the odds-on favorite, keeping the presidency in PRI hands.[20]

Fox's standing vis-à-vis Labastida in public opinion surveys rose in late February and early March, prompting a spate of "the-PAN-can-upset-the-PRI" articles in major newspapers, which often depict electoral contests in terms of dramatic horse races.[21] Rather than portend a Fox triumph, though, this surge resulted mainly from Labastida's failure to air television commercials for several weeks while his PAN opponent, who began to dress and speak more professionally, dominated the air waves. Meanwhile, Labastida's campaign leadership suffered a shake-up and his party went through the internecine battle of naming its candidates for 128 Senate and five hundred Chamber of Deputy seats. In late March, the PRI candidate reopened his lead over Fox—partly because of a fresh batch of television ads for Labastida, and partly because of the broad appeal of his proposal to provide instruction in English and computers to schoolchildren. Mexico City pundits, often deaf to opinion polls outside the capital, attacked this idea as anti-nationalist, impractical, and a sop to Uncle Sam.[22] Labastida lost ground in an April 25 televised debate. Rather than appearing "presidential," he ripped into Fox for calling names and using vulgarity. Fox coolly replied that while he might clean up his language, PRI leaders would always be the "corrupt ones." Subsequent surveys declared Fox the hands-down victor.

Mexico's Left, which harbors the nation's most acerbic critics of the United States, is beset by deep divisions that minimize its chances of taking over Los Pinos presidential palace. Cárdenas, who is making his third bid for chief executive, enjoys the support of the Democratic Revolutionary Party

[20] Even though Labastida is a client of Pearson, this firm (in concert with Washington-based Greenberg International Research) conducted the most credible poll in early 2000. Of the 678 probable voters whom Pearson surveyed in the January 22–26 period, 47.1 percent favored Labastida, 34.8 percent Fox, and only 11.3 percent Cárdenas. Francisco Arroyo, "Obtiene ventaja de 12 puntos el sinaloense, según encuesta" (The Sinaloa native enjoys a 12 point advantage, according to polls), *El Universal*, Feb. 12, 2000 (http://www.el-universal.com.mx/net2/home/html).

[21] In a mid-February 2000 survey, *Reforma* found Labastida with 39 percent to Fox's 32 percent—and Cárdenas running a distant third. See Sam Dillon, "In Mexico's Election, the Race Is Real," *New York Times*, Mar. 11, 2000. See also Henry Tricks, "PRI Losing Ground as Mexican Polls Approach," *Financial Times*, Feb. 22, 2000 (http://www.news.ft.com); and James F. Smith, "Fox May Be Mexico's Real Thing to Loosen PRI's Grip on Power," *Los Angeles Times*, Mar. 17, 2000 (http://www.latimes.com).

[22] Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, "El paisaje, el inglés y las computadoras" (The countryside, English and computers), *Reforma*, Mar. 10, 2000.

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and the small Labor Party. Yet his failure to deliver on the overblown promises he made in his successful quest to be mayor of Mexico City in 1997 has diminished his support nationwide. He has also suffered scorching attacks from Deputy Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, who bolted from the PRD to accept the nomination of a fringe party. The entry of several other left-of-center contenders in the presidential sweepstakes has further harmed Cárdenas's electoral prospects.

Unanticipated events could derail Labastida's political train. The expert M. Delal Baer has highlighted the "culture of intolerance" afflicting Mexican politics and warned of the possibility of assassinations, rebel uprisings, kidnappings, and the overt involvement of drug cartels in the presidential contest. "The 2000 election will bring Mexico to trial by fire," she has written. Furthermore, Mexico's rulers seem more interested in fighting one another than their common enemies, and they remain oblivious as the capital sinks beneath a wave of crime, the provinces smolder, and drug lords send corruption creeping through the establishment. For the country to survive as a democracy, this must change soon. Mexico's institutions are simply too fragile, and its commitment to openness too recent, to withstand such national traumas for long.[23]

Since Dr. Baer's apocalyptic warning, the PRI has held a peaceful primary, the losers have thrown their support to Labastida, the price of oil (which generates 30 percent of Mexico's federal income) has remained high, and Zedillo has hammered out a year-end budget compromise with key opposition legislators. The majority of Mexicans hold conservative values, and the presence of radical guerrillas and firebrands, such as the ringleaders of the ten-month strike at the National Autonomous University of Mexico that ended in February 2000, tends to frighten voters to stick with a known quantity such as the PRI over opposition parties that have never run the country. Still, Cárdenas's failure to advance in the polls could send droves of his "anybody-but-the-PRI" backers into Fox's arms. Furthermore, Labastida reacted to his setback in the debate by aligning himself with party "dinosaurs," whose practices he had flayed earlier in the year. This move undercut his claim to epitomize a "new PRI" wedded to clean government.

His opportunism aside, Labastida offers the best hope to manage diverse forces, attract the private investment crucial to accelerating the nation's growth rate, and create jobs for the 1.2 million men and women who enter the work force each year. The possibility that the PRI, which now holds 242 seats, will maintain substantial numbers in the 500-member Chamber of Deputies enhances the likelihood that, of all the presidential hopefuls, La-

[23] M. Delal Baer, "Mexico's Coming Backlash," *Foreign Affairs*, July/Aug. 1999, p. 104.

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bastida has the best chance of gaining legislative approval for controversial proposals, particularly in energy and banking matters. Nevertheless, a number of issues remain controversial, and Zedillo's abandoning the *dedazo*, combined with lawmakers' desire to demonstrate greater institutional independence, will test the mettle of even a skilled negotiator like Labastida.

For his part, a President Fox would confront a legislature dominated by the PRI and PRD. By and large, the movers and shakers of these two parties detest their National Action counterparts more than each other. Even if Fox forged a broad-based unity cabinet, he might well find his initiatives torpedoed by a PRI/PRD-led coalition. He could also encounter continual struggles with hostile labor organizations. Links to the PRI have discouraged trade-union officials from launching strikes in recent years. They would have no such compunction against harassing a PAN administration with work stoppages, traffic-snarling marches in major cities, and even acts of sabotage against government installations. PRD-oriented university students, left-wing teachers, and organizations in poor neighborhoods might also challenge a National Action government even if it embraces a variety of parties and interest groups. Under such conditions, one can only imagine government paralysis, mounting social unrest, drug cartels' increasing political involvement, and the proliferation of rebel bands. In the worst possible case, narco-traffickers might ally with guerrillas as in Colombia, ensuring violent confrontations with Mexico's armed forces.

Thus, the United States can no longer take for granted the Pax Mexicana that has long permitted Washington to concentrate its military, diplomatic, and economic resources on Europe and Asia. The security of the two nations is increasingly intertwined.

Surging Integration

NAFTA has accelerated U.S.-Mexican integration. As indicated in Table 1, data on items ranging from telephone calls to tourism to petroleum shipments attest to the explosive growth in bilateral contacts. Although more difficult to quantify, broadening interaction is also bringing changes in cuisine, music, visual arts, and even political practices. Every major Mexican presidential candidate, for example, has hired at least one American consultant.

Not only will interactions increase in quantity, they will also expand in scope—with the energy sector furnishing a case in point. Until the 1980s, Mexico's state-owned oil and electricity companies (Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, and Comisión Federal de Electricidad, or CFE) operated like firms in the former Soviet Union.[24] They stressed quantity over quality, patronage

[24] Luz y Fuerza (Light and Power) serves the metropolitan Mexico City area. Although smaller in size and boasting fewer customers than CFE, Luz y Fuerza is politically important because of its presence in the capital and the strength of the Mexican Union of Electrical Workers (SME).

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Table 1: U.S.-Mexican Integration, 1970–1999

Category	1970	1980	1990	1999
U.S. telephone calls to Mexico (minutes)[1]	N/A	179,862	934,425	2,897,986,720 (1998)
Mexican telephone calls to U.S. (minutes)[1]	N/A	N/A	N/A	1,086,310,773 (1998)
U.S. travelers to Mexico[2]	N/A	N/A	16,381,000	18,771,000 (1995)
Mexican travelers to U.S.[2]	1,058,772	3,396,300	7,041,000	8,016,000 (1995)
U.S. exports to Mexico ($ billions)[3]	1.568	11.979	28.375	86.87
Mexican exports to U.S. ($ billions)[3]	8.39	10.072	18.837	109.70
U.S. direct investment in Mexico ($ billions)[4]	1.912	5.989	10.313	25.877
Mexican direct investment in U.S. ($ billions)[4]	N/A	N/A	0.554	4.029 (1998)
Mexican oil exports to U.S. (thousands of barrels/day)[5]	16 (1973)	533	755	1,316 (1st 10 months)
U.S. oil exports to Mexico (thousands of barrels/day)[5]	N/A	14.8	109.8	357.1 (1998)

[1] Federal Communications Commission, *Common Carrier Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1980–1999).
[2] U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Research and Analysis, U.S. Travel service, *Foreign Visitor Arrivals*, 1966–1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO); telephone interview with Karen Woodrow, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, June 2, 1987; International Trade Administration, "Trade Development, Tourism" (http://www.tinet.ita.doc.gov). (Arrival figures include persons traveling for business, pleasure, study, and transit.)
[3] International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1970–1999); telephone interview with Brent Fogt, Mexico Division, U.S. Department of Commerce, June 3, 1987; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Survey of Current Business* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1970–1999).
[4] *Survey of Current Business*; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, *International Investment Data* (www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/diapos66.htm).
[5] U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Information Agency, Monthly Energy Review (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 1971–1999); U.S. Dept. of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Census Bureau, 1999); Petróleos Mexicanos, *Statistical Yearbook 1991* (Mexico City: Pemex, 1992) and (http://www.pemex.com/46.55.pdf).

over efficiency, self-sufficiency over profitability, and secrecy over transparency. Pressure from PRI-linked labor unions ensured that the work force remained bloated, that the national companies heaped generous benefits on their workers and their families, and that corruption abounded within the monopolies.

The government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94) promoted privatization of airlines, steel mills, and the banking system, but failed to concentrate on the politically sensitive energy field. President Salinas did, however, trim hugely inflated payrolls, open bidding on most major projects, sell off a majority share of Pemex's air fleet, and reorganize the state petroleum giant into four functional operating companies.

Soon after taking office, Zedillo named reformers to the top oil and electricity positions. He appointed Adrián Lajous Vargas, a Cambridge University graduate who had worked a dozen years at Pemex, as the monopoly's director-general. He selected Rogelio Gasca Neri, a Stanford Ph.D. with vast experience in the government's economic bureaucracy, to take the helm at CFE. A deep recession delayed revitalization of both state giants. Still, Lajous started employing international standards to "benchmark" everything from refineries to petrochemical plants to accident rates. He also auctioned off natural gas distribution and storage networks to private companies in nine urban centers. Furthermore, Lajous ended Pemex's monopoly on liquefied petroleum gas, the cooking fuel preferred in the majority of Mexican homes. In addition, he brought in the Bechtel Corporation to manage development of the prolific Cantarell fields, the sixth-largest hydrocarbon deposits in the world, located fifty miles off the Yucatán Peninsula. Finally, he began the upgrading and expansion of Pemex's refining capacity. Gasca Neri embarked upon analogous changes at CFE. He implemented legislation, enacted in 1991, that allowed private companies to generate electricity for their own consumption or for sale either to CFE or to small-scale consumers in rural areas. In 1998, CFE announced plans to award contracts for the construction of major projects, including 225- to 450-megawatt generating plants powered by gas turbines.

Despite a number of conspicuous successes, Lajous and Gasca Neri failed to gain legislative support for two vital initiatives: the sell-off of Pemex's money-losing secondary petrochemical complexes and the further opening of electricity generation and transportation to private capital. Energy secretary Téllez looked askance at both these failures because of the tens of billions of dollars that Mexico will require to keep up with surging energy demand through 2006. He also resented the readiness of the top executives at Pemex and CFE to bypass his office and communicate directly with Zedillo, the finance secretary, and other ranking officials. Above all, Téllez perceived that Lajous and Gasca Neri, though skilled administrators, favored too much state control over industries that should be opened more rapidly to private capital.

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As one official, who asked to remain anonymous, argued, "Téllez wanted to replace 'modernizers' with 'reformers.'"

In 1999, Téllez forced the resignations of both Gasca Neri and Lajous. While praised for their intelligence and competence, the new directors-general—Rogelio Montemayor Segúy at Pemex and Alfredo Elías Ayub at CFE—had modest backgrounds in energy. Their need for on-the-job training strengthened Téllez's hand in fashioning energy policy. Should the PRI retain the presidency, Téllez's prominence as an economic policymaker will only increase. In a Labastida cabinet, Téllez would champion substantially greater foreign investment in Pemex and CFE—a development that would forge even more formidable bonds between the United States and Mexico. For instance, increased generating and transmission capability in Mexico would expand the North American power grid, which connects parts of Canada and Mexico to the United States via more than 700,000 miles of high-tension lines.[25] This grid stands as a metaphor for integration.

A sound, workable bankruptcy statute would also fortify the U.S.-Mexican interrelationship. If Zedillo fails to procure passage of such a law in 2000, his successor will make this legislation a high priority. A viable bankruptcy process would allow Mexico's banks to divest themselves of assets acquired from defaulting debtors. Disposing of these holdings would enable banks to recommence lending and make these institutions much more attractive to American and other foreign investors, which have long been wary of Mexico's wobbly banking structure. In view of his links to so many important players in the political system, Labastida would have a better chance than his competitors of achieving these reforms.

Migration and Narcotics

As demonstrated by the DEA's arrest of ninety-four alleged drug traffickers and wholesalers on September 22, 1999, Washington can score victories in the drug war when fighting at home. More setbacks than successes occur, however, when U.S. officials seek to shape Mexico's strategy below the Rio Grande. In any case, the United States' overwhelming focus on supply as opposed to demand threatens to contaminate a relatively clean institution, the Mexican armed forces, at the very time that Zedillo is attempting to shepherd his country through its most competitive presidential election in modern history.

In October 1995, Secretary of Defense William V. Perry met with his Mexican counterpart, General Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, and Zedillo. Alarmed at the corruption suffusing Mexico's attorney general's office and the

[25] Sally McGrane, "Getting Power to the People: The North American Electricity Grid," *New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1999.

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Federal Judicial Police, the Pentagon and CIA were casting about for a more reliable partner in their mounting efforts to fight drugs. Perry came away pleased. The Mexican officials agreed that the military should supplant the attorney general's office and federal police as the primary force in combating narcotics. Soon Cervantes began dispatching the first of hundreds of young men to study drug-control tactics at U.S. bases. The CIA quietly complemented this initiative by providing instruction, resources, and operational support for a Mexican army intelligence unit, the Center for Anti-Narcotics Investigations, or CIAN.

Although the CIAN claimed some initial successes against the obscenely wealthy and powerful Juárez and Tijuana cartels, the majority of Mexico's military leaders deeply resented the dominant antidrug role thrust upon them because of its corrosive effect on their once-popular institution. And they had a point. Far from stanching the northward export of narcotics, changing the lead agency only magnified corruption within the armed forces, as evidenced by the three dozen officers whom Cervantes has publicly charged with drug-related crimes. Such a housecleaning, in turn, has exacted a toll on morale, since professional soldiers understandably take umbrage when their colleagues are hustled off to the stockade while *civilians* linked to drug smuggling (e.g., Quintana Roo's former governor Mario Villanueva) blatantly flaunt the law with impunity.

U.S. efforts to shape Mexico's drug-control strategy have introduced new problems.

Obviously, U.S. agencies should cooperate with foreign governments in fighting crime. Still, the unintended consequences of the Clinton administration's policy towards Mexico strengthen arguments in favor of earmarking the lion's share of Washington's $18 billion annual drug-control budget for prevention, treatment, in-prison rehabilitation, and other consumption-related programs. Failure to accomplish a dramatic change of emphasis will further enhance the political clout of drug barons, while suborning an institution essential to Mexico's stability.

Although U.S. decision makers still have a chance of shoring up dikes against the flow of drugs, the flood of illegal immigrants from Mexico is likely to become an uncontrollable tidal wave. A U.S. congressman once compared the frontier with Mexico to the pre-World War II Maginot Line: "It is outflanked, overflown, and infiltrated. And you know what happened to the French."[26] What is amazing is the lack of forceful, determined action to regain control over the border, especially because an overwhelming percentage of American residents support such a policy. For example, a February 1999 Gallup Poll found that 85 percent of respondents believed that immigration should be decreased or kept at its present level, up from 72 percent in June

[26] Rep. Lester L. Wolff (D-N.Y.) quoted in *U.S. News and World Report*, Apr. 25, 1977, p. 35.

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1965. Few subjects command such widespread support among U.S. citizens.[27]

The nature of immigration began to change in 1965, when Congress introduced an admissions formula that overwhelmingly rewarded visa applicants with family members already living in the United States. The emphasis on "family reunification," as opposed to criteria such as age, education, and English proficiency, sharply reduced the skill level of newcomers, who now come disproportionately from Mexico in particular and Latin America in general. These immigrants differ from previous waves in numerous ways: (1) the major country of emigration shares a 2,000-mile-long border with its northern neighbor; (2) the clustering of Hispanics in a small number of U.S. cities and states hampers their assimilation; (3) powerful vested interests champion bilingual education, which further dampens the flame beneath the melting pot for prospective citizens from abroad; (4) decades of rest followed previous eras of great immigration, fostering the incorporation of new arrivals into the American mainstream; (5) as late as 1960, the average male immigrant earned 4 percent more than his native counterpart, but by 1998 he earned 23 percent less; and (6) in 1970 immigrant families were slightly less likely to receive public assistance than native families, but in 1998 almost a quarter of immigrant families received some type of assistance compared to 15 percent of native households.

Current immigration policy constitutes an income transfer to Mexico and other sending countries, as well as to the businesses and individuals who employ unskilled or modestly skilled workers. Other racial and ethnic minority citizens, poor women, teenagers, and former welfare recipients "who compete with immigrants and whose wages will fall" bear the brunt of this subsidy. Yet, the labor movement's limited success in organizing such groups of people legally in the United States prompted AFL-CIO president John Sweeney to propose a "new amnesty" for millions of unlawful residents. Noting that union membership would safeguard such immigrants from exploitation by unscrupulous employers, the AFL-CIO called the current immigration system "poorly constructed and ineffectively enforced."[28]

If the past is prologue to the future, however, the group paying the highest price will be the last wave of Mexican immigrants, who experience what one expert has called "negative synergy."[29] The new entrants gravitate to locations where high concentrations of Mexican workers already exist. They inflate the supply of labor, retard wage increases, and consume more

[27] The Gallup Organization, "Most Important Problem," Gallup News Service, 1999 (http://www.gallup.com).

[28] James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration* (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, 1997). See also Nancy Cleeland, "AFL-CIO Calls for Amnesty for Illegal U.S. Workers," *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 17, 2000.

[29] Roger L. Conner, former executive director, Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform, electronic mail, Jan. 4, 2000.

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public services.[30] They exhibit lower expectations than their predecessors, which gives employers an excuse for not improving remuneration and workplace conditions. They reinforce what scholar George Borjas calls the "stickiness" of cultural habits within their group about education, while competing for limited educational, health-care, and social-service resources. The penultimate immigrant group has little ability to influence decision makers, the last cohort of newcomers even less. Irish immigrants, who resemble Mexicans most in terms of numbers, concentration, and conditions, did not begin their upward mobility until mass immigration from Ireland was shut down.

The failure of Mexican immigrants to find the opportunities they expect in the United States would both threaten national unity and create the seedbed of resentment in which racial and ethnic politics flourish. Teodoro Maus, Mexico's consul in Atlanta, exhibited this tendency when, in late 1999, he urged Hispanic Americans to apply "economic pressure" on businesses that exploit immigrant workers. He also suggested a national boycott of firms that do not offer services in Spanish.[31] The presence of businesses, schools, newspapers, magazines, and radio and television stations that cater to immigrants reinforces such anti-assimilation sentiments in a country where the pursuit of diversity is pervasive. As one writer expressed it:

> The America of individual rights and responsibilities, where each citizen was to be judged on his own merit (at least in theory), has been replaced by Multicultural America, where the state formally categorizes an atomized and anomic populace based on ethnicity, race, sex, sexual preference, disability status, language, age. . . . Thus, whatever their views on abortion or the appropriate level of taxation or the propriety of government funding of the arts, immigrants are assimilating into an ethos that exalts and perpetuates tribalism, rather than one that promotes a common national identity.[32]

Foreign Policy as Domestic Policy

In the past, the American political system has responded to, if not resolved, many crucial problems. Unequal treatment of African Americans precipitated the presidential initiatives against discrimination in the 1940s, *Brown v. the Board of Education, Topeka*, and other landmark Supreme Court decisions of the 1950s, and the civil rights legislation of the 1960s. The unequal treatment of females produced scores of judicial actions and federal and state statutes designed to advance women's legal status. Manufacturers' abuses exposed by consumer advocate Ralph Nader in the 1960s spawned corrective action over the following decade and an explosion of tort law.

[30] Mark Krikorian, "Will Americanization Work in America?" *Freedom Review*, Fall 1997, p. 47.

[31] "Mexican Consul Calls [for] Boycott of Anti-Hispanic Companies," *The News* (Mexico City), Jan. 6, 2000 (http://unam.netgate.net/novedades/the-news.htm).

[32] Krikorian, "Will Americanization Work in America?" p. 52.

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Publicized degradation of the environment led to passage of acts to control emissions in the air, clean up rivers, and regulate the transportation and disposal of toxic substances. Yet, every indication is that the illegal immigration "crisis" is likely to paralyze the political system rather than energize it to fashion policies to resolve it.

In the cases of the civil rights, women's, and consumer movements, mainstream politicians and the mass media amplified the otherwise limited power of these aggrieved groups, enabling them to play a greater role in shaping policy. Today, the same process of organization and amplification is occurring with regard to Latinos, but for the purpose of thwarting rather than fostering reform. The reason is that, even though illegal aliens cannot vote (and even legal immigrants vote at low rates), many ambitious Hispanic American leaders regard the mushrooming of their community's numbers as enhancing their own political clout. As Hispanics, who are projected to number 31 million on July 1, 2000, surpass African Americans as the United States' largest minority, their influence in the Electoral College will dissuade politicians in both major parties from emphasizing skills and education over family reunification in visa criteria and curtailing the number of immigrants to encourage assimilation of the 20 million people who have entered this country during the last two decades.

The fecklessness of politicians will not only continue to work to the disadvantage of less-fortunate legal residents, it could make a mockery of the concept of *e pluribus unum*. Equally unsettling is the possibility that, when an economic downturn next afflicts the U.S. economy, political strife will accompany competition for a shrinking job pool. In sum, a volcano is building up pressure inside our borders, but no political mechanism exists that can release it, given the constraints imposed by political correctness in the United States, while the constraints imposed by the anti-*yanqui* political discourse in Mexico have led to a dearth of diplomatic means to address the problems of immigration and drugs. And yet, if the pressure is not released and is allowed to build, the quality of life will suffer greatly in the United States—and possibly in Mexico as well.

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Latin American Challenges

Has the Future Arrived for Brazil?

by William Perry

Such attention as is paid to Latin America by the U.S. foreign policy establishment is almost invariably directed at Mexico or some trouble spot in the Caribbean Basin. But the nature and importance of the U.S. relationship with the whole of Latin America is changing significantly in the post–Cold War era, and that trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Fully one-third of that vast, varied region, whether measured by territorial extent, population, or economic weight, is to be found in Brazil. This Portuguese-speaking giant of a country is physically larger than the contiguous forty-eight United States, has a rapidly expanding population of 165 million (exceeding Russia's), and boasts a gross domestic product that is already the planet's eighth largest. Moreover, Brazil is a world of its own—quite distinct from the other countries of the area and harboring very pronounced ideas about its present and future role on the regional and global stages.

The long-term relationship of the United States with its hemispheric neighbors (currently scheduled to be fused into a comprehensive inter-American free trade zone by 2005) depends a great deal upon their ability to sustain trends toward democratic government, the practice of market-oriented economic policies, and a disposition toward closer cooperation with Washington that became evident in the 1980s. Brazil's future in these regards is obviously a fundamental variable, given its enormous weight in the regional context and the inevitable influence it exercises on neighboring countries.

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"The Country of the Future"

Local and foreign observers have been predicting brilliant prospects for Brazil virtually since its discovery (the quincentennial of which is being celebrated there along with the millennium). And a particularly strong spurt of economic growth under military governments during the late 1960s and early 1970s led to optimistic forecasts that it would finally emerge as a great power on the world scene by the then-magical year 2000.[1] But Brazil's enormous developmental problems were not so easily overcome by the statist economic model that a long history of corporatism encouraged its leadership to adopt. Brazil was and (despite some recent gains) remains the largest Third World importer of petroleum. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 were met not by austerity, but rather by prodigious borrowing on international capital markets. Thus, the debt crisis of the 1980s hit the country with particular severity. Instead of anticipated rapid growth, Brazil experienced general stagflation for more than a decade thereafter. Despite its return to democracy in 1985, the nation's dreams of international greatness were disappointed, and its disadvantaged majority remained mired in poverty. Indeed, Brazilian society displays one of the worst degrees of income inequality in the modern world. The upper-end middle classes enjoy production and consumption levels similar to those of southern Europe even as most of the population is afflicted by living standards typically identified with the poorest of Third World nations.

Moreover, as neighboring countries began to adopt liberal economic models during the 1980s, it became increasingly obvious that Brazil's state-centered approach was part of the problem, not the solution to national ills. But the country's newly democratic political system created a difficult environment in which to effect market-oriented reform or austerity measures, and the decidedly limited leadership capabilities of the first three civilian presidents offered little to inspire hope.[2] José Sarney (1985–90) seemed merely to preside over the slow-motion production of a new constitution that expressed expansively utopian objectives but failed to provide a practical foundation for concrete action. After a brief period of trumpeting a much-needed liberal reform agenda, Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–92) succumbed to a sordid corruption scandal that ultimately led to his removal from office. His vice president and successor, Itamar Franco, appeared totally flummoxed during most of his interim period (1992–95) at the helm of state.[3]

[1] Ronald M. Schneider, *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976).

[2] Wayne A. Selcher, *Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986) provides a detailed view of the process.

[3] For an in-depth overview of the political development and history of Brazil, see Ronald M. Schneider, *Order and Progress: A Political History of Brazil* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).

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The Advent of the Cardoso Era

By the onset of the 1994 campaign season, a severe recession and an inflation rate that was ultimately to reach over 80 percent per month had produced a level of popular frustration that elevated a representative of the unreconstructedly Marxist Workers' Party (PT), Luiz Inacio da Silva (known as "Lula"), to a commanding lead in the public opinion polls.[4] But, toward the end of his term, President Franco began to turn over real authority to his newly appointed finance minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, an historically left-of-center academic who, it soon became apparent, had experienced a conversion to market-based economic concepts. Cardoso's team quickly formulated an ambitious plan based upon a firm new currency, the *real*, backed by a comprehensive wave of austerity, de-bureaucratization, trade liberalization, and privatization initiatives.[5] As this "*Real* Plan" was being implemented, its author resigned from the government to enter the presidential race—bringing his own Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB)[6] into alliance with the center-right Liberal Front Party (PFL)[7] and the much smaller Brazilian Workers' Party (PTB).[8] The government's new economic approach succeeded in halting the run-away inflation and precipitating a wave of investment that sparked the beginnings of perceptible recovery. This, in turn, led to a dramatic reversal of fortune during the presidential campaign, and Cardoso surged past Lula to score an impressive first-round victory in the October 1994 balloting (no mean feat given Brazil's multiplicity of parties and candidates).

Cardoso went on to enjoy a fruitful first term as president of Brazil

[4] The Partido dos Trabalhadores came out of the São Paulo labor movement and was initially the most significant Marxist party to emerge under Brazil's new democratic political system. Its perennial leader da Silva has been the principal radical alternative in all three presidential elections since then. Meanwhile, although a more moderate faction has emerged, the PT still constitutes the most visible opposition to the liberalizing initiatives of the Cardoso administration.

[5] For the complete version of this plan, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Maos a Obra, Brasil: Proposta de Governo* (Hands to Work: Proposal for Government) (Brasilia: n.p., 1994).

[6] The Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira originated in a mass defection of the "progressive" wing of the PMDB (see n. 14) prior to the elections of 1989. Often known as the *Tucanos* (from the tropical bird which is the party's symbol), its members drew their inspiration from Europe's social democratic parties. Having chosen Fernando Henrique Cardoso as its candidate in 1994 and entered into alliance with the PFL, however, the PSDB has been supporting the liberalizing precepts of the *Real* Plan.

[7] The Partido da Frente Liberal sprang from a split among backers of the military regime over the candidate to be fielded in the indirect elections of 1984. The PFL broke ranks with its former colleagues in ARENA (briefly reconfigured as the Partido Democrático Trabalhista) to support the candidacy of Tancredo Neves and named one of its number, José Sarney, his running mate. When Neves died on the eve of his inauguration in 1985, Sarney became the first civilian president of Brazil since 1964. Subsequently, the PFL has become Brazil's major center-right party—entering into alliance with the PSDB to form the core of support for both Cardoso administrations (with PFL member Marco Maciel as the country's vice president).

[8] The Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro is an old name in Brazilian politics, but during recent years has been largely a flag of convenience for candidates who could not secure nominations from large parties. The PTB's modest congressional delegation (about 30 members) is nonideological and opportunistic, impelling it to join with the PSDB and PFL as a very junior member of the current ruling coalition.

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(1995–99), especially by comparison to the woeful performance of his immediate predecessors. Constitutional provisions that had prevented participation of foreign capital in critical sectors of the economy underwent significant changes, other restrictions on the conduct of business were relaxed, and import duties were lowered substantially almost across the board. A serious effort to shrink the state's enormous bureaucracy was launched, both as an end in itself and as part of a broader effort to impose financial austerity. Finally, a process of broad privatization began, most notably in the telecommunications and electric power sectors, which reduced government obligations while simultaneously bringing in large amounts of revenue and generating additional investment for maintenance and technological advance. The confidence thus inspired promptly produced a rapid turnaround in the performance of Brazil's long-languishing economy. Local private capital mobilized itself more effectively, foreign investment flowed in, and for the first time in recent history Brazil achieved steady growth without high inflation. Medium- and longer-term credit under reasonable conditions again became possible. These elements were particularly important, not only because of their highly favorable impact upon the general business climate, but also because of their positive effect on working-class incomes, which allowed millions of humbler citizens to enter the consumer economy.

It is true that a strong (indeed, significantly overvalued) *real* inhibited export performance so that Brazil began to run serious trade deficits for the first time in many decades. But this was more than compensated for, and in fact made possible, by new investment and international credit. Brazilian commerce with its southern neighbors also mushroomed under the umbrella of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur, or Mercosul in Portuguese) crafted in 1991 among Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay.[9] Moreover, Brasilia indicated positive interest in the concept of a hemispheric free-trade zone (although according to its own particular lights), as well as the prospect of expanding economic interaction with the European Union.

President Cardoso's political standing was an obvious and substantial beneficiary of this sharp spike in national fortunes. Within a short time after their inaugurations, his three predecessors in the "New Republic" had seen their images and effectiveness destroyed by the corrosive tendencies of the country's political system. But Cardoso's popularity remained high throughout his first term in office. This, in turn, allowed him to secure repeal of the constitutional stricture prohibiting a second term, which he then won in a convincing first-round victory in the general elections of 1998.[10]

[9] Bolivia and Chile later subscribed to the Mercado Común del Sur as associate members.

[10] For greater detail on the 1998 elections, see William Perry, "The 1998 Brazilian Elections: Pre-election Report," *Western Hemisphere Election Study Series* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sept. 14, 1998); and "The 1998 Brazilian Elections: Post-election Report," *Western Hemisphere Election Study Series* (Nov. 11, 1998).

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The Brazilian Dilemma

Below this successful facade, however, dangerous undercurrents persisted, which have manifested themselves more clearly over the past year. The domestic and international optimism accompanying Brazil's apparent economic recovery were, in large measure, based upon the promise that President Cardoso would more or less promptly complete his program of market reform and austerity. But this effort, begun late by regional standards, proved frustratingly slow, and so long as it remained incomplete, strong economic performance was dependent on a large and continuing influx of foreign capital. Thus, further progress was vulnerable to any domestic and/or international events that might shake investors' confidence. In particular, Brazil's overvalued *real* had been under intermittent siege since its launch, and the only significant unknown that might have affected the outcome of the 1998 presidential race was whether it could be sustained until election day in the face of the contraction of international capital markets born of the crises in Asia and Russia. The prospect of a support package of over $40 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) managed to hold the line, but less than two weeks after Cardoso's second inauguration on January 1, 1999, he was obliged to devalue the currency and allow it to float. The *real*'s subsequent fall led to deep recession during most of 1999 and produced a sharp decline in the president's political standing.[11]

Cardoso's problems in completing his liberalization and austerity agenda after five long years have a great deal to do with the fragmented and anarchic nature of Brazil's political system (and the culture that it reflects). Under the constitution of 1988, the president wields apparently wide powers.[12] But in practice he is substantially constrained by the need to secure congressional concurrence on regular legislation, the budget, and many restructuring issues, not to mention constitutional changes, which require particularly cumbersome procedures. Brazil is also a notably corporatist society in which a host of private and public groups and institutions have a long history of working doggedly to protect their interests. State governors, moreover, exert considerable influence on the federal government by means of their own autonomous actions and their ability to sway their jurisdictions' congressional delegations. Finally, Brazil's judicial system is ponderous and legalistic when it comes to resolving disputes among the various branches and levels of government.

But the most obvious obstacle to presidential initiatives on behalf of change (or even the timely discharge of regular business) is undoubtedly the

[11] For greater detail on the political and economic implications of the economic crisis, see Alexandre Barros and Alkimar R. Moura, "The Brazilian Economic Crisis: Political and Economic Implications," *The Latin American Program Working Paper Series* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Aug. 1999).

[12] For greater detail, see "Why the President Gets Tied Down," *Euromoney*, Oct. 1999.

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fragmented, constantly shifting nature of party politics as manifested by the conduct of the national legislature.[13] In this context, it should be remembered that in other Latin American countries significant liberalization and austerity programs were carried out by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes (Chile and Mexico), or under democratic systems in which the executive commanded dependable legislative majorities (Argentina). In Brazil, by contrast, eighteen parties are represented in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, none of which enjoys even the nominal allegiance of more than 20 percent of the members. Moreover, these entities (with the partial exception of those on the Left) are notably lacking in loyalty to any particular political philosophy, program, or president. Their behavior is often so undisciplined that links among them (as well as to the executive) tend to be transitory. New parties and coalitions emerge or change their names and commitments in a confusing kaleidoscope, while individual members often make tactical or permanent changes in their affiliation. What Brazil's elected representatives do respond to are local interests, primarily in terms of bringing budgetary allocations, public works programs, and patronage to their home bases (less whatever emoluments stick to congressional fingers—a source of unending scandals, few of which result in anyone's punishment).

Facing considerable opposition, Cardoso may be a dramatically premature lame duck.

Thus, President Cardoso has never enjoyed anything like a dependable majority in the legislature. To be sure, he was able to assemble a coalition to defeat Lula in 1994 and 1998, and has managed to win the partial cooperation of other center-right forces, most notably from the ranks of the PMDB[14] and the PPB.[15] However, while his intractable opponents number only about 20 percent of the federal legislature, even his own party and allies are far from reliable collaborators on every issue. Winning coalitions must be laboriously stitched

[13] Brazil's military-dominated governments enforced a simple division between their supporters, mustered under the banner of the National Renovating Alliance (Aliança Renovadora Nacional—ARENA), and their opponents, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro—MDB). As the country moved toward democracy, the number of parties proliferated exponentially, and there are now more than two dozen.

[14] The Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro is the linear descendant of the broad civilian coalition (MDB) that opposed continued military rule and dominated the New Republic at its inception in 1985. Since that time, however, defections have reduced its numbers in congress to rough parity with the PSDB and PFL (presently, the "big three" parties in congress, with about one hundred members each in the 517-seat Chamber of Deputies). Today the PMDB, divided into various internal factions, constitutes the soft, nonideological center of Brazilian politics, and has so far been generally willing to cooperate with the Cardoso administration.

[15] The Partido Progressista Brasileiro represents the supporters of the former military governments, who remained loyal to their party's unsuccessful bid for the presidency in the elections of 1984. After several name changes, it settled in as a conservative party of the second rank, with strength limited to specific localities and a few distinguished personalities from the old regime. The PPB has generally supported the Cardoso administration—choosing not to field its own presidential candidate in 1998 and allowing one of its members to accept a cabinet position in the incumbent government.

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together on almost a case-by-case basis through liberal use of patronage sweeteners. And even this slow process was only possible because of the president's popularity and the apparent success of his first term. Nor did Cardoso's victory in October 1998 do much to change the situation in congress. The parties of the Left made modest gains in the legislature and took six governorships (it had previously held just two). Also, the governor of Minas Gerais state, Itamar Franco, though elected under the banner of the PMDB in 1998, has since aggressively obstructed the president's policies and left that party because it would not break with the government. Thus, opposition governors now control three of the four most important states (Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, and Minas Gerais), and they are bound to spell trouble for Cardoso's second term.

Over the past year, the president's difficulties have also broadened considerably. A recession was already in train when the *real* collapsed, leading to near-panic both locally and abroad. This resulted in an even sharper downturn and predictions of a 5 to 6 percent decline in GDP over the course of 1999, accompanied by a sharp resurgence of inflation. In light of such risks, Cardoso was able to force through congress a number of positive measures during the first months of 1999 that were required by the IMF to begin dispersal from its support package. As a result—and also because Brazil's economic fundamentals were more favorable than its initial plunge had indicated—the *real* stabilized and the economy began an amazingly rapid recovery.

Still, Cardoso's political standing suffered great damage. A substantial segment of the population has always been opposed to his program, many former supporters were bitterly disappointed when he broke his campaign pledge never to devalue the *real*, and almost the whole population was either directly affected by the ensuing recession or discouraged by the country's diminished prospects. In fact, the president's positive rating in public opinion polls plunged from around 50 percent to under 10 percent by the middle of 1999. As a result, Cardoso's ability to secure at least minimal cooperation from congress (as well as the new line-up of state governors) was significantly constrained. The national legislature, rather than continuing to process an extensive agenda of needed liberalizing measures, spent most of its time on routine business and anodyne investigations of malfeasance in all branches of government, while posturing for political advantage. Not yet a year into his second term, therefore, Cardoso has assumed some characteristics of a dramatically premature lame duck. Not only has congress been notably less responsive to his legislative proposals, but the president has also been stymied by unrest within the governing coalition and jockeying for position in anticipation of the presidential campaign of 2002. This combination of factors could have seriously negative consequences for the important task so hopefully begun during his first term.

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What Will the New Millennium Hold?

Brazil now stands at a critical historical juncture. No significant political actors currently articulate a direct challenge to the continued practice of democratic government. Real progress has been made toward reforming the old-fashioned, statist development model. The economy is now bouncing back from the recession of 1999, which has given Cardoso's popularity a modest boost, allowing him to score a few needed victories in the special legislative session concluded in February 2000. But Brazil's new economic model has not yet reached the stage where it is easily self-sustainable. Additional reforms, ongoing austerity, and continuation of the current privatization process are still required, and until they are implemented the Brazilian economy will remain vulnerable to any unexpected constriction of foreign capital flows.

Moreover, the Cardoso administration's political capacity to advance its liberalization initiatives during the remainder of his second term remains to be seen. The obvious defects of Brazil's political system—especially in terms of allowing sufficient executive direction—have not been ameliorated, notwithstanding the periodic talk of reforms in this area. Moreover, despite limited recovery, the president's popularity (and hence efficacy with congress) remains weaker than during his initial period in office.[16] We are also entering a year in which municipal elections will be held—not normally an easy time for the executive to push painful or controversial measures through the legislature and hold the line on spending. Already, initiatives are emerging from congress, various state governor's offices, and even the judicial branch that run absolutely counter to the Cardoso administration's best intentions. Even some elements within the government may prove willing to trim the sails of reform in order to weather these adverse currents or seek individual advantage as Brazil begins to look toward the post-Cardoso period.

Brazil's surprisingly swift economic recovery has certainly been one of the bright spots on the local scene during recent months. Despite the crisis of early 1999, the economy managed to register a positive growth rate of 0.6 percent for the year—with inflation contained to a modest 8.6 percent.[17] Moreover, current trends and a robust renewal of foreign capital investment point to a respectable 3.5 percent rate of expansion in 2000.[18] The budget deficit, although still a matter of concern, is being managed fairly successfully, with the help of attendant improvement in tax revenues.

This degree of success, however, has certainly not been due to the

[16] For detailed polling results, as of March 2000, see "Popularidade Presidencial Ainda Fragil" (Presidential popularity still weak), *Follow-up Político*, Goes & Consultores Associados (Brasilia), Mar. 9, 2000.

[17] For detailed economic statistics and indicators, as of February 2000, see "Brazil: Latin America Monitor," *Business Monitor International*, Feb. 2000.

[18] Ibid.

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effect of institutional reforms adopted by congress during its regular proceedings in 1999. On the contrary, the legislature failed to pass any significant tax, pension, or administrative reform, or create a new basis for splitting revenues between federal and local authorities. In fact, one previously passed measure—permitting taxation of the overly generous pension benefits enjoyed by certain retirees—was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The privatization of state enterprises has always provoked opposition from the Left, and resistance seems to be spreading due to the higher levels of unemployment that afflicted the working class during 1999. Nationalistic themes have also been sounded by politicians in response to the poor performance of some recently privatized utilities and the expanding foreign interests in historically sensitive sectors of the economy.[19] Thus, increased attention will be focused this year on the proposed sales of such high-profile assets as the Furnas electricity-generating facility and the São Paulo state bank (BANESPA).

But the main preoccupation of Brazil's political class over the coming months is sure to be the October 2000 municipal balloting, in which innumerable candidates, parties, and coalitions will scramble for more than 5,500 large and small city halls. Local figures with little discernible ideology, but linked to parties generally supportive of the administration in Brasilia, currently hold the vast majority of these posts (as well as seats on the municipal councils). But preliminary polling suggests that outcomes may be different this year.[20] In particular, leftist parties—historically strongest in urban areas of the southern, more developed parts of the country—have been extending their influence into the poorer areas of the north and northeast. In Brazil's more advanced southeast, as well, the parties associated with Cardoso's coalition are struggling as a result of the federal government's reduced electoral appeal. Key jurisdictions, including the sprawling cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, could easily fall to the opposition, in which case even the candidates and parties associated with the Cardoso government might judge it electorally advisable to shake off their allegiance. Local factors, of course, play a big role in such races, so it will be impossible to consider these contests as a referendum on Cardoso. But at the same time, their cumulative results are sure to be seen as an important indicator of the way the wind is blowing. Substantial setbacks by politicians associated with Cardoso would further encumber his ability to govern effectively. Moreover, under present circumstances, these races are likely to merge soon with campaigns for the presidency.

Handicapping a presidential race two years hence is a hazardous

[19] As perceptively noted in "The Nationalist Groundswell in Brazil," *The Economist*, Feb. 26, 2000.

[20] Figures from Vox Populi survey of December 11 and 12, 1999, cited in "Primeira rodada de pesquisas Vox Populi mostra força das oposicões" (First round of Vox Populi polling shows strength of opposition forces) *Follow-up Político*, Dec. 1999. (Vox Populi is a prominent polling firm.)

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proposition, especially in Brazil's volatile political environment. Cardoso obviously hopes that he can keep reform and growth on track and recover enough popularity to influence the succession. This is not impossible, but does not now seem likely. Nevertheless, a moderate candidate could win without much help from Cardoso, especially in the event of a runoff, because the middle and business classes would undoubtedly throw their formidable support behind whoever opposed a leftist or populist candidate. That was what happened to Fernando Collor in 1989, and to Cardoso during his first-round victories in 1994 and 1998. But these hopeful prospects could be dashed for a number of reasons. In the first place, it is important to appreciate that, in the absence of strong support for the president or his apparent successor, the PSDB/PFL core of the present coalition seems destined to fall apart well before the 2002 campaign. During Cardoso's first term, the obvious heir seemed to be the PFL's Luiz Eduardo Magalhães, the presiding officer of the Chamber of Deputies and son of that party's power broker. Following Magalhães's death of a heart attack in 1998, Cardoso has sometimes seemed to favor Finance Minister Pedro Malan. But this very competent man's image may be too technocratic, and the coattails of his patron too small, for him to win the presidency.

Cardoso's own party, the PSDB, has never been completely comfortable with its role as an enforcer of painful reforms, especially in harness with more conservative parties and factions (many of which supported the former military governments). Moreover, some individuals in the party—such as the governors of São Paulo and Ceará (Mario Covas and Tasso Jerreissatti, respectively) and the incumbent health minister, José Serra—would like to run on their own, regardless of Cardoso's preferences. Jerreissatti, in particular, may emerge as a compromise candidate between Cardoso and his impatient party colleagues.

Likewise, the PFL has been noticeably more restive since the government's popularity collapsed in early 1999. Since then, the party's senior figure, Senate president Antonio Carlos Magalhães, has been behaving like a presidential contender and distanced himself from the administration's legislative program. Should his advanced age turn out to be an obstacle, other PFL actors would step forward, including the reserved vice president, Marco Maciel, and Maranhão's governor, Roseana Sarney, the daughter of a former president.

On the Left, the future is even more difficult to forecast. Its denizens know from experience that a unifying coalition will probably be needed in the end, and all sorts of more or less plausible combinations have been mentioned in the press. Lula da Silva still appears most prominent in the polls and might be the PT's choice for a fourth time. Alternatively, the torch could be passed to representatives of a new generation, such as the radical governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Olivio Dutra, or the more moderate former head of the Federal District, Cristovão Buarque. But, in any event, it would be hard for

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the PT to yield pride of place to any other party on the "progressive" end of the spectrum. The Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro—PSB), for example, possesses more seats in congress than its better-known rival, but has not yet had a suitable figure to back in a national race. The Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista—PDT) was long the electoral vehicle of the populist Leonel Brizola, who almost edged out Lula in the first round in 1989. But as its aging leader slips into semi-retirement, this party is entering a period of flux. The governors elected under its banner (although not yet much of its congressional delegation) are showing increased signs of ideological flexibility. Anthony Garotinho, in particular, who was elected head of the old *brizolista* bastion of Rio de Janeiro state, seems to be entertaining presidential aspirations independent of the historic PT/PDT struggle for preeminence on the Left.

There are also individuals who merit attention independent of Brazil's party structure. Ciro Gomes is a former PSDB governor of Ceará who served briefly as finance minister at the end of the Franco government. But he subsequently broke with the Cardoso administration and ran as a "social democratic" alternative under the banner of the minuscule Popular Socialist Party (PPS) in the presidential contest of 1998.[21] His performance at that time was quite respectable under the circumstances (about 10 percent of the vote), and he could be a much stronger force in 2002 if the electorate continues to tire from the rigors of reform and austerity.

In some respects the most active contender for the presidency has been former president Itamar Franco (the man who, ironically, gave Cardoso his start at the highest levels of politics). Having been elected governor of his important home state of Minas Gerais in 1998, Franco wasted little time in becoming a serious problem to the administration. His decision to suspend payments on the state debt to the federal union helped to precipitate the devaluation of the *real*, and since then he has been engaged in open warfare against Brasilia's neoliberal economics. Franco has also attempted to forge a league of governors opposing Cardoso and publicly severed his allegiance to the PMDB in December 1999. Franco is a rather eccentric individual with increasingly pronounced nationalistic/populist views, whose prior period as president was far from successful—until he appointed Cardoso finance minister. But he does have the advantage of being governor of Brazil's second-largest state at a time of increasing disaffection with the policies of the current government.

It is difficult to foresee precisely what the electoral landscape will look like in 2002 and which actors will prove most adept at exploiting the

[21] The Partido Popular Socialista was Brazil's old Communist Party before the advent of the New Republic. Suppressed by the previous military governments, it remains a tiny presence on the national political stage, despite having been adopted as the vehicle for the presidential aspirations of Ciro Gomes prior to the 1998 campaign season.

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trends. Certainly, opposition to the Cardoso administration has grown rapidly, with both Lula da Silva and Ciro Gomes garnering favorable ratings of about 20 percent in national opinion polls. Cardoso, meanwhile, has managed to crawl back to double-digit approval, only a bit higher than Franco, as the economy recovers from recession. Any renewed recession—especially if accompanied by high inflation, unemployment, and social distress—could not help but favor forces hostile to liberalization.

Brazil in the International Arena

Historically, the Brazilian giant has not enjoyed especially close relations with its neighbors. The Caribbean littoral is far distant from its concerns, the Andean states along the northern and western borders are separated from the centers of Brazilian life by huge expanses of nearly impenetrable terrain, and relationships to the south were dominated by the long-standing rivalry with Argentina over primacy in the Plate River basin.

Portuguese America was held together under a branch of the Braganza dynasty, while the Spanish empire in the New World broke apart into numerous internally and externally warring states sporting republican trappings during the initial post-independence period. But the domestic situations of its neighbors eventually stabilized, and, with the end of the monarchy in 1889 (as well as peaceful abolition of slavery the previous year), Brazil became less isolated in hemispheric affairs. During this same period, the United States was beginning to pursue a more coherent inter-American state system as one component of its emergence as a major power. In this process, the two countries gravitated into a cooperative relationship that came to be known as the "unwritten alliance."[22]

Over the following decades, Brazilian diplomacy dependably supported Washington's approach to hemispheric and global affairs, thereby obviating the prospect of a concerted bloc of Latin American resistance to the United States. In exchange, Brazil achieved a special relationship with an increasingly powerful patron that provided it with backing vis-à-vis still-suspicious neighbors (especially Argentina) and a more respected role in world councils. Despite some problems with the authoritarian regime of Getúlio Vargas in the run-up to World War II, this relationship was strengthened by Brazil's active participation on the Allied side during that conflict. In fact, it sent an expeditionary force that saw combat in the Italian theater and had its armed forces substantially reequipped as a counterweight to Argentina, which was widely perceived as pro-Axis. Although increasingly challenged in the postwar period by currents of leftist and nationalist opinion, the

[22] See E. Bradford Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1966).

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Brazilian-American relationship probably reached its apex during the first half of the period of military rule in Brazil (1964–85), especially when the Nixon/Kissinger White House began looking for regional partners to police the multipolar world it saw emerging. For their part, Brazil's leaders never regarded their country as a client state, but rather as an emerging power on the world scene.

The tensions inherent in those divergent perspectives were evident by the end of the Ford administration and became greatly aggravated after Jimmy Carter took office. Carter's active championing of human rights, disdain for military rule, and opposition to Brazil's nuclear ambitions enormously irritated Brasilia, which responded by abruptly suspending the country's long-standing military cooperation agreement with the United States and adopting a new foreign policy orientation (deemed "ecumenical pragmatism") that eschewed automatic alignment with Washington. Relations between the United States and Brazil have improved since then, especially after civilian government was restored in 1985, but the "unwritten alliance" was a thing of the past.[23] Brazil's preoccupation with its domestic difficulties and the United States' preoccupation with the final, intensive stage of the Cold War tended to diminish the salience of the relationship in both capitals. A persistent series of trade disputes born of Brazil's attempt to export its way out of the doldrums further sapped the remaining good will. Brazil's involvement in Latin American initiatives aimed at keeping the Cold War out of the hemisphere (e.g., recognition of Castro's regime and the Rio Group's effort to broker peace in Central America) demonstrated that little was left of the former special relationship.

Relations brightened somewhat when President Fernando Collor de Mello embarked on his liberalization program and looked favorably on Washington's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. But it was left to Cardoso to forge a truly new foreign policy strategy in the context of his ambitious economic reform. He has proceeded on two fronts. First, given Brazil's critical need for large capital inflows in an ever more competitive global environment, the Cardoso government has touted its accomplishments in a remarkably successful effort to attract American, European, and Asian capital and technological investments. Simultaneous efforts to end Brazil's nuclear program, maintain the military in a subordinate position, improve the situation for the country's poor majority, and forge friendly, cooperative relations with neighbors have also bolstered the nation's image abroad. The knowledge that the Cardoso government represents the best hope for realizing Brazil's enormous potential within the global economic system (as well as containing instability, radicalism, and nationalism) commends itself highly to multina-

[23] Roger W. Fontaine, "The End of a Beautiful Relationship," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1977, pp. 166–74.

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tional corporations, international financial institutions, and Western capitals—Washington above all.

The second, more narrowly self-assertive strand to contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, however, reflects the ambiguous attitudes toward market economics harbored by many important elements in Brazilian society. Indeed, Brazil's size and historic isolation have bequeathed to the population a certain disregard for currents shaping the rest of the world, and Brazilian elites have by no means given up on their aspirations to autonomous great power status. In fact, Brazil has been seeking a permanent seat on a reformed U.N. Security Council in recognition of its enhanced status in a changing world. It also remains wary of becoming subordinate to the United States through the economic integration of the Western Hemisphere and has therefore tried to engage Western Europe as a counterweight. These factors have significant implications for the region and the United States, especially in the context of efforts to forge a comprehensive inter-American economic community.

Thus, Washington policymakers have found in Brazil a crucial actor with pronounced ideas of its own on regional and global affairs. The abiding U.S. assumption has been that a hemispheric free-trade area would be constructed by sequential adhesion of countries (or coherent groups of them) to the NAFTA core: first would come Chile, then the Caribbean states, Central America, the Andean subregion, and finally Mercosur. But, as this effort has stalled in the U.S. Congress, it becomes apparent that Brasilia prefers that Mercosur should first be strengthened and expanded into some kind of "SAFTA," which would then negotiate a grand accord with NAFTA to reach the agreed-upon goal of a hemispheric trading zone by 2005. While there is nothing inherently illogical or malign in this notion, its practical consequences could prove far different than its stated intentions. After all, the principal obstacle to consummation of an all-embracing hemispheric free-trade area involving the United States is the opposition it faces on Capitol Hill. And if the U.S. Congress has proved reluctant to take the next logical steps with respect to such small, meritorious cases as Chile or some of the states of Central America, what would its reaction be to the much larger, vastly more complex, and inevitably controversial challenge of the South American states as a group? The outcome might well be interminable stalemate, leaving the hemisphere divided into two trading blocs.

The principal obstacle to a hemispheric free-trade area comes from Capitol Hill.

Another area in which Washington and Brasilia have tended to disagree is the use of political and especially military force to maintain international order.[24] The Cardoso administration certainly favors diplomatic efforts

[24] On the security implications of the proposed hemisphere-wide free-trade zone, see Georges A. Farriol and William Perry, "Thinking Strategically about 2005: The United States and South America," *Policy Papers on the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dec. 1999).

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to promote democracy and peace, as is evident from the fruitful U.S.-Brazilian cooperation to save constitutional government in Paraguay and resolve the conflict along the Peru-Ecuador frontier. But Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign office, almost always disapproves of coercive diplomacy and armed intervention within the hemisphere. This divergence of perspectives is likely to increase in salience as deteriorating security conditions along the northern tier of South America impel U.S. policymakers to assist the Colombian government in its struggle against guerrilla groups and drug traffickers. A further complicating factor is Brazil's sensitivity to the perception of increased foreign influence in the vast Amazon Basin.

Brazil also must pursue day-to-day economic policies on behalf of its own development aspirations, and these have the potential to create tensions with overseas commercial partners. During the initial phase of the Cardoso administration, policymakers in Brasilia were content to endure large, persistent trade deficits as the price for a stable currency and a more integrated relationship with Mercosur neighbors. But in the wake of the 1999 crisis, looming changes could complicate these relationships considerably. Brazil's devaluation of the *real* (over which there were no consultations within Mercosur) greatly injured Argentina's burgeoning trade with its northern neighbor and abruptly increased the competitiveness of Brazilian goods in the Argentine market. Moreover, needing to export its way out of the ensuing recession, Brasilia has subsequently pursued a hard line against claims from Buenos Aires for some kind of compensation, and the controversy has produced some unusually ugly rhetoric. Continuation of an aggressive export strategy could also lead to a renewal of formerly chronic trade disputes with other trading partners, including the United States, especially if the drive toward a market-development model were to fade in the face of protectionist pressures and poor economic performance.

The strength of Brazil's diplomacy will depend to a considerable degree on the stability of its government and the success of its efforts to revive economic dynamism. When Cardoso appeared at the height of his powers, for example, the potential for expansion of Mercosur to embrace the whole of South America was greater than it is today. But the recession of 1999 dimmed that luster and even threatened the future of the existing bloc.

In the end, Brazil cannot pursue a foreign policy that advances its aspirations to greater international standing unless the approach being carried out by the Cardoso administration is brought to a reasonably successful conclusion. That will depend in part on a stable world economic system that permits it adequate access to ongoing flows of investment, credit, and technology. But, perhaps even more fundamentally, Brazil must preserve its own domestic political equilibrium in support of sound economic policies over the long term.

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Implications for the Future

The remainder of the second Cardoso administration—culminating with the outcome of the October 2002 general elections—will represent a watershed in Brazilian history. Long-overdue efforts to modernize the country's statist development model so that it can compete in an integrated world economy and provide a decent standard of living for the whole population are effectively under way. But the task is only partially complete, and Cardoso must now confront the frustrating realities of Brazilian politics that ruined his three predecessors. Perhaps the significant gains already made can be expanded and passed on to another reformist administration. The hard truth, however, is that it will probably take decades of steady growth to lift the majority of Brazilians out of poverty and provide them with a real stake in stable, democratic government.

In the meantime, the dangerous currents of Brazil's peculiar political system could stymie or reverse the process. Such an adverse result would be particularly likely if another downturn prior to the 2002 general elections seemed to discredit the liberal economic model. Defeat of the reform process, much less a return to the dead ends of the past, would once again frustrate Brazil's efforts to become a modern society, thereby producing social unrest of dimensions threatening to democracy and denying Brazil the international recognition that its natural attributes have long promised.

Latin America needs a politically stable, economically dynamic Brazil to facilitate its full integration into the Western community of nations. In corresponding measure, seriously adverse conditions there would have very baneful consequences for neighboring countries, especially in the Southern Cone. This whole region is of increasing importance to the United States—given apparently immutable trends toward more intense socioeconomic interaction with its hemispheric neighbors and current plans for a comprehensive inter-American free-trade area.[25]

After more than a decade and a half of generalized advance toward democratic government and development, the societies of Latin America are now entering a more challenging period. Acute social problems, crime, violence, and political tensions—all conducive to economic regression, disorder, and new forms of authoritarianism—are threatening the region's recent gains and enormous future potential. Some states, such as Chile, seem to have escaped the devils of the past, while others, especially along the northern tier

[25] For greater detail on the importance of Brazil to the United States, see William Perry, "Brazil: Too Important to Ignore," *Policy Papers on the Americas*, July 15, 1996.

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of South America, may well succumb to them. But in a strategic and historic sense, the greatest unknown is the fate of Brazil. We shall know much more as events unfold over the next two years.

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Latin American Challenges

Regionalist Momentum in the Southern Cone

by Mark Falcoff

News from the southern South American republics is a bit like news from nowhere. Most Americans have only the vaguest idea of where these places are, and they end up on the front page only when there is some way of tying them in to U.S. policy or interests, which is not very often. In a way, this is not surprising. Historically, Argentina and Uruguay have been more closely associated with Western Europe than with the United States. Chile, in spite of long-standing U.S. involvement in its mining industry, has always maintained a remarkably diversified pattern of international trade, and its political life, at least superficially, was more nearly like that of Italy or France than that of neighboring Bolivia or Peru. Consequently, Americans, whose Latin American experience is usually restricted to Mexico (if that), often express astonishment, when visiting the region for the first time, at how "European" it is. And if they stay long enough, they are struck by the major differences between Argentina and Chile—differences that (apart from language) are almost as great as those between Germany and France. Ten hours' flying time from New York, however, is a rather high price to pay for a geography lesson, so it is hardly surprising that this region—called the "Southern Cone" because of its peculiar shape on the map—is so little known.

The Land of Juan and Eva Perón

It is ironic that the recent mini-boom of American awareness of Argentina is mainly the result of an atrocious but commercially successful film on the life of its former first lady, Eva Duarte de Perón. A hundred years ago the country had more serious and sober claims to our attention. With an

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economic growth rate unmatched anywhere in Latin America, it was regarded as the emerging power of the south, a kind of Latin American United States. Some of the similarities were striking, particularly the fact that the motors of its development were export agriculture, its openness to European investment and technology, and its population, which was largely of European immigrant extraction. This made it, along with Uruguay, the only really "white" country in Latin America (for whatever that might have been worth).

For many decades Argentines believed in the future of their country and eagerly challenged the United States at international forums. What is more, thanks to their close commercial relationship with the British Empire, they were often in a position to do so. Neutrality in both world wars made the Argentines rich, and their peso was for years one of the world's strongest currencies. The story has it that by 1945 the Central Bank in Buenos Aires had accumulated so much gold from the country's agro-export transactions that the ingots had to be piled in the hallways. The high point of Argentine prosperity and self-confidence was probably reached in the three to four years following the Second World War, and since that time the country has experienced a slow but steady economic decline. One could argue that the past fifty years of Argentine history have been marked largely by a search for effortless prosperity and lost social concord—a search that has so far proven fruitless.

Understandably, the causes of Argentina's decline—as well as its lost international status—have been the subject of a vast literature, both domestic and foreign.[1] No single explanation is fully satisfactory. Conservatives have preferred to point fingers at the huge, largely unproductive public sector created under General Juan Perón (1946–55), as well as an excessively politicized labor movement. Liberals and leftists have preferred to cast blame upon either the Argentine armed forces, whose leaders governed the country with no great skill for long stretches after 1955, or upon a selfish "oligarchy" of ranchers-cum-lawyers working in collusion with British and American imperialists to keep the country backward, or some combination of the two.

In reality, many of Argentina's troubles are due to events over which no Argentine, or for that matter any confabulation of Wall Street or City of London bankers, had much control: namely, the decline of Britain as a great power, and with it, the disappearance of markets reserved by imperial

[1] See, for example, Carlos Díaz-Alejandro, *Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Carlos Waisman, *Reversal of Development in Argentina: Postwar Counterrevolutionary Policies and Their Structural Consequences* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Gary W. Wynia, *Argentina in the Postwar Era: Politics and Economic Policy Making in a Divided Society* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978). For a taste of the more polemical literature, see Donald C. Hodges, *Argentina, 1943–76: The National Revolution and Resistance* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976 and subsequent editions), a kind of Trotskyite-Peronist interpretation; or Roberto Aizcorbe, *Argentina: The Peronist Myth* (Hicksville, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1975), an elegy to the supposed glories of the pre-Peronist era. In Spanish, of course, there are whole libraries devoted to the topic.

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preference, combined with the simultaneous the growth of European agricultural self-sufficiency through the creation of a common market.[2] In effect, since about 1952 Argentina has never been able to find the kind of clients for its agricultural exports that it enjoyed in its heyday, and the attempt to develop an industrial base of its own ran up against other difficulties such as a shortage of energy, competition from Brazil and other larger-scale economies, an outdated educational system, and a penchant for investing heavily in inefficient and unproductive state enterprises.

In the end, the country was always forced to fall back on comparative advantage. The problem, however, was that while agro-export earnings were never enough to restore the glittering days of the 1930s or '40s, they were still the country's best bet for economic survival. This dilemma eventually undermined the credibility of every government—Peronist and anti-Peronist, civilian and military, democratic and dictatorial—right up to the present. Argentina's latest misfortune has been the collapse of the Soviet Union, which until the late 1980s took as much as 60 percent of its cereal exports and paid for them in carefully hoarded dollars, pounds sterling, and other hard currencies.

The combination of economic stagnation and the loss of international status, both relative and absolute, produced some bizarre political consequences. From the 1950s through the early 1980s the country's leaders—often active members of the military—sought compensation in confrontation with outside powers (Brazil, Chile, the United States, Great Britain).[3] In nationalist circles, both civilian and military, there was much talk of *Argentina Potencia.* For many years a major war with Brazil was the chief strategic hypothesis of Argentine military schools, and both countries engaged not only in an arms race, but also the quest for nuclear credibility. (Both refused to subscribe to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American version of the Nonproliferation Treaty.)

The quarrel with Chile, apparently over possession of three tiny islands in the Strait of Magellan, was really about whether Argentina's trans-Andean neighbor should have something well beyond Argentina's reach, namely, a two-ocean navy. (A common slogan on window decals of Argentine automobiles in the late 1970s read, "Argentina in the Atlantic, Chile in the Pacific.") In spite of its Ruritanian flavor, the controversy was no laughing matter: the Argentine generals brought their country virtually to the threshold of war with Chile in 1978, and only dire threats from Washington (the exact content of which remains unknown) and the prospect of facing Chile's professionally superior army averted a conflict—literally at the last minute.

Confrontation with the United States came naturally to Argentines.

[2] While Argentina was not formally a member of the British Empire, from the Great Depression through the Second World War it was folded into the Ottawa system of imperial preference through an explicit agreement reached in 1933, the so-called Roca-Runciman Pact.

[3] Edward S. Milenky, *Argentina's Foreign Policies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978).

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U.S. agricultural protectionism closed American markets to Argentine exports in the 1920s, and competition in the international cereal market assured a tense and problematic relationship in the best of times.[4] Dislike and distrust of America and Americans was common on both ends of the political spectrum—a combination of jealousy and cultural contempt *à la française* on the Right, of jealousy and Third Worldism on the Left. Argentina's convoluted political scene, with Peronists and anti-Peronists virtually at daggers' edges for more than two decades, and weak civilian regimes punctuated (and truncated) by periodic military governments, left Washington with little to choose from. Indeed, even under right-wing juntas claiming to be anticommunist, Argentina's voting record at the United Nations strongly resembled that of leftist regimes elsewhere in the Third World, particularly on issues of interest to the United States.

When the armed forces seized power in 1976 and unleashed a wave of repression with a ferocity and extent hitherto unknown anywhere in Latin America, they unknowingly simplified the task of defining U.S. interests. Argentina became, in fact, the centerpiece of the Carter administration's new human rights policy, and bad relations became good politics in both countries. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Carter administration's hastily hatched grain embargo suddenly revealed the limits of its Argentine policy, and in fact President Carter himself was planning to mend his fences with the generals after his reelection, an event, of course, that never took place.[5]

Carter's replacement by President Ronald Reagan was viewed in Buenos Aires as a new era in U.S.-Argentine relations, and indeed for a brief period it was. Military-to-military relations, long frozen, were carefully resumed, and President General Roberto Viola and his successor General Leopoldo Galtieri were received with all honors in Washington. One sign of the new cordiality was Argentine willingness to lend a hand in Central America, where the new administration was still hamstrung by congressional restrictions on providing military assistance to the beleaguered governments of El Salvador and Honduras and the nascent anti-Sandinista counterrevolution in Nicaragua. Unfortunately for the Argentine generals, U.S. gratitude did not translate into concrete economic benefits, and growing unrest over unemployment and inflation led to a revival of political demonstrations for the first time in years. Partly in an attempt to neutralize domestic unrest,

[4] A very interesting work by Carlos Escudé, *Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la declinación Argentina, 1942–49* (Great Britain, the United States, and Argentina's Decline, 1942–49) (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Belgrano, 1983), drawing almost exclusively on declassified British and American materials, argues that Argentina's anti-U.S. foreign policy under Peron in the late 1940s led to costly retaliation by Washington, namely, exclusion of Argentine agricultural exports from the U.S.-sponsored European Recovery Program.

[5] See Mark Falcoff, *A Tale of Two Policies: U.S. Relations with the Argentine Junta, 1976–83* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989), pp. 22–25.

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General Galtieri took a supremely audacious leap and sent an invasion force to recover the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.

Roughly three hundred miles east of the tip of Patagonia and nearly three hours' flying time by jet from Buenos Aires, the Malvinas are an icy, windswept archipelago—hardly the sort of place one would expect to attract the interest of Argentines, a supremely urban, even metropolitan people. In fact, the islands are populated by a handful of hardy British settlers and many more penguins. However, the archipelago belonged to Argentina until the early nineteenth century, and its recovery had long been a principal desideratum on the national agenda. The decline of British power seemed to suggest a gradual devolution by default, and various postwar London governments actually explored the possibility—always to run up against the settlers, who were hostile to anything Argentine, and a well-placed and well-financed Falkland Islands lobby. General Galtieri's gamble was that the British were no longer in a position to protect their interests half a world away, and he almost guessed right. Unfortunately for him, the prime minister of the day, Margaret Thatcher, was a woman of iron determination—and one who had domestic political problems of her own, which recovery of the islands had the potential to neutralize. An expeditionary force was cobbled together in record time and dispatched to recover the islands, which it did with remarkable dispatch. After a moment's hesitation, the Reagan administration supported the British—as any student of Atlantic politics might well have predicted it would—revealing just how thin the new Argentine-American alliance really was.[6]

The impact of the defeat of the Argentine army in the field by an enemy that was, to say the least, geographically disadvantaged, had a devastating long-term impact on Argentine politics. The military was revealed to be incompetent not only to run the country but even to pursue its narrow professional mission. The short-term result was to force Galtieri's resignation and the calling of elections, but the longer-term outcome was even more significant. The Argentine armed forces, the country's most important power brokers since 1930, were forced to retire definitively from the political arena. All three branches have been subject to radical downsizing, conscription has been abolished, and effective civilian control established for the first time in over sixty years.

The reestablishment of democracy in Argentina on the first really solid bases since the 1920s has had important consequences for Argentina's foreign relations. The nuclear program has been dismantled and Buenos Aires has subscribed to the Tlatelolco nonproliferation treaty. Buenos Aires gracefully accepted the finding of a papal mediator to the effect that the islands in Tierra

[6] A particularly fascinating look into decision making during the war in London, Washington, and Buenos Aires comes from a book of interviews with policymakers in all three cities by Michael Charlton, *The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Dispute* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

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del Fuego belong to Chile. The growth of economic regionalism (see below) has superseded traditional rivalries with all of Argentina's neighbors. The arms race in the southern cone has effectively come to an end, though perhaps more for reasons of economic stringency than a strict remission of geopolitical rivalry.[7] Among other things, both Argentina's and Brazil's vaunted military industries have entered into receivership.

Relations with the United States have steadily improved, moderately under Radical president Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89) and then conspicuously under the Peronist Carlos Menem (1989–99). Perhaps the most emblematic example was the latter's dispatch of three warships to the allied fleet during the Gulf War, the only such contribution by a Latin American country. This decision was remarkable in that it represented a departure from Argentina's long tradition of isolation and neutrality in world conflicts. The United States has also specifically expressed its appreciation for the Argentine contribution to peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and the Sinai. President Menem even supported the U.S. position on Cuba for a time in the early 1990s, until he succumbed to domestic and regional pressures, although he did—along with Chilean president Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle—absent himself from the 1999 summit of Ibero-American leaders in Havana.[8]

Good relations with the U.S. are now a vote-winning agenda in Argentina.

Perhaps the strongest indicator of the shift towards warmer relations with the United States has been the fact that the newly elected government of Radical president Fernando de la Rua has affirmed that it will largely continue Menem's friendly posture. This is all the more remarkable because, during the previous administration, many Radical leaders were harshly critical of the country's supposed subservience to Washington. Even the new government's most left-wing member, Vice President Carlos Alvarez, has emphatically stated that good relations with the United States are now a vote-winning agenda in Argentina, in sharp contrast to times past.[9]

[7] The recent decision of the Clinton administration to lift the ban on the sale of high-tech supersonic aircraft in South America pleased no one. Theoretically, no single power was favored, but in fact the penniless Argentines were irritated that the more prosperous Chileans, who had the money to replace their fleet of outdated French Mirages, were likely to do so, even though it was by no means foreordained that they would buy U.S. equipment. As for the Chileans, they were angered and upset that the United States awarded Argentina the status of a major non-NATO ally—presumably a consolation prize for its inability to take advantage of the new opportunity to purchase U.S.-built supersonic aircraft. For their part, the ever-touchy Brazilians regarded the decision as a "provocation to Brazil," though why the United States should *want* to provoke Brazil (or even, why Brazil was important enough to want to provoke) is a huge mystery.

[8] Menem's position was that Argentina was staying away from the Havana meeting not so much out of distaste for the government there as in support of its neighbor Chile, whose government boycotted the meeting to protest Spain's attempt to extradite former dictator Augusto Pinochet, who was being detained by British authorities in London for violation of the International Convention on Torture.

[9] He could not help adding that this was because "the United States has changed; it no longer supports dictatorships in Latin America." Statement made at a meeting of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, August 1999.

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To be sure, this does not mean smooth sailing on all fronts in the U.S.-Argentine relationship. Although the Clinton administration—much to its credit—has lifted the decades-old ban on the importation of Argentine beef, and although the two countries have formed a common front against the European Union in defense of genetically altered crops, Argentina's inability to enact a world-class intellectual property law has led to considerable tension with American pharmaceutical companies, since many of their drugs are being produced by Argentine firms without proper respect for patents. For their part, Argentines continue to protest against the huge, congressionally approved subsidies for such U.S. exports as wheat and sugar, which put Argentine producers at an artificial disadvantage in the world agricultural market. Compared to the nettlesome political, military, and diplomatic differences of the past, however, these kinds of problems (far from uncommon in Latin America) should almost be a relief to policymakers.

The greatest changes in Argentina in recent years, however, have been economic rather than political or diplomatic. Assuming office in a moment of national panic and hyperinflation (1989), President Menem embarked upon a drastic economic reform that did away with what might be called corporatist Argentina. The country put up for sale some of its largest and most expensive white elephants—a 1937 state-of-the-art telephone system, electrical power plants, the state airlines, and even the state oil company, long a sacred cow for nationalists of all hues. The withdrawal of the state from large sectors of the economy has led to a return of Argentine capital abroad and massive new foreign investment. Much of the country's energy and communications network has been modernized, leapfrogging as many as ten generations of technology. At the same time, the partial privatization of the pension system has created domestic capital markets for the first time since the 1920s (formerly both the Argentine state and private sector had to borrow abroad to finance their operations). One indicator of the depth of the change is the availability, for the first time since about 1940, of fixed-rate home mortgages (until recently, all real estate sales—large or small—were cash transactions).

These reforms, however, have not come without a price. They have dramatically impoverished the country's middle class—the largest in Latin America—revealing the extent to which it has always been dependent upon bureaucratic preferments or employment in private companies with a privileged link to the government. The political consequences of this phenomenon have so far been limited to voting Menem's Peronist party out of office in October 1999, but it remains to be seen whether the new government of President de la Rua, a coalition of centrist and leftist parties and groupings, will be able to avoid a similar fate.

Apart from massive privatization, the other great economic change has been the emergence of Brazil as Argentina's most important customer and, largely as a result, its political and strategic lodestar. In a way, this is

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rather paradoxical, since Brazil itself is far behind Argentina on the curve of economic reform, is a much less socially integrated society, and suffers from a disorganized and often incoherent political system. On the other hand, the sheer size of the Brazilian economy—often cited as the eighth, ninth, or tenth largest in the world, depending on the year—and the existence of perhaps as many as 60 million people with near–"First World" purchasing power, dazzles foreign investors and has lured literally scores of billions of dollars in new investment into the country over the last ten years.

Brazil's importance to Argentina these days can hardly be underestimated, since it is the country's number one consumer of agricultural products. On the other hand, Brazil's rather cavalier attitude towards its currency—which stands in strong contrast to Argentina's rigid and disciplined dollarization—periodically exposes its Argentine neighbors to threats of devaluation.[10] Such a devaluation did in fact occur in January 1999, throwing Argentina into a recession almost literally overnight, from which it has yet to recover.

Argentina's close economic relationship with Brazil has strong political and diplomatic implications. These two countries, along with Uruguay and Paraguay, are members of Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur, or the Common Market of the South), a regional trading bloc that is supposed to grow into something much larger. Passports issued to citizens of member countries already bear a Mercosur stamp at the top (in obvious imitation of the European Union). Leaders of the member states make no secret of their plans for eventual political, military, and cultural integration. There has even been talk lately of a common currency (that would certainly *not* be the U.S. dollar).

In reality, Mercosur (called Mercosul in Brazil) is Brazil's attempt to draw its immediate neighbors firmly into its sphere of influence and to act as an alternative to the United States as a pole of attraction.[11] This is an ambitious project, but for the moment at least, seems less so in light of the reluctance of Washington to expand membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) even to relatively small and unthreatening economies such as Chile's. Meanwhile, Argentina has little choice but to draw closer politically to its principal market. At the same time, however, the country seems to have mortgaged its future to a questionable proposition, namely, that Brazil will emerge as an economic superpower on a par with the United States or the European Union. But given the physical and economic limitations of geography, it currently lacks any alternative.

[10] The term "dollarization" is used here rather loosely. In effect, the government has established a currency board that regulates the supply of pesos based on the number of dollars in the Central Bank's vaults. There has been some discussion of formal dollarization—that is, abandoning Argentina's own currency altogether—but for the moment this has been put on the back burner.

[11] In this sense it appeals greatly to those Argentines who miss the old "nonalignment" of the past, with Brazil taking the place of the former Soviet Union in diplomatic as well as economic terms.

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The Land of Allende . . . and Pinochet

If Evita Perón is the best-known Argentine around the world, the most famous Chilean is probably its late Socialist president Salvador Allende (1970–73). Taking office with little more than one-third of the popular vote, Allende allowed himself to be swept away by the ideological delusions of the period and a coterie of advisers close to Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. In due course the country was thrown into chaos, hyperinflation, and a condition of near–civil war, and Allende himself was contemplating resignation when he was overthrown by his own military chiefs. (He committed suicide in the presidential palace as the troops converged upon the building.) Ironically, he owes much of his retroactive prestige to the actions of his successor, General Augusto Pinochet, whose barbarous treatment of Allende's collaborators and supporters—over a thousand "disappeared" into graves still unknown, and many more cruelly tortured and exiled—has crowned three years of socialist misrule with an unexpected nimbus of martyrdom. The subsequent revelation that the United States had a hand in matters has added spice to the sauce, at least for anti-Americans around the world.[12]

An even greater irony is the fact that, during Pinochet's sixteen years of stern military dictatorship, the Chilean economy, which by 1973 had the largest public sector in Latin America after Cuba's, was drastically revamped by a team of economists trained at the University of Chicago. The result was a sustained period of economic growth, both qualitative and quantitative, the likes of which Chile had not known since the First World War. So dramatic was the turnaround, in fact, that by 1991 every country in Latin America except Cuba was poring over the Chilean experience. Studying along—much to the horror of the local Communist Party and its sympathizers—was the former Soviet Union, which had previously been thought of as the Promised Land of the Chilean Left.

If Pinochet expected gratitude for these achievements, he must have been sorely disappointed. For in a plebiscite convoked in late 1988 to determine whether his people would approve an additional eight-year term in office (with the possibility of another eight years after that) he was soundly defeated by a hitherto unimaginable coalition of centrist and leftist forces.[13] However, once Pinochet was gone, his Socialist and Christian Democratic

[12] See Paul Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1993), esp. pp. 48–84; and Nathaniel Davis, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985). Davis served as U.S. ambassador to Chile during the period mentioned in the title of his book. See also Mark Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–89: A Critical History* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1989), esp. pp. 199–250.

[13] This coalition, which is still governing Chile, is also an unexpected creation of the Pinochet dictatorship. It is made up of Christian Democrats and Socialists, both of whom were literally at each other's throats on the last day of the Allende regime. It took political persecution of an extremely crude kind to bring these former enemies together.

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opponents were faced with the task of governing Chile. As a result, almost overnight, critics of the free-market economic model were discovering its virtues, and over the ten years since the return of democracy virtually no changes have been made in the broad thrust of economic policy. The controversies that have shaken the country since then have been narrowly political: to what extent Chilean politicians should recover civilian control of the military; in what ways (if any) Pinochet's 1980 constitution should be amended; even whether Chile should finally legalize divorce (it is the only Western country that currently refuses to recognize such). To be sure, the center of the storm has to do with the validity (or invalidity) of the Chilean military's "self-amnesty," which is to say, the restrictions on the reach of civilian courts in matters relating to alleged crimes by members of the armed forces, and lately, the question of whether General Pinochet himself—finally returned after a long period of house arrest near London—should face prosecution.

Theoretically, the election of economist Ricardo Lagos, a socialist, to the presidency of Chile in December 1999 should bring these sensitive issues to the fore. Those who know the country well, however, are not so certain. Lagos's right-wing opponent, Joaquín Lavín, did so well in the first round of voting in November (he actually bested Lagos's score by a couple of points), that for the first time the leading candidates were forced into a runoff. Lagos prevailed, thanks to the support of the Communists and other small parties, as well as the return of some conservative Christian Democrats who had apparently deserted the coalition ticket in the first round. Even so, Lavín came perilously close to 50 percent of the vote. While some of the latter's success may have derived largely from the normal exhaustion of popularity of the ruling Christian Democratic–Socialist coalition after ten years in power, it also suggests that Chile is a rather more conservative country than many foreigners like to think. Lagos—a shrewd and able politician—surely knows as much and is likely to proceed with considerable circumspection, at least where economic issues are concerned. Although the new Chilean president does not deny his association with Allende—on the day of the coup, he was slated to become Chile's ambassador to the Soviet Union—he does affirm that he and the late president "live in different worlds." This is undoubtedly true: ideologically, Lagos is far closer to Britain's Tony Blair or Germany's Gerhard Schröder than to any historic icon of the Latin American Left. In and of itself that speaks volumes on the distance the country has traveled since it was almost literally on the verge of civil war a little more than twenty-five years ago.

Chile's relations with the United States have always been complex.[14]

[14] For a brief but comprehensive treatment by two senior Chilean diplomats, see Heraldo Muñoz and Carlos Portales, *Una amistad esquiva: las relaciones de Estados Unidos y Chile* (An Ambivalent Friendship: Relations between the United States and Chile) (Santiago: Editorial Pehuén, 1987).

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A small and isolated South American country sharing long boundaries with Argentina and Peru—both with irredentist claims to its national territory—Chile has historically reached outside the region to counterbalance its somewhat unfavorable geopolitical situation. In the nineteenth century it was a close ally of Britain (and to some extent remains so[15]) and to a lesser degree of the United States in the twentieth.[16] From the time of the First World War, the United States was the country's principal investor (largely in the mining industry) and creditor. It also exercised a strong influence in military, scientific, and academic circles—though never as strong as many Americans imagined. The presence of two large, imaginatively led Marxist parties (one of them clearly allied to the Soviet Union) and the challenge of Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba led the United States to invest heavily—both financially and otherwise—in the Christian Democratic experiment of Eduardo Frei Montalva's presidency (1964–70). The election of Salvador Allende was greeted by consternation and worse in Washington, and during the three years of Popular Unity (1970–73), the United States played a major role in keeping opposition parties alive. The coup itself was no surprise to Washington, nor indeed to most Chileans, but the particular form that it took revealed a barbarous side of the country's political culture that few people could have anticipated.

During the early years of the Pinochet regime, the United States contented itself with the knowledge that a Marxist experiment had been defenestrated before it had the opportunity to consolidate power, however high the human cost. By the mid-1970s, however, Pinochet's secret police were so emboldened as to operate beyond Chilean soil. The murder of former foreign minister Orlando Letelier in Washington and former army commander General Carlos Prats and his wife in Buenos Aires, as well as a failed attempt to assassinate former Christian Democratic politician Bernardo Leighton and his wife in Rome, drew international attention to the nature of the regime, and also put pressure on Washington to distance itself from Santiago.

Along with Argentina, Chile became a major target of the Carter administration's human rights campaign, with rather indifferent results. Pinochet's sound economic policies led to an unexpected boom, and many European countries, while deploring Chile's political system, were perfectly happy to take advantage of the congressionally mandated U.S. arms embargo (the Humphrey-Kennedy Act of 1976) to sell the country high-tech weaponry.

[15] As Baroness Thatcher, the former British prime minister, recently revealed in her defense of General Augusto Pinochet, the latter had provided Britain with valuable facilities in the war over the Falklands. Although this information could hardly be news to *cognoscenti* on either side of the Atlantic, that a former British prime minister would blurt it out in public shocked many people in both Chile and Argentina.

[16] Chile's position in the Second World War was more favorable to the United States than Argentina's, but not outstandingly so. See Michael Francis, *The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).

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The very fact of Chile's geographical isolation and its diverse pattern of international commerce insulated it somewhat from foreign pressures, and it benefited as well from the Sino-Soviet split: by persecuting Chile's Moscow-leaning Communist Party, Pinochet attracted the ardent support of Beijing.

As it did with Argentina, the Reagan administration took office determined to mend its fences with Chile, but had no Falklands war to bring matters to a head. For his part, Pinochet assumed that Reagan's conciliatory attitude constituted a blank check from the United States, instead of what it really was: an invitation to hasten the process of political normalization. By the mid-1980s, there was acute disappointment in Washington that "quiet diplomacy" yielded no results, and eventually the administration—goaded by a Democratic Congress and the human rights community—distanced itself from the Chilean regime and even to some extent encouraged its moderate opposition. The *volte-face* of an administration as obviously anticommunist as Reagan's had a bracing effect in Chile, demoralizing the government and emphasizing its international isolation. A long-planned plebiscite on Pinochet's continued rule in 1988 led to the invasion of an army of foreign observers who fanned out over the length and breadth of the country to ensure an accurate result. The defeat of the dictatorship—56 to 44 percent—set the stage for a transition that in many ways continues to this day.

Incorporating Chile into NAFTA would serve U.S. interests.

U.S. relations with Chile's two democratic governments since 1989 have been rather low-key and uneventful. The country experienced a new wave of American investment, particularly in forest products, financial services, communications, and viticulture. The arms embargo was also lifted, and military-to-military relations resumed slowly. But in the face of a firmly centrist Christian Democratic–Socialist coalition government, the United States remained largely disengaged from Chile's political life for the first time in decades. By virtue of its vigorous, booming, free-market economy, Chile expected to be the first South American country to conclude a free-trade agreement with the United States, but the high political price paid by the Clinton administration with its labor constituency to ratify the NAFTA dampened enthusiasm in Washington for further adventures of this sort. Chile's admission to an enlarged NAFTA was therefore postponed *sine die*—a humiliation that has not been forgotten by the country's political and economic elite, and which led it to search elsewhere. Originally cool to Mercosur, Chile has become an associate member and the new Lagos administration claims to be interested in full membership. However, Chile's tariffs are considerably lower than those of Brazil, and many technical problems need to be worked out. At the same time, Chile's trade patterns, with an important Asian component, are different from the Mercosur nations. In light of these issues, Chile would probably accept NAFTA membership were it offered by the next U.S. administration.

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In theory, Chile need not choose between Mercosur and a trade agreement with the United States (or with NAFTA). But in fact, the geopolitical realities behind Brazil's project for the Southern Cone would surely require something of the sort. In any event, unlike Argentina, Chile's mix of exports is such that it stands to benefit more from association with the United States, Mexico, and Canada than with the Mercosur states. Incorporation of Chile into NAFTA would also serve U.S. interests by demonstrating that priority is being given not to market size, but to the quality of a country's economic management—a lesson that cannot be taught too often.

The Land of Battle y Ordóñez

Tiny Uruguay, sometimes called the "Switzerland of South America," is really a long-detached Argentine province, or as one Argentine politician once quipped to me, "Uruguay is Argentina without the superego." Created as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil in the 1830s—largely through the good offices of the British, who were loath to see either of the regional powers dominate both sides of the River Plate estuary—Uruguay has long followed its own path in many areas.[17] Though drawn from the same ethnic stock as Argentines, pronouncing Spanish with the same distinctive accent, looking to Europe with the same wistful intensity, and producing and exporting the same agricultural and pastoral products, Uruguayans are more democratic, more egalitarian, and far more anticlerical. They are also more urban than even the Argentines: fully a third of the population lives in the capital of Montevideo or its immediate environs. Historically, Uruguayans have displayed a firm commitment to civilian political institutions, and in fact their only experience with authoritarianism in recent years was a brief military government (1973–83) when such were the fashion all over South America.

For the most part Uruguayans have avoided the acute social conflicts that have periodically divided Argentina and Chile, thanks to an elaborate European-style welfare state established in the early days of the century by a remarkable statesman and visionary, President José Battle y Ordóñez (1903–7, 1911–15). In contrast to Argentina, Uruguay was vigorously pro-Allied in both world wars. During the more repressive phase of General Perón's first period of power (1946–55), Uruguay offered refuge to many of the Argentine strongman's political opponents. Because its economy has long

[17] See M. H. J. Finch, *A Political Economy of Uruguay Since 1870* (London: Macmillan, 1981); Roberto Ares Pons, *Uruguay: provincia o nacion?* (Uruguay: Province or Nation?) (Montevideo: Ediciones del Nuevo Mundo, 1967); R. H. Fitzgibbon, *Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954); Milton Vanger, *José Battle y Ordóñez of Uruguay: The Creator of His Times, 1902–1907* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); and Martin Weinstein, *Uruguay: The Politics of Failure* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975).

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been dominated by agro-pastoral exports, it has suffered from many of the same postwar disabilities as Argentina. However, its elaborate system of entitlements (which at one time included retirement with full pay at age forty) has been even more effective in undermining economic growth than the Peronist-corporatist system across the river.

What is perhaps most remarkable about Uruguay is the degree to which its people remain largely impervious to the costs of an economy dominated by a hemorrhaging public sector and unrealistically generous social benefits. Although the three administrations elected since the return to democracy in the mid-1980s have valiantly attempted to convince their people of the need for market-oriented economic reform, they have failed. Uruguay is the only Latin American republic signally to reject the concept of privatization—in a plebiscite, no less. The result is that the country is kept afloat by tourism (Argentines and Brazilians flock to its beaches for three months a year) and remittances (perhaps as many as two out of ten Uruguayans live and work abroad, including a disproportionate number of young people and professionals trained in the sciences). It also benefits from a banking system that carefully guards the identity of depositors (hence the Swiss metaphor). A significant percentage of national income thus comes from Argentines and Brazilians, who have for years favored Montevideo as a safe haven for their liquid resources.

The political culture of Uruguay is a curious hybrid—Italian masonry grafted onto Scandinavian social democracy, nostalgia for the Second Spanish Republic (1931–36), and a kind of Latin American Trotskyism. These ideologies have been brought to the country by successive waves of immigration and by an odd mixture of engagement with and isolation from Western Europe. Its social-democratic sensibility is obviously up to date by the standards of current Continental politics, though in fact it long predates them. In many ways Uruguay more nearly resembles France in the late 1940s, where both advanced political and economic notions and conservative (with a lower-case "c") social customs commingled without difficulty. Insofar as Latin America is concerned, the Cuban revolution—too far away to be appreciated first-hand—is still regarded in many quarters as an event worthy of emulation, although its failure is evident to everyone else. The candidate of the Left in the 1999 presidential elections, Tabaré Vásquez, even closed his final campaign rallies with the highly evocative phrase of Che Guevara, "ever onward towards victory" (*hasta la victoria siempre*).

Uruguay's continuous flirtation with left-wing ideas has remained largely platonic: it is too small and too dependent upon its neighbors and upon the international financial community to embark on extravagant ideological adventures. Perhaps this very fact tends to encourage some left-wing play-acting in national politics, since everybody knows that in the final analysis things in Uruguay are bound to remain pretty much the same. This much was proven in national elections late last year when even Tabaré

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Vásquez promised nervous Argentines and Brazilians that he would maintain the secrecy of their numbered bank accounts. In the event, he received a perilously high score in the first round (just under 50 percent) and many predicted that he was bound to win the runoff because the country's two major parties—the Colorados and the Blancos—were incapable of putting aside their differences and uniting behind a single candidate. Those who so calculated were proven wrong when the Blancos, who had come in third place, threw their support to the Colorado candidate, who was the son of a former president and the great-nephew of President Battle y Ordóñez. If nothing else, the election proved that despite their apparent lack of economic sophistication Uruguayans are too sensible to push their country off a cliff.

Even more than Argentina, Uruguay's future depends upon Mercosur, and very specifically upon the economic fortunes of Brazil. Montevideo is now the center of the Mercosur secretariat and presumably could become the Brussels of a larger federation if the Brazilians succeed in courting other states—Chile, Peru, Bolivia, maybe even Venezuela—to become members. Meanwhile, Uruguay's somewhat shabby-genteel democratic society survives, dependent upon its neighbors and at the same time determined to preserve its own distinctive identity.

Why Should the United States Pay Attention?

The fact that the principal external economic actors in the Southern Cone republics are generally countries other than the United States has not isolated them from the worldwide trend towards Americanization in dress, food preferences, films, television programs, popular music, and lifestyles. Miami, New York, and Washington have become obligatory ports of call, and many travelers are now discovering points farther afield. After years of maintaining their monopoly on English, the tiny British communities that used to supply the language teachers throughout the Cone have been forced to cede most of their terrain to the American English spoken in most of the world. Paradoxically, while Brazilian economic influence is significant in countries such as Argentina and Uruguay (and perhaps even dominant in Paraguay), and even though the political elites of all the countries of the region profess a greater sympathy for Mercosur than any equivalent arrangement with the United States, there is little or no interest in anything Brazilian except popular music or an occasional excursion to a Brazilian beach. For its part, Brazil has to defend itself from the same Americanizing influences as its neighbors, with the important difference that U.S. investment in Brazil is growing far faster than anywhere else in South America, with political consequences yet to be determined.

The Southern Cone therefore remains to a remarkable degree *terra incognita*. Its relationship with the United States is growing, but other fac-

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tors—particularly economic geography—continue to place it outside of Washington's primary sphere of Latin American influence. There is no particular reason to regret the fact, but it does pose new and more subtle challenges to American business and American foreign policy. How well can the United States perform in areas of secondary (but still not insignificant) economic importance? To what degree do geopolitics still matter in determining foreign policy priorities? Should a region that is gradually converging with the United States in "soft" factors of power such as culture and consumer patterns be encouraged and welcomed into our sphere of influence, or should it be ignored or neglected? Can we learn to cultivate good relations with countries with which we coincide on many international trade issues, particularly vis-à-vis the European Union, which aspires to outflank the United States? In some ways these are very old questions, posed in a new manner. They deserve some thoughtful answers.

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NSC Reform for the Post–Cold War Era

by Carnes Lord

The National Security Act of 1947 created the framework and institutional structures that dominate American national security decision making today.[1] The act popularized a term—"national security"—that was to be the province of no single agency of the United States government, and established a cabinet-level committee charged with advising the president on the "integration" of the various aspects of national security policy. This National Security Council (NSC) and its supporting staff would eventually form the apex of a complex system of executive-branch policymaking that has few counterparts elsewhere in the world.

That the NSC system served the nation well, on the whole, throughout the vicissitudes of the Cold War is generally accepted. The available evidence suggests that the NSC more than proved its utility as a vehicle for presidential intervention in the national security policy process and for the reconciliation of conflicting agency perspectives. Indeed, where American policymakers most visibly stumbled (e.g., Korea in the fall of 1950, the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, the Iran-contra scandal), formal NSC mechanisms were—not coincidentally—least employed.[2]

What, then, of the present utility of the U.S. national security apparatus? Does the post–Cold War international environment invite or require fundamental rethinking of the meaning of national security and the way the U.S. government is organized to deal with the range of security issues it faces? Not long ago, the fiftieth anniversary of the National Security Act came and went with little public notice, and the Clinton administration, despite its commitment to "reinvent" government and its fitful attempts to redefine the

[1] *The National Security Act of 1947*, P.L. 253, July 26, 1947; subsequently amended 1949, 1953, 1958. A text of the original act may be found in Stephen A. Cambone, *A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning* (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 1998), appendix D.

[2] There is no adequate history of the NSC system. The closest approximation is John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991).

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national security agenda, has shown little interest in significant institutional change in this sector.[3] Over the last several years, however, dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs has become increasingly visible. Perhaps surprisingly, it is most evident in military quarters, but discontent has begun to surface in civilian policy circles as well.[4] The time is ripe, therefore, to assess the merits of the more important recent critiques of the NSC system and to determine whether and how it needs to be redesigned.

Origins and Performance of the NSC

It is worth noting at the outset that the National Security Act was not simply a product of the Cold War mentality or containment strategy. Although the developing antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union was already palpable by the time the act became law and no doubt exerted some influence on the supporters of the legislation inside and outside of Congress, the great 1947 reform of the national security system was more fundamentally a reaction to perceived deficiencies in American decision making before and during World War II. Just as the creation of the CIA was a response to the gross organizational failures in American intelligence that made possible Pearl Harbor, and defense unification gained momentum from the example of superior British coordination of its military establishment during the war itself, so did the establishment of the NSC reflect widespread dissatisfaction with the wartime leadership style of Franklin D. Roosevelt and a commitment to more orderly and disciplined decision making at the national level. These changes indeed signaled acceptance of the idea of the

[3] For an exposition of administration thinking about the basics of national security, see The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998). The "reinventing government" initiative spearheaded by Vice President Gore has focused primarily on management reforms reflecting current thinking and practices in the private sector. Laudable as such measures may be, their objectives are cost-effectiveness and efficiency more than improved policy outputs. For an authoritative assessment, see Peri E. Arnold, *Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905–1996* (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1998), chap. 12. One of the most significant institutional changes of the last few years in the national security arena, the reintegration of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Information Agency into the State Department, was congressionally driven, though it had initially been favored by the administration. See Carnes Lord, "The Past and Future of Public Diplomacy," *Orbis*, Winter 1998, pp. 49–72.

[4] See the remarks on the need to improve interagency cooperation in the report of the National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1997), pp. 66–67. Military unhappiness with the NSC process in the Clinton administration is apparent from George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1995, pp. 8–13. Former commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Charles Krulak has been particularly outspoken in questioning the adequacy of the 1947 act in the context of emerging domestic security threats. See his speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1997.

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United States as a permanent great power, but they had little to do directly with the Soviet threat.[5]

Whatever the original intention, however, the NSC apparatus and the newly empowered Defense Department and CIA clearly bore much of the burden of developing and executing American policy as the confrontation with the Soviets hardened. Some have argued that these new organizational tools, effective as they may have been, were also responsible at least in some measure for biases, missed opportunities, and other deficiencies that marred U.S. policy throughout this period.

This argument generally rests on some or all of the following assertions. First, that the 1947 system is inseparable from a culture of secrecy that distorts national priorities and encourages an amoral approach to dealing with perceived security threats, whether domestic or foreign. Secondly, that it privileges the military and intelligence components of national security, thereby favoring force over diplomacy and national or unilateral over international or cooperative solutions to policy problems. Thirdly, that it privileges the traditional political-military dimension of foreign policy at the expense of economics and nontraditional global issues such as the environment and human rights. Fourthly, that it privileges the foreign policy arena altogether, ignoring the security implications of domestic issues such as poverty or education and skewing national priorities away from them. Taken together, these tendencies are said to establish within the executive branch a nexus of bureaucratic power that escapes democratic accountability and tempts presidents to pursue irresponsible courses of action. According to one critic, "The institutions set up to fight the Cold War . . . have partially destroyed the freedom they supposedly were set up to defend. The vast military and intelligence apparatus created to preserve freedom and dignity instead may have smothered the rest of society and sown the seeds of paranoia among its citizens."[6] Whether the price Americans paid for their current national security institutions was too high even during the Cold War is, in this view, at least debatable. In today's world, lacking as it does a permanent military and intelligence threat of Soviet proportions, the rationale behind them seems still more tenuous.

Even if the argument sketched above were broadly correct, however, it would not be easy to prove that the alleged shortcomings of the NSC system were a more important source of policy failures than an array of other factors (notably, presidential misjudgment and elite arrogance), or that their liabilities outweighed their advantages. But the argument is not even broadly

[5] See, for example, Norman A. Graebner, ed., *National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945–60* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), overemphasizes the extent to which the NSC was simply a by-product of the struggle over defense unification.

[6] Gregory D. Foster, "In Search of a Post–Cold War Security Structure," McNair paper no. 27 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994).

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correct. Is or was the NSC system antidemocratic? In some sense, the answer is certainly yes. But the idea that national security policy can and should be developed in a "serious public conversation" between the government and "an enlightened public"[7] grossly overrates the competence of democratic elites, not to speak of the general population, and ignores the need (as Alexander Hamilton put it in his argument for a strong presidency) for "decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch" in foreign affairs.[8] It is hard enough for the executive branch to engage in a serious conversation with Congress over national security issues. Significantly improving executive-legislative relations in this area, though indeed greatly to be desired, will not be easy given the deplorable lack of expertise and interest in national security affairs in the contemporary Congress. But at least the problem is a bounded one, and under the right circumstances and with a modicum of political will, real progress is conceivable.[9] The idea of a national conversation, by contrast, is simply utopian.

At the same time, it is reasonably apparent that the trend-line of the Cold War years has, if anything, been toward, not away from, greater democratic accountability. The extent of congressional involvement in national security affairs is vastly greater today than it was fifty years ago. The Freedom of Information Act, the erosion of executive privilege, and liberal declassification regulations have made our government more transparent than any other in the world. What is more, "public conversation" between national security officials and legions of well-informed journalists, public policy experts, and academics goes on every day. Whether this greater transparency has improved the quality of national security decision making is another matter entirely.[10]

The idea of a national conversation about security is simply utopian.

Has the NSC system given disproportionate weight to the military and intelligence aspects of national security? Certainly from the perspective of World War II, this is hardly the case. One of its principal functions has been to guarantee the Department of State a place at the table of military policy formulation, from which it was conspicuously absent during the war years. Indeed, it was State's Policy Planning Staff that initially took the lead in the development of national strategy under NSC auspices. Whether the doctrine of containment developed during this era was in substance overly weighted toward the military instrument is a debatable issue, but even if true, there is

[7] Ibid., p. 9.

[8] *The Federalist Papers*, no 77. See also Terry Eastland, *Energy in the Executive* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), pp. 1–23.

[9] Consider Zbigniew Brzezinski, *In Quest of National Security* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), chap. 6.

[10] Daniel P. Moynihan has made what is probably the best case against Cold War secrecy and its present vestiges, in *Secrecy: The American Experience* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). But consider Michael Ledeen, "Secrets," *The National Interest*, Winter 1987/88, pp. 48–55.

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little reason to blame it on organizational bias. Economic and psychological measures loomed at least as large in the minds of NSC planners at this time (consider the Marshall Plan and Truman's Psychological Strategy Board).[11] Throughout the 1950s, President Eisenhower remained sensitive to the appearance or reality of military influence over policy and took important steps to curb it (for example, by assigning nuclear weapons development to the civilian-run Atomic Energy Commission and strengthening the powers of the secretary of defense relative to the uniformed military). In the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his civilian staff intervened massively in the formulation of strategy and the development of major defense programs. The military leadership sat by helplessly as two administrations gradually committed the nation to an unwanted unconventional war in Vietnam without benefit of an orderly national decision-making process.[12]

As for the CIA, it is worth observing that in its formative years the agency exerted influence over administration policy primarily through its direct relationship with the president, not as a participant in an interagency process under NSC aegis. This has since changed, but so has the agency itself. The congressional and media assaults of the 1970s essentially destroyed the freewheeling culture the CIA inherited from the World War II–era Office of Strategic Services and nullified covert action as an autonomous instrument of national policy.[13] This is not to deny, however, that the institutional weight of the CIA in national security decision making is in other respects disproportionate (an issue addressed below).

There is more merit to the charge that the NSC structure has helped create an unduly narrow conception of national security, with particular prejudice to the economic dimension of policy. But several points need to be made. First, the highly technical character of many economic, commercial, and financial issues makes it difficult as a practical matter to ensure their close coordination with other aspects of national policy. Secondly, in spite of its importance, this area is simply less risk laden and politically salient than traditional security issues, and thus less preoccupying for senior officials. Having said this, however, the case for greater integration of political-military and economic decision making is surely a strong one, and today even more than in the recent past. The relatively benign security environment and the continuing globalization of economic activity have increased the political and strategic significance of economic concerns for all players on the contemporary scene. Moreover, the conspicuous failures of the United States and the U.S.-backed international financial institutions with regard to recent crises in Russia and Southeast Asia clearly point to underlying structural problems in this arena that have yet to be remedied. These considerations lend legitimacy

[11] Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, pp. 50–56.

[12] H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).

[13] See John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).

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to the most important innovation in White House–level decision making over the last decade, the creation of a National Economic Council (NEC) by President Clinton in 1993.[14]

Much of the rationale for creating an NEC outside of the NSC system as such derives from the growing interdependence of the foreign and domestic aspects of the economy and economic decision making. As for the relationship among the NSC system, emerging global issues, and other domestic dimensions of national security, there is undoubtedly also considerable room for organizational improvement. On the other hand, it is hardly clear that the solution is to redefine security in so broad a way as to encompass health care, welfare, housing, education, crime prevention, drug treatment, or environmental protection, as some have suggested.[15] Such a move is apt to empty the term "security" of all content and legitimize a still more active, intrusive, and possibly coercive role for the federal government both at home and abroad. Waco and Ruby Ridge are flashing lights along that road. It is surprising that those critics who complain of the existing NSC system as a threat to American liberties are not more sensitive to the potential dangers this involves.

Quick Fixes, False Fixes, Unneeded Fixes

What changes are needed in contemporary national security organization and management? As a general proposition, it is hard to disagree with Gregory Foster's assertion that "we must seek a fuller integration of civil-military, domestic-international, national-supranational, government-industry, air-land-sea, and routine-emergency structures and processes than now exists."[16] Implicit in this proposition is the suggestion that the time-honored term "coordination" is inadequate to describe the central function performed by interdepartmental institutions such as the NSC and NEC. Fuller integration within and across departments can be seen as a particular imperative in our post–Cold War era of so-called complex emergencies involving more tasks, more agencies, and more international actors than in the past.[17]

But how to accomplish this? Foster would replace the current NSC

[14] For assessments of the NEC's performance, see Kenneth I. Juster and Simon Lazarus, *Making Economic Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997); and I. M. Destler, *The National Economic Council: A Work in Progress* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1996). The relative success of the NEC probably obviates any need for one of the most frequently suggested revisions to the National Security Act—formal inclusion of the secretary of the treasury in the NSC. See, for example, Rick Inderfurth, "Abolish the National Security Council," *Washington Post*, June 21, 1992.

[15] Foster, "In Search of a Post–Cold War Security Structure," pp. 24–25.

[16] Ibid., p. 26.

[17] See Douglas E. Lute, *Improving National Capacity to Respond to Complex Emergencies: The U.S. Experience* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998); and more generally, Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security* (New York: Free Press, 1988), pp. 102–4.

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with a "U.S. Security Council" that would include the president, the vice president, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and supra-cabinet "ministers" of international affairs, domestic affairs, and national resources. The secretaries of state and defense would report to the minister of international affairs, and other ministers would have similar oversight (though it is not clear what degree of control) over the various domestic agencies within their spheres. The CIA would be abolished, its data-collection and analysis functions would be transferred to the state and defense departments, and a new "director of national intelligence" would provide coordination. Finally, a "Council of Strategic Advisors" composed of distinguished private citizens and absorbing the functions of the Council of Economic Advisers and the National Economic Council, would provide broad advice to the president on matters of "global strategy."[18]

The idea of cabinet reform centering on the creation of one or more supra-cabinet positions is not new. It was embraced by Richard Nixon some thirty years ago and continues to have significant appeal. It is reflected in a variety of proposals as well as actual arrangements that endow departmental secretaries with additional, presidentially sanctioned authority to coordinate the activities of groupings of various other agencies whose policy responsibilities overlap. The Cabinet Council system established in the first Reagan administration to handle domestic and economic policy issues is perhaps the best example of an approach of this sort. Under such an arrangement, the chairs of cabinet-level committees are considered "dual-hatted" inasmuch as they serve both as a departmental secretary and a special representative of the president. "Dual-hatting" is a familiar and accepted concept in the national security arena. It is a common feature of high-level military command and control arrangements, and is part of the basic structure of the most senior military body in the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS is a committee made up of the chiefs of staff of the various military services and chaired by a four-star officer specially appointed by the secretary of defense and the president. Apart from the chairman (and, since 1986, a vice chairman), its members all have dual responsibilities as heads of their respective services and as military advisers to their civilian superiors. In similar fashion, the head of the CIA is dual-hatted as director of central intelligence (DCI), in which capacity he is responsible for coordinating budgetary and other issues across the intelligence components of the other national security agencies (and is supported by a small staff distinct from the CIA).

The idea of dual-hatting cabinet officials as a way to improve national security policymaking has recently been developed in a novel and intriguing direction in a study prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies by Stephen A. Cambone and apparently reflecting the views of former

[18] Foster, "In Search of a Post–Cold War Security Structure," pp. 29–33.

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high-ranking American officials. The model Cambone proposes is military command and control, or more specifically, the arrangements governing American theater or combatant commanders (the CINCs) as they relate to one another, the military services, and the JCS. His objectives are twofold: to strengthen presidential control of the process, yet without lessening executive accountability; and to free the president as much as possible from day-to-day responsibilities so he can concentrate on the essentials of national security. The result is a complex system that, among other things, would assign the president a greater or at least more visible operational role in national security decision making than he currently possesses, while eliminating the mechanisms he now relies on to support such decision making, namely, the National Security Council and the NSC staff.[19]

Cambone's scheme is a two-tiered one. Critical national security decisions would be assigned to a "National Security Directorate" (NSD) headed by the president as director and consisting of a deputy director and five cabinet secretaries dual-hatted as "Principal Members of the National Security Directorate" (PNSDs). Routine national security business, on the other hand, would be handled by a cabinet secretariat headed by a new and powerful official serving essentially as chief of staff to the president and overseeing a system of interagency committees. The deputy director of the NSD (essentially replacing the national security adviser) would have cabinet rank and be subject to Senate confirmation, but he would lack any operational authority, and his staff would be small and limited to purely administrative tasks. The five directorates within the NSD (each with its own interagency staff) would include: a Directorate for Crisis Management led by the secretary of defense, a Directorate for Regional Affairs led by the secretary of state, a Directorate for Home Defense Affairs led by the attorney general, a Directorate for Finance and Trade led by the secretary of the treasury, and a Directorate for Science and Technology led by the secretary of commerce or possibly the secretary of education. These six officials, together with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the director of central intelligence, would constitute a new "council of advisers" to the president on national security along the lines of the current NSC, but less formal and comprehensive. Policymaking as such would shift to the NSD and the cabinet.

A further distinctive feature of Cambone's structure is the position of operational director (OPDIR), conceived on the analogy of a military joint task force commander. OPDIRs are departmental officials temporarily dual-hatted as representatives of the NSD and the president and endowed with directive—not merely coordinating—authority over all agencies or assets of the government necessary for the accomplishment of an assigned mission. In this capacity, they are in an operational chain of command that extends

[19] The core argument is presented in Cambone, *A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning*, pp. 43–60.

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through one of the PNSDs and thence to the president. OPDIRs are envisioned as operational crisis managers with command authority over military as well as civilian assets, whether or not the director is a serving military officer. In addition, OPDIRs could be used as managers of major regional diplomatic or security initiatives, heads of investigative or reaction teams dealing with domestic emergencies, or directors of research and development projects.[20]

What is one to make of all this? In spite of the fact that Cambone presents his scheme as an alternative to more radical reorganization of the national security establishment, his suggested changes are still very far reaching, and their rationale is not always clear. If the national security adviser and staff are eliminated on the grounds that they are unaccountable filters between the president and the line agencies, why create a powerful cabinet secretariat exposed to precisely the same charge? Moreover, as Cambone admits, the two-tiered arrangement is a recipe for bureaucratic struggle between the NSD deputy and the cabinet secretary.[21] The problem, of course, is that it would be extremely difficult to distinguish in a consistent and nonarbitrary manner between critical and routine national security business.

Similar problems arise in the proposed organization of directorates within the NSD. Cambone would assign issues to the Crisis Management Directorate under the secretary of defense when "the preponderance of assets deployed" belong to the Pentagon or when U.S. assets or personnel are "likely to be resisted by force of arms." This would represent a major change in the long-standing U.S. approach to crisis management, which stresses the importance of close civilian control of military participation in crises precisely because of the risk of war. Moreover, the criteria just mentioned would invite constant challenge by the State Department and other civilian agencies. As for the Directorate for Regional Affairs, its mandate is so broadly defined that it would severely undermine the State Department's statutory responsibilities for the conduct of foreign policy. Predictably, its staff would become a mini-NSC, locked in bureaucratic trench warfare with Foggy Bottom in spite of having to answer directly to the secretary of state. Finally, the choice of the attorney general and the secretaries of commerce or education to head their respective directorates is problematic at best. Home-defense issues are not exclusively or even predominantly legal in character. Indeed, what is most needed in this area is a strategic outlook and greater operational competence—neither of which is a particular strength of the Justice Department. The secretary of commerce or education would lack even minimal credibility as the government's science and technology czar.

Finally, all of these problems beg the larger question of whether dual-hatting cabinet secretaries is really the answer to deficient presidential

[20] Ibid., pp. 61–83.
[21] Ibid., p. 59.

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control. Dual-hatting can work as an organizational strategy only where roles are genuinely synergistic and do not conflict directly. The history of the JCS provides a cautionary tale in this regard. It was for many years a notorious fact of Washington life that the corporate interests of the various military services frequently took precedence over the requirements of "jointness," that is, of providing impartial, well-integrated, and cogent military advice to the civilian leadership. Following the changes introduced by the Defense Reform Act of 1986, which gave the chairman enhanced authority in representing military views to the president as well as in controlling the Joint Staff, this situation has certainly changed for the better.[22] But whether the process can truly function as advertised without a strong and persuasive chairman (as in its formative era under General Colin Powell) remains an open question. There can be little doubt that Cambone's scheme sets up serious conflicts of interest for most if not all of the major cabinet players involved (the secretaries of state and defense and the attorney general). Where such conflicts exist, moreover, the chances are good that other agencies will be less inclined to defer to the leadership of these officials. Finally, the reality is that agency heads simply lack the time, inclination, or incentive to spend much energy on what is perceived as White House business rather than agency business. To what extent all of this might increase the requirement for active presidential intervention is a question Cambone does not address, but it is far from clear that the net result of the changes would be to lessen the burden of presidential management.

The least one can say is that Cambone's case against the existing system is not proven. The case against the NSC adviser and staff in particular is implied rather than stated, and Cambone nowhere acknowledges the strongest arguments that can be made in their behalf: to wit, that they provide the president a source of advice undistorted by bureaucratic imperatives and serve as an impartial arbiter of conflict within the bureaucracy itself.[23] As for the division of labor between the NSD and the cabinet secretariat, it is simply unworkable. Cambone would replace a substantive principle of White House organization (national security policy versus domestic and economic policy) with a functional one (critical versus routine policy). While there is some merit to the idea of a single White House staff integrating policy across the foreign/domestic divide, any attempt to create separate organizations with (necessarily) vague functional mandates is a recipe for infighting and general confusion.[24]

All of this having been said, it must also be emphasized that there is much of value in the Cambone study. In the first place, its premise that

[22] "Goldwater-Nichols: Ten Years Later," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, pp. 10–66.

[23] For the broader argument, see Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*, pp. 61–113.

[24] For an earlier proposal along similar lines, see Peter Szanton and Graham Allison, *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), chap. 4.

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presidential control of the national security bureaucracy is inadequate and in need of strengthening cannot reasonably be disputed, the hapless Clinton presidency notwithstanding. Secondly, the idea of creating a system of presidential command and control along military lines has much to be said for it. The need for such a system has long been recognized in "crisis management" operations, but its implications for the institution of the presidency as a whole have never been fully addressed. Thirdly, the OPDIR concept holds great promise as a mechanism for enhancing presidential control of certain kinds of activities and improving responsiveness and interagency cooperation at the operational level. Finally, there are a number of lesser proposals—for example, the establishment of a new national security career system (similar to the joint system within the military)—that are long overdue for serious discussion.

If the case for radical reform of the NSC system is weak, the case for limited reform is strong—indeed, in some respects stronger than Foster, Cambone, and other critics seem to recognize. Crisis management, strategic or policy planning, intelligence, and domestic preparedness are functional areas that could benefit substantially from institutional reform.

Mending the NSC System

Crisis management has been recognized since at least the early 1970s as a proper and indeed necessary function of the National Security Council and its staff. NSC staff leadership of an interagency crisis management committee (currently the Deputies Committee) has been generally accepted by all players. During the early Reagan years, a Crisis Management Center (CMC) was established within the White House with its own substantial staff to monitor developing crises and provide technical support to facilitate crisis decision making.[25] Though by all accounts reasonably successful, this experiment ran afoul of bureaucratic jealousies and the Iran-contra scandal, which magnified sensitivities throughout Washington to any "operational" White House staff role. By the early 1990s, the CMC was essentially defunct.

There can be little question that crisis decision making has been a conspicuous weakness throughout the Clinton administration. The interventions in Somalia and Haiti, the Bosnia quagmire, the missile raid against Sudan and Afghanistan, the mini-war against Iraq in late 1998, and the Kosovo adventure all gave evidence of poor planning, indifferent execution, failures in articulating and defending policy, and elementary problems of coordination both within the U.S. government and with its allies and other

[25] Ronald H. Hinckley, "National Security in the Information Age," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1986, pp. 25–39.

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interested parties.[26] In August 1997, General John Shalikashvili, shortly after retiring as JCS chairman, publicly criticized the divided leadership and lack of interagency cooperation evident in recent U.S. military operations abroad.[27] Although the White House has made a reasonably successful effort to improve interagency performance in the limited sphere of peace operations or "complex emergencies," the larger problems remain.[28]

Strategic or policy planning is also a commodity in short supply in the Clinton administration. Although the president's personal style and predilections are obviously a factor here, the institutional dimension should not be dismissed. An administration that could embarrass itself to the extent this one did in its recent negotiations with the visiting Chinese premier over China's entry into the World Trade Organization evinces flaws in policy development much deeper than can be accounted for by presidential unreliability alone. The examples could easily be multiplied—consider NATO expansion, or policy toward the former Yugoslavia or Iraq. It is true that institutional support for planning in the federal government has never been especially strong, but it was considered the primary function of the NSC system in its earliest years, and the prominence during this period of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff was largely owing to its role in that system. Planning was especially encouraged by Eisenhower, who well understood its value through his experience in World War II and before. In the post–Cold War world, moreover, systematic planning may be even more essential to the United States than in the recent past.[29] During the Cold War, our principal worry was a single, closely observed, and relatively predictable foreign adversary. Today, the threat environment, while less dangerous, is more diffuse and opaque, and capable of unpleasant surprises. This is only in part an intelligence issue. It points also to the need for better analysis and forecasting of foreign trends, more sophisticated conceptualization of U.S. interests and objectives in the longer run, and useful contingency plans to deal with the unexpected.

This brings us to the question of intelligence and its place in the National Security Council system. Of all the traditional disciplines of national security, intelligence is the only one that has been widely seen in recent years as a candidate for fundamental reform. This is partly a result of some

[26] Carnes Lord, "Crisis (Mis-) Management," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1999. For discussion of Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, see Lute, *Improving National Capacity*, pp. 14–30.

[27] Philip Shenon, "No G.I. Role Seen in Arrests of Bosnian War Suspects," *New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1997.

[28] Presidential Decision Directives 25 (May 1994) and 56 (May 1997) mandate the establishment of an NSC-led "Executive Committee" to conduct formal and comprehensive planning as well as implementation of complex contingency operations. Uniquely for this sort of interagency committee, the Excom is explicitly directed not only to develop an operational plan along military lines, including the identification of resource requirements, but to exercise it and to provide a written after-action report. Further, in order to strengthen accountability, all Excom members are required to be presidential appointees.

[29] For a good statement of this case in the context of the Defense Department, see Carl H. Builder and James A. Dewar, "A Time for Planning? If Not Now, When?" *Parameters*, Summer 1994, pp. 4–15.

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spectacular counterespionage failures (notably, the Aldrich Ames case) and partly of continuing turf wars between the CIA and Pentagon (notably, intelligence support for military operations—a notorious problem in the Gulf War). A raft of studies by congressional committees, special commissions, and private groups of various kinds over the past decade has highlighted continuing weaknesses in the performance, internal structure, and procedures of the intelligence community (IC) as a whole, and proposed a variety of more or less far-reaching reforms.[30] While a few significant changes have occurred within the IC in response to these criticisms (e.g., the creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in 1996), Congress has so far failed to act. The momentum for reform seems largely lost, even though a good deal of dissatisfaction with the status quo still exists. Unquestionably the most cogent and well-informed critique of the contemporary IC is that of a distinguished group of practitioners led by retired Lieutenant General William Odom (former head of army intelligence and director of the National Security Agency). It calls for major organizational changes, including the abolition of the National Reconnaissance Office, the creation of a new National Counterintelligence Service, a strengthening of the DCI's second role as head of the IC, and a drastic restructuring of the CIA that would strip it of the intelligence analysis function. It goes so far as to consider as a serious option the temporary abolition of the CIA's clandestine service and retirement of the agency's name to symbolize the need for a new institutional start.[31]

The tendency of most other studies of the IC has been to seek to enhance the authority of the DCI, the better to protect the intelligence function from the policy agencies and the bureaucratic impulses that supposedly lead them to neglect it. Two points need to be made. First, the canonical separation of the intelligence and policy functions that has been at the core of the CIA's identity since its beginning is highly questionable. Arguably, much of what has been wrong with U.S. intelligence reflects the extraordinary autonomy the CIA has enjoyed within the security establishment. The original promise of a centralized intelligence organization was that it would provide national-level intelligence analysis free of the distorting perspectives of the military and diplomatic services. The CIA indeed fulfilled

[30] Presidential Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996); Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations, *Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996); Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence, *In From the Cold* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996); Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, *The Future of U.S. Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1996). A useful general account is Richard A. Best, Jr., and Herbert Andrew Boerstling, *Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949–96* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1996).

[31] Lt. Gen. William E. Odom et al, *Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century* (Fairfax, Va.: National Institute for Public Policy, 1997), esp. pp. 96–97.

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this promise in a sense. But there can be no denying that, in the process, the agency developed a strong institutional culture of its own that has introduced other distortions in the intelligence process. The worst of them is the idea that the integrity of the intelligence business depends on its maintaining a healthy distance from national policy and the officials who make it.[32]

The second point has to do with the contemporary information revolution and the declining importance of secret intelligence. Much of the CIA's bureaucratic clout during the Cold War derived from its role as chief interpreter of the Soviet Union, a state dedicated as a matter of principle to denying information to its adversaries. With the disappearance of the USSR, the unique (and expensive) surveillance technologies the CIA developed to penetrate its Soviet target became less valuable, and the agency's claim to unique expertise was called into question. At the same time, technological developments in the private sector, such as high-resolution photoreconnaissance satellites and above all the Internet, with its vast and readily available information, further eroded the CIA's comparative advantage in information collection and analysis. The very agility of electronic communication is a major challenge to the heavily bureaucratized and hierarchical culture of the CIA. But the profusion of unclassified information sources of all kinds has also made the agency's claim to being the primary producer of "all source" intelligence for the government as a whole seem increasingly antiquated.[33]

These technological leaps have convinced many that the United States is in the midst of a "revolution in military affairs" that will fundamentally alter the way it goes to war. Central to this notion is the claim that the traditional distinction between military intelligence and operations is rapidly becoming untenable. The growing integration of reconnaissance and strike systems on the battlefield has important implications for future relations between intelligence and operational personnel and the organizations to which they belong. Little systematic attention seems to have been given to the implications of such technologies at the strategic level. But it is at least plausible to suppose that they call for a complete rethinking of the relationship between the IC and the operating agencies—one that accepts as its starting point the need for a greatly diminished role for the CIA.[34]

What steps might be taken to improve the performance of the American government in these areas?

[32] On this issue, see especially the report of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, and Kenneth E. deGraffenreid, "Intelligence in the White House," in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Intelligence and Policy*, ed. Roy Godson (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 9–31.

[33] See Robert D. Steele, "Relevant Information: A New Approach to Collection, Sharing and Analysis," paper presented at the Tenth Annual Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., Apr. 1999.

[34] On the implications of the ongoing "revolution in military affairs" see, for example, Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki, eds., *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995); and Joseph S. Nye Jr. and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs*, Mar./Apr. 1996, pp. 20–36.

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The first and most essential step—one that should take precedence over any major reform in the national security agencies themselves—is a reconfiguration of the NSC staff. Instead of a single NSC deputy, as at present, there should be four, with functions demarcated on the model of higher-level military staffs. A deputy for operations (the J-3) would be the principal deputy, with responsibilities for managing crises and staying on top of unfolding events. A deputy for information (the J-2) would be the senior NSC intelligence officer, yet with broader responsibilities for management and oversight of national-level information technology issues and systems, including line authority over a reconstituted Crisis Management Center. A third deputy (the J-5) would handle policy and plans. A fourth (the J-4) would be dual-hatted as deputy of the National Economic Council, with responsibility for international economic issues and perhaps for general questions involving the national security budget and resources.

This reorganization would achieve several goals at once. First, it would enhance the authority and reach of the national security adviser and ease existing decision-making bottlenecks by providing him with additional senior staff and strengthening national-level planning and crisis-management functions. Secondly, it would make room for the increasing importance of economic and resource questions in the contemporary policy arena and formalize an institutional arrangement that has worked reasonably well to date.[35] Thirdly, it would provide a central locus for the integration of information and intelligence concerns above the level of the DCI or the IC generally, and a vital bridge between the worlds of intelligence and policy. Ideally, the NSC J-2 would become the executive agent for a new "National Information System" that would become the national-level equivalent of the integrated military command system (the "system of systems") envisioned by the proponents of the revolution in military affairs.

A second step is the reconstitution of a crisis-management and decision support staff within the White House. Such an organization should work closely with the NSC staff, but in a strictly supporting role. It should be responsible for technical support for White House information requirements, information fusion for crises and other special situations, database management, indicators and warning analysis, and the development of crisis-related doctrine and procedures. In order to function effectively, however, this organization would also have to be given sufficient authority to coordinate crisis-management procedures across the national security agencies and to oversee the formal aspects of interagency crisis-management operations. Reportedly, a major effort sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research

[35] The tentative suggestion is offered here that the NSC/NEC deputy take on some role in the area of national security resources, thereby strengthening communications and cooperation between the NSC and the Office of Management and Budget as well as White House congressional liaison personnel on strategically important resource allocation questions. See Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*, pp. 137–44.

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Projects Agency is now underway to develop a new generation of computer software tools for crisis management at the national level.[36] But to what extent this effort is driven by policy requirements rather than the push of technology, or is linked to a vision of organizational change, remains to be seen.

A third step would involve the creation, or re-creation, of a genuine interagency planning process under NSC auspices. The idea of a purely White House–centered planning operation is sterile and unworkable. By the same token, the State Department's Policy Planning Staff can never be effective without an intimate link with the NSC staff and structure, as in its glory days under Truman and Eisenhower. An NSC J-5 would not be an autonomous planning body, but rather the catalyst and coordinator of planning throughout the national security agencies. In order to perform effectively in this role, however, it could not afford to be seen simply as a pass-through for work being done elsewhere in the government. It would have to perform a genuinely integrative function requiring the application of substantive expertise drawn from the NSC staff as a whole or (as has happened not infrequently in the past) from a network of nongovernmental consultants. Contemporary information technologies open up many new possibilities for bringing this sort of expertise to bear in an effective and timely manner.

There is little justification for the ungainly intelligence bureaucracy as it exists today.

To try to discuss the intelligence function in detail would take us too far afield. Suffice it to say that a strong case can be made for the devolution of major responsibilities for intelligence analysis from the CIA to the policy agencies, primarily State and Defense. Clearly, there remains a role for a strategic intelligence organization with a special relationship to the White House and NSC, but there is little justification for the ungainly intelligence bureaucracy as it exists today. As for the CIA's clandestine service, the Directorate of Operations (DO), its usefulness in the post–Cold War era is certainly debatable.[37] At the very least, there needs to be a readjustment of the DO's relationship to the rest of the government, including the Congress. It can be argued that the special relationship that has developed between the CIA and Congress in the realm of covert action has only aggravated the agency's isolation within the executive branch and hampered whatever overall effectiveness such operations may have. The time has come in this case to return to the drawing board.[38]

[36] George I. Seffers, "Crisis System for President," *Defense News*, Mar. 30, 1998.

[37] For a contrary position on the utility of covert operations, see Thomas Henriksen, "Covert Operations, Now More than Ever," *Orbis*, Winter 2000, pp. 145–156.

[38] Consider Carnes Lord and Gary J. Schmitt, "Strategic Engagement: Some Modest Proposals," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 13 (1994), pp. 253–59.

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Organizing for Homeland Defense

The other bureaucratic sector that plainly demands radical reform is domestic preparedness. As noted earlier, this is a field that once loomed much larger in organizational arrangements for national security than it does today. National industrial mobilization and civil defense were initially viewed as an important focus of NSC activity. Today, increasing attention is being paid to the need for a comprehensive approach to what is sometimes referred to as "homeland defense," as well as new national-level organizations and mechanisms to bolster the fragmented, disorganized, underfunded, and in some cases merely nominal capabilities the U.S. government now possesses. A recent report by a high-level study group urges the necessity of breaking down traditional barriers between foreign and domestic security threats and between national security and law enforcement. Among other things, it recommends creating a National Terrorism Intelligence Center, a National Information Assurance Institute (designed primarily to provide a vehicle for public and private-sector collaboration in countering potential cyberthreats), and a Catastrophic Terrorism Response Office.[39] The Clinton administration, in response to similar concerns, launched a major initiative to review and strengthen U.S. government and private-sector "infrastructure protection" efforts across the spectrum of possible threats.[40] The United States is, however, far from having a well-conceived and comprehensive architecture that would guide reform efforts in these and related areas.

The basic organizational problem, which has been in no way alleviated by recent changes, is that the agencies normally assigned domestic emergency responsibilities are either bureaucratic backwaters lacking credibility in such matters as international terrorism (e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency—FEMA) or handicapped by a narrow law-enforcement mentality and excessive turf consciousness (e.g., the FBI). It is all the more important, then, that this function be overseen and anchored at a high level within the national security structure. How might this be done?

One plausible approach would involve the following elements. First, the function must have an NSC-level presence. Perhaps the best solution is a new "director of national preparedness" (DNP), who would be made statutory adviser to the NSC on the model of the director of central intelligence. Like the DCI, this official could be dual-hatted, as DNP and director of FEMA (or a successor agency that could be given a broader and clearer legislative

[39] Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Combatting Catastrophic Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec. 1998, pp. 80–94. See also Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, *America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), chap. 5.

[40] In 1998, the president appointed a national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection and counterterrorism under the national security adviser, and created an interagency coordinating committee and a new center for infrastructure protection and domestic crisis management within FBI headquarters in Washington. "Crisis Center is Expanded And Updated By the F.B.I.," *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1998.

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mandate). Also on the analogy of the DCI, he could be supported by a "National Preparedness Council," a group of senior civil servants and staff reporting directly to him, with policy oversight and coordinating responsibilities over such functional areas as industrial and manpower mobilization, protection of infrastructure, civil defense, continuity of government, and so-called consequence management for natural disasters and terrorist or state-sponsored military incidents.[41] Finally, an argument can be made for assigning policy-making and perhaps even operational responsibilities in this area to the vice president. Notoriously underutilized, the vice president is in a unique position to provide leadership to the entire federal bureaucracy, the Congress (where he is an *ex officio* member of the Senate), and (of particular importance in this context) state and local authorities. He could play a critical role in sponsoring the DNP within the government, perhaps as chairman of a cabinet-level "National Preparedness Policy Board," and could even be made chairman of an interagency crisis-management committee to be activated in the event of domestic emergencies.[42]

It's Up to the Next Administration

As noted at the outset of this discussion, major organizational reform is not the only—and perhaps not even the straightest—path to improving U.S. national security decision making. Many changes in areas such as personnel recruitment and training, information management, budgeting practices, and interagency procedures could significantly improve the way Washington conducts its business. Some of these steps would be modest; others would require wrenching cultural change. But their payoff could be very substantial, and it is a measure of the poor quality of the public discussion about national security organization and management that issues such as these have scarcely been addressed, let alone adequately studied. It is to be hoped that the new administration will not shirk this challenge.

[41] The concept of a National Preparedness Council was first proposed by Joseph Muckerman, former director of emergency planning in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. See John R. Brinkerhoff, "The Late, Great Arsenal of Democracy," *Orbis*, Spring 1995, pp. 223–25.

[42] A vice-presidential role is mentioned in the valuable discussion of FEMA's future role in James A. Blackwell, Jr., "Roles, Missions, and Functions for National Security Preparedness," *Parameters*, Summer 1994, pp. 77–84. The National Preparedness Policy Board proposed here differs significantly from the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board that existed from 1981 to 1985. The EMPB was a subcabinet-level organization chaired by the national security adviser, with its own interagency secretariat and system of working groups. See John R. Brinkerhoff, "The Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board," unpublished paper, Sept. 1997. Much of the justification for what may seem an unwarranted bureaucratic elevation of the preparedness function has to do with the widely acknowledged need for greater military involvement in it. The employment of military forces in missions that for the most part are heartily disliked and resisted and pose difficult problems of coordination with civilian agencies and authorities is a challenge that should not be underestimated. See Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, *America's Achilles Heel*, pp. 313–20.

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Women Can Never "Belong" in Combat

by Anna Simons

Demi Moore never perspired in the movie *G.I. Jane*, she sweated. And she had to do so in order to convey how much work was involved in becoming the first female member of a combat-oriented Special Operations team. No woman currently serves in such a unit. But what Moore's performance suggests is that if only the right female were given the opportunity to prove her ability to meet the same physical standards as the military's most elite combat soldiers, then even these men would have to grant her their grudging respect. She would belong, and presumably pave the way for other gritty women.

Hollywood, of course, gets this completely wrong. Respect does not guarantee belonging. No matter how much respect a particular woman may garner, no matter how courageous or physically adept she might prove to be, not even the military's most unconventional combat units are unconventional enough to accept a female as a male. This observation, transparent though it may seem, remains opaque to those whose crusade it is to see the armed services tear down what they regard as misogynous gender walls. Nevertheless, in today's military, Moore's character (like Meg Ryan's in *Courage Under Fire*) would have to be shown respect not only because she is an officer, but because a chilly climate of fear pervades the services. It has been fed by the combined aftereffects of the Tailhook scandal, the sexual harassment charges at Aberdeen Proving Ground, and the long reach of retroactive and sometimes vengeful political correctness.

Perhaps, then, we should not consider it surprising that the never-ending debates over the combat exclusion laws, which preclude women from serving in front-line or behind-the-lines units, continue to generate a fog of battle all their own. Lost in most of the arguments is common sense, both regarding the purposes and functions of the U.S. military—deterrence and defense—and the potential consequences of mixing men and women together—sexual attraction and pregnancy. Rather than regarding th se predictable outcomes as unalterable realities, however, those who advocate ifting the ban point to a long American

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tradition of being able to amend behaviors, beliefs, and ideals. Culture, so far as they are concerned, *can* be changed, hence they seek to legislate into existence a series of new attitudes among men and women alike.

But careful examination of the culture of combat (and what must be simulated in order to train successfully for combat) reveals that unit cohesion and morale are no more subject to "legislation" than is combat itself. Even if new sets of behaviors, beliefs, and ideals could be legally demanded of individuals, any human group's cohesion and morale depend on a chemistry utterly impervious to external decrees. Alter the composition of a group and its cohesiveness will change. Make personnel changes and morale will soar or plummet. There may be nothing more critical to the effective performance of units—or, as a consequence, of the U.S. military as a whole—than these intangibles.

Unfortunately, there is nothing quantifiable about human bonding, and as a result, the "glue" within units tends to be ignored. Furthermore, those statistics that are brought into the debate over combat exclusion laws reflect a singular preoccupation with individual capabilities and liabilities, such as the number of women who become pregnant, the weight soldiers have to be able to lift, or the distance they should be able to walk.[1] No one talks in terms of units as *the* unit to measure or analyze, although it is units, not individuals, that are marshalled into battle, sent against the enemy, and expected to hold the line.

No military has improved on male bonding as a way to build unit cohesion.

Nevertheless, sound arguments can be made concerning the ineffable importance of bonding, cohesion, and morale to the performance of units, and indeed must be made if common sense is to prevail over ideology.[2]

Cohesion and the Mixed-Gender Unit

Cohesion should be regarded as the most serious obstacle to gender integration precisely because no structure can guarantee it, though certain known factors will surely inhibit or disrupt it. Solidarity derives from complex organic processes. Perhaps the fact that most militaries have excluded females from combat is nothing more than a coincidence of universal proportions. Regardless, so far, no military anywhere has *improved upon* male bonding as the fundamental building block of unit cohesion.[3] Without ques-

[1] See Linda Bird Francke, *Ground Zero: The Gender Wars in the Military* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); and Brian Mitchell, *Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1998).

[2] See Elizabeth Kier, "Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness," *International Security*, Fall 1998, pp. 5–39; and Melissa Wells-Petry, "To the editors," *International Security*, Summer 1999, pp. 186–94. For a more grounded analysis of cohesion and bonding among soldiers, see Nora Kinzer Stewart, *Mates and Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands* (McLean, Va.: Brassey's, 1991); and Eyal Ben-Ari, *Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1998). The classic comparative account is William Darryl Henderson, *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1985).

[3] Nor does Lionel Tiger consider it a coincidence that young men in groups produce violence—which is precisely what militaries are designed to control, both offensively and defensively. *Men in Groups*, 2nd ed. (New York: Boyars, 1984).

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tion, solidarity has been attained with women present in some wars of survival, among some partisan groups, and in some guerrilla movements. However, no one has compared the cohesion achieved in those units with cohesion achieved in all-male units. Nor does any evidence suggest that this cohesion can be duplicated in large-scale militaries that, by design, *train* for war far more often than they engage in it.

The instruments and methods for maintaining morale and sustaining rigorous training differ, by definition, depending on whether there is peace or war. Training, which is the principle activity of standing armies, is invariably boring, and boredom presents a radically different set of challenges than does fighting. This is something that few people outside the military seem to appreciate, while not enough commanders within the services pay sufficient heed to the monotony of routine training. It must also be remembered that members of a national military such as the U.S. armed forces can be (and increasingly have been) commanded to engage in humanitarian and police actions that are unrelated to the nation's immediate survival. In fact, this would seem to mark a fairly obvious distinction between the duties of a peacetime army and those of a conscripted wartime force. Ironically, it has been just these sorts of actions, and U.S. servicewomen's performance under fire in Panama and the Persian Gulf, that have drawn increasing attention to women's potential role in combat, never mind that the single fire fights in which they performed so well do not add up to sustained war, or that technology has hardly lightened the foot soldier's (literal) load.

The arguments usually offered for and against the combat exclusion laws tend to revolve, therefore, around women's physical abilities and their physiological limitations, presumptions about military culture and the attitudes of men in today's All-Volunteer Force, and historical (even cross-cultural) examples of the effect (and/or effectiveness) of female combatants. Proponents often emphasize the exploits of exceptional women or cite the fact that women fought during wars of survival in such disparate locales as Greece, the Soviet Union, Israel, and Eritrea, implying that such cases prove women *can* be present on the battlefield with no ill effects.[4] Yet, scattered ethnographic evidence also suggests the opposite. For instance, the great Shaka Zulu, widely recognized as a military genius, insisted on segregating his male and female regiments. Similarly, Mau Mau freedom fighters in Kenya (1952–55) found that "what disturbed [Kikuyu] men most was, first, the old taboo against wartime sex and then, when that became impossible to sustain, that sexual competition would wreck comradeship and discipline."[5]

With universal service, of course, no one would have to worry about

[4] See, for instance, David E. Jones, *Women Warriors: A History* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1997).

[5] J. Lonsdale, "The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: Wealth, Poverty and Civic Virtue in Kikuyu Political Thought," in *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa*, ed. B. Berman and J. Lonsdale (London: James Currey, 1992), p. 457.

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alienating or offending the sensibilities of the already small pool of men from which members of the combat arms are currently drawn in this country. The military would somehow have to get around issues of women's overall fitness and toughness (as some have argued it has done already through "gender norming"). Likewise, allowances would have to be made for women's physiological needs (as also now often occurs, with showers, portable toilets, and such provided for women in the field). Yet, even were universal service adopted to address critical equity issues related to citizenship, opening up combat units to women—rather than creating all-female units—would still not solve the least tangible problem associated with gender integration, and one that no amount of new rules can recalibrate: cohesion. Tellingly, too, physical and physiological differences would likely remain a key rallying—if not sticking—point for combat soldiers and combat veterans who consider themselves representative of the mainstream.

The Birds and the Bees Revisited

The reality that those on both sides of the argument want to ignore (though for different reasons) is that the male and the female of the species are different. On the one hand, there is what women allegedly lack that men do not—speed, strength, stamina. On the other, there is what women have that men do not—menstrual periods, the potential for pregnancy, breast milk. Even young ROTC cadets who have been raised to regard women not merely as equal but "the same" usually begin any discussion about gender integration by citing women's lack of upper-body strength. Combat veterans invariably do. They know how important it is to face fire with people who can carry out the wounded and sling heavy guns or sandbags in a hurry. However, if pushed, even the most adamant agree that perhaps there are some exceptional women out there "who could make it over the high bar," just as there are many men who cannot.

One sure way to deflate all the arguments about women being too physically weak for combat is simply to agree that women should have to meet the exact same physical standards as men. But when that argument is made, military men tellingly shift their ground. Some turn to physiological differences, as one retired Special Forces colonel did when all he "needed to say" on the subject was: "Most females just aren't physically or mentally prepared to live in the woods the way we do; they can't shower; they've got female problems every month."[6] Similarly, a retired rear admiral laughed at

[6] This and other quotations are taken from personal interviews with active duty and retired Special Forces soldiers and officers, active duty and retired SEALs and naval aviators, and ROTC cadets from UCLA. Formal fieldwork was conducted among Special Forces soldiers at Ft. Bragg, N.C., (1991–92), the subject of the book *The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army Special Forces* (New York: The Free Press, 1997). Formal interviews were also conducted in person and by telephone with active duty and retired navy personnel in San Diego (1997) on the specific topic of integrating women into Special Operations Forces.

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the preposterousness of women on SEAL teams operating in shark-infested waters: "What group of SEALs would launch an ocean mission with a menstruating woman in their midst?" (One might also wonder what woman would put herself in this kind of danger.) Pregnancy raises a host of related questions, chief among them being: how does the inability to deploy or the need to withdraw women due to pregnancy (or menstruation) *not* sap unit strength?

The military is and must be predicated on the notion that everyone who trains together will deploy together. Otherwise, training with the same people day in and day out serves no practical purpose. All members in a squad or fire team have to be familiar with one another's quirks for something so simple as a patrol to go well. And the combat arms comprise nothing but small units that must relentlessly practice such maneuvers if the coordination they strive for is to be achieved.[7] Unforeseen absences due to illness or injury cannot help but affect a unit's ability to perform its tasks *as* a unit. In hard-charging combat units, soldiers and Marines will often suffer with pain and forgo medical treatment precisely to avoid being released from duty. One distinction between pregnancy and an unforeseen illness or injury is that a pregnant woman cannot simply "suck it up"; pregnancy requires that a woman be removed from duty. In addition, pregnancy and problems associated with menstruation can hardly be considered random or accidental events that could happen to any soldier. No comparable, or separate but equal, set of "disabilities" renders males non-deployable. Consequently, it becomes virtually impossible to convince men that women's gender will *not* render them a liability at some point. The concern will always lurk that women could be absent for prolonged, and thus potentially critical, periods of time.

We see the effects of such expectations in, for instance, the corporate world, which—rightly or wrongly—has long presumed that women of childbearing age are less dependable than men. The fact that women *do* avail themselves of maternity leave, surrender high-status positions after giving birth, or quit their careers entirely merely confirms many men's suspicions that women's priorities—and loyalties—will shift. The significance of this at subconscious levels is something the military has not sufficiently considered. In practical terms alone this promises turbulence within units. But treating pregnancy as a "disability," or as an incident akin to an injury or debilitating

[7] This, of course, represents the ideal. In prolonged conflicts commanders have to be able to treat fighters interchangeably, although pilots, soldiers, and Marines can hardly regard one another with such dispassion and new personnel must prove themselves before they are accepted. Conformity is key. In a pinch, women can conform simply by taking up arms. As soon as a group's survival is no longer threatened, however, women's "non-maleness" becomes noticeable again. The status of Eritrean female soldiers is a case in point. Eritrea was long lauded for having a highly integrated military. Yet, once the struggle for independence was over, numerous women complained that they were no longer treated as first among equals. This has since become a topic of research for feminist Africanists, among others.

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illness, sends less-than-subliminal messages that compound the damage that gender-specific absences already do.

Still, no matter how important it may be to consider the implications of women's absence, it is actually their *presence* in tightly knit units that poses the far greater threat.

Operational Intimacy

Soldiers and Marines in ground combat units routinely experience operational intimacy. No set of individuals anywhere trains to spend so much time together in such close and unyielding quarters. While members of police and fire departments can be said to engage in similarly hazardous duty, they invariably work in shifts, escape from one another for predictable, guaranteed periods of time, and indeed enjoy the comforts of home and family on a regular basis. War does not occur in shifts, nor do field exercises. There is no going home to one's spouse and family every twenty-four hours. War is a crazy mix of long, boring lulls and periods of intense, sleepless activity. So is training. Both can be highly demanding in different and unhealthy ways. For example, some Special Forces soldiers during the Gulf War went without taking a shower for fifty-four *days*, and few of them even considered the 100-hour-long ground assault that climaxed that conflict to have been a real war, given its brevity. Nor do members of police and fire departments have to subsist on cold MREs (meals ready to eat), as did some soldiers and Marines in the gulf.

By the nature of things, then, fire and police departments enjoy the leeway that deployable combat units know they cannot count on. Not even the most flexible and innovative military units can approach the methods available to other government agencies that enable individuals to escape group constraints, whether in the work place or during supposed off-hours. Indeed, having to come together as a team only *if* duty calls is antithetical to everything combat units train together to endure. One might, however, think that if women could be fitted into any combat units, then it would probably be into those that are least conventional and least regimented, especially if they could make it through the Special Forces', SEALs', or Rangers' months-long selection, assessment, and training programs, as does the character in *G.I. Jane*, and as Captain Katy Wilder tried to do in 1980.

The "Katy Wilder story," as it is referred to in Green Beret circles, is instructive, though it is also incomplete and hard to gauge accurately. The worst rumors about Captain Wilder, a military intelligence officer assigned to a unit in support of the 5th Special Forces Group, held that she slept her way to admission into the Special Forces Qualification (Q) Course. But these rumors, although long-lived, are not credible, since the decision to admit her to the course was made at levels well outside and above those in which she

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moved. More believable are the reasons given for her failing "Robin Sage," the final stage of the Q Course.

Robin Sage is a two-week-long field training exercise designed to test candidates' ability to work in mock teams under intense pressure. Apparently, Wilder failed during this phase of her training largely because soldiers in the field did not consider her a team player. Whether this is because they did not want her playing with them, or she did not think they did, or she did not want to, is impossible to determine now and may well have been impossible to know then (although higher-ups, threatened with a law suit, eventually overrode the assessors in the field and passed her through the course on paper). Almost twenty years after the fact this still rankles men who knew of her at the time. Moreover, if what was said at the time and is still remembered is true, then the reason is revealing: she apparently still had food to eat when her teammates had none—and she refused to share. This, as anyone who has operated on a team will acknowledge, is a sin.[8]

The fact that this refusal—and not her physical or physiological shortcomings—is what most angers men who remember her is also telling because, without doubt, there *are* female mountaineers, sailors, athletes, and others who could make it through Special Operations selection. Significantly, too, it was a young woman, not a young man, who became the first person to swim from Cuba to Florida. SEAL candidates only have to swim five miles, a mere fraction of that distance.

Regardless of their abilities, women will attract attention *as* women.

It seems clear that at several points along the way it was Wilder's status *as* a woman that marked her for special (or different) treatment. And this is what disturbs men who knew of her. It is also what worries men who currently serve and cannot countenance the idea of women being introduced into their units: women will attract attention *as* women. Wilder clearly did because she was the first. But all women will remain women even if they perform up to or beyond the standards of the Q Course. Physical difference, in this sense, is ineradicable. Moreover, female physical difference is of a radically different category than whatever "difference" is implied when people refer to race, although a soldier will, of course, remain a black or white soldier no matter how well he does (or does not do) in living up to his unit's standards. Because that *categorical* difference cannot now be addressed within the services, it is imperative that it be done here.

One argument often heard is that, just as white soldiers prior to desegregation feared integrating blacks into their units, opposition to women in combat units on the grounds that their presence would destroy cohesion is tantamount to racism. But no matter how vigorously critics of the combat

[8] Special Forces teams consist of 12 individuals; SEAL platoons of 16.

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exclusion ban employ this analogy, it is false. Segregation kept the races apart and stoked mutual disregard at multiple levels. By contrast, soldiers of all colors are raised by women, grow up with women, marry women, and are keenly interested in women. They know women. And, one can only presume, they understand—even if they cannot articulate it—what effect the presence of women has on them as *men*.

Ultimately, this is the sticking point, and one that too few of those making, enforcing, and analyzing policy are willing to acknowledge openly: heterosexual men enjoy the company of women precisely because women are not men. Nor can they pretend women are men. Men read women differently than they read other men. What they see when they look at women is not other "persons," and how they think about women is not how they think about men. To paraphrase what one former Green Beret has long contended: "Men don't sit across from teammates and think about sleeping with them." This, underlying all the hierarchies the military puts in place, is the ultimate keeper of order. Teammates always know where they stand with one another: on the non-sexual side of intimacy, while as males they do not want to stay on just that side of the line with women. As one officer candidly sums up his behavior: "If a woman comes into my office, I do a physical assessment. Even if it's for just ten seconds, I go through a sexual scenario with that woman. Can I ignore it? I try to. In this culture, there are penalties for acting that out. But it's natural. There's nothing wrong with it. We have to be real about it." And he does this without women being aware; no one would mistake him for anything but a gentleman.

He is hardly unique, and he knows he is not. Men fantasize. In fact, a graphic fascination with women may be the only thing all heterosexual males share, which is why they talk about women so much. Women afford men an immediate, inexhaustible connection, more universal than sports, more entertaining than shop talk. And this is more than evident in the team rooms of Special Forces units. There, behind closed doors (with only junior officers present), team members routinely speak in terms society would consider sexist and bigoted. Nothing is sacred, and profanity flows. Merciless and purposely offensive "team room humor" affords men the ability to engage in continual one-upmanship without jeopardizing cohesion. As long as the commonalities hold—we are males, we are heterosexual, and we are soldiers—then everything else about individuals can be dismissed because nothing else is relevant to the team. What is key is that there be something outside of soldiering that ties everyone together, that everyone considers important, but can still treat lightly. As it happens, sex with women is it; it is an endlessly useful topic.

At the same time, however, the interest in women that serves as a sure-fire bond among men becomes a cleaver dividing them as soon as women are present. The tone of conversation changes. Benign posturing turns into serious competition. What had been easy and meaningless banter

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among peers about what they would do *with* women gives way to meaningful attention being paid *to* women, and when women reciprocate the attention the bonds among even the closest teammates become strained. Women, without meaning to do so, automatically snatch men out of one another's orbits. Add one woman to a team of males, and the dynamic among the men will immediately shift. Add more than one woman, and multiple pools of tension will spread and overlap. In the wake of rivalry come envy, frustration, impatience, disgust. Women cannot help but rearrange the team's comfort zone.

It is simply too easy for team members to find complementarity in women. That is what wives represent (in good marriages). Teammates cannot duplicate this for one another and do not try. Comfort on teams comes from sameness. Everyone works the same, gets treated the same, treats everyone else the same. It is not only responsibilities that are divided up, but danger and reward as well. The all-for-one, one-for-all ethos requires that what is shared is really shared (thus Katy Wilder's sin). If, for instance, there is sex to be had, then anyone who wants it should be able to get it. If not, then tension mounts.

No team can afford to have teammates in love, or lust, because the integrity of small units depends on the implicit understanding that no one receives or merits special attention. This is another reason why the presence of women inspires creeping doubt. Nor is it women as individuals who are problematic; it is women simply as females. Talk to anyone who has spent time in a foxhole, hidesite, or snowcave, or on lonely, boring guard duty, and he will tell you that it is not possible to shake and shiver and wait with a female beside him without this making some sort of difference. Never mind what the female soldier may be thinking. It is enough that she distracts—and even if she does not, everyone else who is not present will still assume that she has. All that it takes to corrode cohesion is such a mistaken impression, a seed of mistrust, an infectious doubt. After all, part of what men cannot say too loudly is that, when it comes down to it, they know they cannot always trust themselves.

That is the point being made, however indirectly, whenever this topic is raised. It was the subtext of what a former prisoner of war, who spent nine months in North Vietnam, said when he was asked why he felt women should be excluded from combat units. Among other things, given what he was put through, he does not think men could withstand hearing female prisoners being tortured. "I could keep my cool if they said, 'If you don't do X we'll torture him,' but if they said 'We're going to torture her'?" He is certain that a single episode would have been enough to make him sign on the dotted line. But what if he would not do as his captors demanded? What if he could get used to women being treated in as raw a fashion as men in war? That, as a possibility, might spook him even more.

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Combat and the Feminine Mystique

So far, no one has suggested knocking Lady Justice or the Statue of Liberty off of her pedestal. Yet, this may prove far easier than changing men's dependence on women, or the male need for women to stand for certain things such as liberty and justice. Women, it must be emphasized, mean far more to soldiers than sex. They represent a contradictory bundle of good things, including comfort, motherhood, family, home, and everything else worth fighting for—nonviolence especially.

It is hard to imagine a set of males who know themselves and what they are capable of better than combat veterans. Thus, when a former SEAL draws the contrast between women and men with such assertions as "Men are violent. The male reaction to anger is violence. War is violent. It's the ultimate violent exercise," one is obliged to pay attention. And it is difficult not to take note when, days later and miles away, the rhetorical questions of another combat veteran strike the same theme: "How many serial killers do you know who are female?" and "How many women commit rape?" Likewise, two aviators who have known each other for years believe (though it is unclear that everyone would) that "women are much more loving than men are. It's women and mothers who grow tired of war. If men were unchecked by women, men would destroy the world."

In no society does it seem as simple a matter as men being from Mars and women from Venus. Too frequently, women have egged men on into fights or battle and lionized warriors on their return. However, the fact that it is combat-hardened men who voice such convictions is revealing. They point to a place—combat—where nothing is clear cut. No participant ever knows when he might be killed, maimed, spattered with gore, rescued, reprieved, or turned coward. Contrast this real world with an ideal world in which women, at least, are above the fray. Whether this places women on a pedestal where many would prefer not to be, or instead reflects a Vietnam-era reference to "the world" beyond the world of combat, is hard to say. It might simply be a shorthand way to preserve a whole set of ideals. Images of girlfriends, wives, women yet to be met, along with memories of mothers, sisters, and daughters offer soldiers something to live for *beyond* honor, duty, and the respect of the filthy, smelly, belching males beside them. If women become peers to turn to during combat, men will have lost them as a source of succor (and sanity) to return to—and that may be reason enough to keep females out of foxholes.

The Conundrum

Somehow, the entire debate over women in combat units has slipped away from what combat is about. Who knows how horrific combat is better than veterans who have slogged through war? Yet, their views are routinely

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discounted. Why? Because they couch them in chivalrous language that is considered chauvinistic? Because they talk about feeling protective? Come war, is that not exactly what everyone would want them to be?

As for combat soldiers who have yet to be bloodied, their concerns might be considered more suspect, especially members of Special Operations units that want to remain elite. Special Operators continually consider the angles, or, as one SEAL commander said, "They're completely mission-oriented. Teams are so eager to try anything new or different they think might lend them an edge, you have to wonder: why are they so resistant to women?" Because—he answers with another question—"what could women add?" Forget what women cannot do. "In more than twenty years I've never heard anyone explain what women *can* do, and how they would help rather than hurt my teams."

Yes, the availability of female fighters might well be helpful in certain urban, intelligence-gathering missions, as the world's espionage agencies have long understood. And yes, there are women who would gladly shave their heads (like G.I. Jane) and can bench press 240 pounds. Others might even be able to outrun, outgun, and outlead this particular SEAL commander—or any other. But there is not a woman alive who could contribute enough to one of his teams over the long haul to make up for what her presence would do to the trust among his men. Women who would nevertheless try to join these units obviously do not understand this point. And the fact that they do not understand it is itself proof that they can never belong.

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Mend, Never End, the All-Volunteer Force

by Doug Bandow

The U.S. Selective Service System has been dead now for more than a quarter of a century. Despite a rocky start, the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) that replaced the draft now provides America with the highest-quality military in its history and the finest armed services in the world today. Yet, recruiting and retention problems have long been apparent, and 1999 proved to be the Pentagon's toughest recruiting year since the early 1980s. As a result, Washington is hearing increasing calls for a return to conscription. But the draft was bad policy during the Cold War and would be especially foolish today. Renewed conscription would simultaneously reduce the quality of new servicemen and increase the cost of the military. Nor would a draft ease the problem of retaining skilled personnel or inculcate civic virtue among American youth as a whole. Perhaps conscription's greatest negative would be its injustice, since it compromises the very constitutional liberties that the U.S. military exists to defend.

Throughout the first ninety years of its existence, the federal government relied on volunteers to man its professional force of regulars. Militia duty was compulsory in most states, but the requirements were limited and faded over time. National conscription was first imposed during the Civil War and promptly met with substantial resistance in both the Confederacy and the Union. An even more comprehensive draft arose during World War I. But in both cases conscription disappeared with the end of hostilities. In 1940, with war raging in Europe and an aggressive Japan active in East Asia, Congress adopted the first peacetime draft, and conscription persisted—save for a fifteen-month hiatus in 1947 and 1948—until 1973. So accepted did it become in a world dominated by the Cold War that in 1967 a congressional advisory group, the so-called Clark Commission, rudely dismissed the idea of

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a volunteer military for "placing [the nation's] faith in its own citizenry to rally to its defense when the national security is threatened."[1]

What killed the draft was the widespread resistance to the Vietnam War and recognition of how unfair the system was, falling as it did disproportionately on the poor and ethnic minorities. In 1973 President Richard Nixon finally ended conscription, hoping to dampen protests against the Vietnam War. But low pay, post-Vietnam demoralization, and the poor social status of military service made the transition difficult and quickly inspired support for a return to compulsion. Only under the Reagan administration, when better pay and benefits and a renewed respect for military service made it an attractive career again, could the AVF be deemed a success.

The Chorus Only Grows

By the end of the century, however, the chorus chanting on behalf of conscription has grown in numbers and volume. Among its members are pundits such as George Wilson, a former *Washington Post* military correspondent, who insisted that "the time has come to enact a fair, limited and selective draft to fill the billets that a reasonable amount of recruiting cannot fill."[2] Lawmakers such as Representative Stephen E. Buyer (R-Ind.), chairman of the House National Security Committee's Military Personnel Subcommittee, have suggested that "there are benefits to a draft."[3]

That Washington is even discussing this issue is bizarre. Advocates have typically based their case on the requirements of national survival in an emergency. In 1985 Georgetown professor Philip Gold contended: "Conscription is only necessary if it is to be the American purpose to offer this planet alternatives to either Armageddon or a communist New Dark Age. Nothing else, nothing less, can justify its return."[4] Although he proved to be more than a little hysterical, Gold's belief that America faced just such a choice presented the best case for a draft—that the survival of America and the world depended on it.

It turned out that conscription was not needed then, and it certainly is not needed now. The nation is at peace, and no major war threatens. The United States stands astride the globe as a colossus, its enemies are pathetic and its allies secure. As General Colin Powell famously observed, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and

[1] Citizen Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, *Report to the Committee on Armed Services*, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 28, 1967, p. 18.

[2] George Wilson, "Selective Draft Could Be Answer to the Shortfall," *Navy Times*, Dec. 7, 1998, p. 31.

[3] "Lawmakers Debate Reviving the Draft," *Dallas Morning News*, Sept. 26, 1998.

[4] Philip Gold, *Evasions: The American Way of Military Service* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1985), p. 152.

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Kim Il Sung [of North Korea]."[5] Together with its friends and allies, America accounts for roughly 80 percent of global military spending, and spends as much on defense as the next seven powers combined. Allied states such as France are abandoning conscription, and Gold, now president of Aretea, a Seattle-based think tank, calls conscription "the absolutely positively worst idea," one which "would generate nothing but massive disruption, expense, inefficiency and inequity."[6]

Nor can one conceive of the circumstances in which a draft would be needed in the future. Although the Clinton administration initiated war with Yugoslavia and predictions of future conflicts abound, none involves a clash of massive armies on the scale of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact conflict during the Cold War.

Still, the advocates of conscription have their reasons—above all, the AVF's problems with recruiting. The propensity of 16-to-21-year-old men to enlist in the military dropped from 34 percent in 1991 to 27 percent in 1997. The army and navy fell short of their recruiting goals in 1998 and last year every service aside from the Marine Corps had a difficult time. At the same time, the services are losing skilled veterans of all sorts. For instance, the air force retains just half the pilots it needs and estimates a potential shortage of two thousand pilots by 2002. The navy figures that it has a worldwide shortage of 18,000 sailors. Its ships sail on average with only 90 percent of their official complement, and the ratings of most ships have fallen to the second-highest level of readiness (C-2). Manpower shortages and readiness problems are also evident in a number of army divisions.[7]

Secondly, critics of the AVF lament the expense of recruiting new soldiers. Already the military spends $7,187 per new recruit, up from $5,460 (adjusted for inflation) a decade ago. The army's cost runs $11,187 per recruit, yet its shortfalls only add pressure to increase bonuses and compensation even more. George Wilson wonders, "How much is too much for recruiting an all-volunteer force?"[8]

Thirdly, the alleged unrepresentativeness of the volunteer force rankles some critics. Journalist Jacob Weisberg complains, "Instead of a draft, which distributes risk fairly, we have a volunteer force that hires mainly minorities and working-class whites to bear the burden on behalf of those

[5] "Overheard," *Newsweek*, Apr. 22, 1991, p. 19.

[6] Philip Gold, "Viewpoint: Resuming Peacetime Conscription Bad Idea That Would Clog Courts," *News Tribune* (Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 29, 1998.

[7] See, e.g., Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), *Population in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1996* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Dec. 1997), p. 2-1; George Wilson, "The All-Volunteer Force Is in Danger," *Air Force Times*, Apr. 13, 1998, p. 62; Dave Moniz, "Skilled Workers Bailing Out of Military in Droves," *The State* (Columbia, S.C.), Oct. 2, 1998; Steven Lee Myers, "Good Times Mean Hard Sell for the Military," *New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1998.

[8] Wilson, "Selective Draft Could Be Answer."

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with brighter prospects."[9] In short, the U.S. military appears as a mercenary force hardly befitting the ideals of a great republic.

Finally, and particularly galling to some critics, is the failure of many political leaders to serve in the military. President Clinton symbolizes the problem, but he is far from alone. The proportion of members of Congress who served in the military has dropped from more than 75 percent in 1971 to less than 34 percent in 1999. The *Army Times* editorialized that a new draft "would ensure that future generations of political leaders would enter office understanding the military, its strengths and weaknesses, and its culture."[10]

No "There" There

This lengthy bill of particulars against voluntarism may appear impressive, but in truth there is really no "there" there. Most of the criticisms have been batted around since the founding of the AVF and are no more persuasive today than they were twenty-five years ago. In fact, the military's problem is not a lack of recruits, but a shortage of high-quality recruits, and the reason for that is that the AVF is choosier than selective service. The commanding general of the army, Major General Evan Gaddis, reports that of roughly nine million males between the ages of 17 and 21, "only 14 percent are the high quality, fully qualified and available prospects all military services want to recruit."[11] The Pentagon could solve its recruiting problems tomorrow if it simply lowered its standards to those of a conscript military.

It goes without saying that it is preferable to attract brighter recruits: those with more education perform better and are more likely to finish their tours. But the Pentagon's specific goals are still arbitrary. In 1997 the army reduced its objective for high school graduates from 95 percent to 90 percent. Lieutenant General Frederick Vollrath, the army's deputy chief of staff for personnel, acknowledged that the former standard "was not based on any absolute analytical requirement in order to sustain the force."[12] According to Vollrath, the recruiting command had set the higher goal because it thought it was achievable.

As a result, despite the problems now besetting the AVF, it remains a far higher quality force than during the draft era. The percentage of "high-quality" enlistees, that is, those who hold high school diplomas and score

[9] Jacob Weisberg, "Bombs and Blockbusters," *New York Times Magazine*, Apr. 11, 1999, p. 18.

[10] "Time to Reconsider Compulsory Service," *Army Times*, Jan. 25, 1999, p. 44.

[11] U.S. Congress, House National Security Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Hearing on Recruiting Issues, Statement of Evan Gaddis, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 18, 1999, p. 3.

[12] "Army Press Briefing, Army Recruiting Program," United States Army, Office of Public Affairs (transcript, Neal R. Gross, Court Reporters and Transcribers), Mar. 4, 1997, p. 25.

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above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), jumped 50 percent between 1973 and 1997.[13]

A Positive Dynamic

The AVF attracts superior personnel for two important reasons. First, the services can choose not to accept high school dropouts and so-called Category IVs and Vs—people who score well below average on the AFQT. As the Pentagon puts it, "Non-graduates and persons with lower aptitude scores would be more vulnerable to Uncle Sam's draft call than they would be to today's invitation to enlist."[14] For this reason, few leaders in the armed services would like to return to conscription. As Gordon Sullivan, former army chief of staff and current president of the Association of the United States Army, has stated: "Military commanders prefer high-quality volunteers to mixed-quality draftees."[15]

Moreover, the AVF by definition draws in people who want to be there, which creates a dramatically more positive dynamic. It is free to discharge soldiers who abuse drugs, perform poorly, or otherwise are ill suited to service life. Draftees, by contrast, must be retained at almost all costs lest indiscipline become a means of escape.

A conscript force would lack experience, stability, and efficiency.

Career retention has long been a Pentagon concern. However, conscription would actually exacerbate that problem. A draft brings in untrained, resentful first-termers who reenlist in far lower numbers than do volunteers. Before the advent of the AVF, only 10 percent of first-termers stayed on, compared to about 50 percent today. Moreover, with a draft, the increased difficulties in working with recalcitrant soldiers mean that even experienced noncommissioned officers are less likely to re-up.[16] Thus, a return to conscription would undoubtedly result in a military that lacks experience, stability, and efficiency.

Nor is coercion cheaper than voluntarism, despite some savings in recruiting costs. First, even radical pay cuts would save little since first-termers earn the lowest pay in the military anyway. Secondly, the obvious

[13] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1997* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 1998), p. D-14. AVF critic Thomas Ricks observes: "The result of [the services'] selectivity is that the military is now far better educated than the general population." Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1997 (http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/97jul/milisoc.htm).

[14] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1997*, p. 9-2.

[15] Gordon Sullivan, "Washington Tightwads Are Creating a Hollow Military," *Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 22, 1998.

[16] See, e.g., James Hosek et al., "Active Enlisted Supply: Prospects and Policy Options," in *The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. William Bowman et al. (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 197.

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unfairness of dramatically reducing benefits for the unfortunate conscripts would generate increased expenses elsewhere. For example, because of conscripts' shorter terms and lower reenlistment rates, total costs would rise if the Pentagon were forced both to train larger numbers of soldiers and offer more generous reenlistment pay and bonuses in order to build and maintain a career force. To that must be added the costs of draft classification, induction, and enforcement. Nor is this mere speculation. In 1982, the Reagan administration's Military Manpower Task Force concluded that a return to the draft would actually hike budget costs by about $1 billion annually: "The anticipated cost savings," stated the task force, "would probably be illusory."[17] Similar estimates from other studies during the mid-1980s ran from $1 billion to $1.5 billion. Finally, conscription would make the military less efficient, since the services would make less effort to utilize their manpower. Before becoming secretary of the navy, Richard Danzig observed, "When it receives people at no cost, the military, like most institutions when this happens, tends to treat them as if they were virtually of no worth."[18]

A draft would also generate significant social costs. The Vietnam era demonstrated that the price of the inevitable avoidance activities and economic dislocations can be substantial. Conscription inspired a plethora of avoidance schemes, including early marriages, unnecessary schooling, inefficient employment, and political violence.

Nor would conscription deliver a more representative force. In fact, the notion that the military is dominated by dumb minorities and lower-class whites is a scurrilous myth. In broad sweep, the AVF has slightly more African-Americans, high school graduates, above-average students, and members of the middle class, and slightly fewer college graduates, Hispanics, and members of the lower and upper classes than the general population. It is quintessentially middle American. Virtually all members of the armed forces, active and selected reserves, have a high school diploma or its equivalent, compared to just 79 percent of the comparable youth population. The vast majority of new recruits fall in the top three AFQT categories, compared to 69 percent of their civilian counterparts. On average, new soldiers read at a higher level than civilian youths of the same age. Almost all officers have at least a bachelor's degree. Fewer enlistees have college degrees than their civilian counterparts, but roughly similar numbers are college capable. Young recruits join the military when others their age are attending a university. Surveys have found servicemen to have higher educational aspirations than comparable civilians, and many enlist precisely to obtain the tuition aid offered by the Defense Department. The SAT scores of

[17] Military Manpower Task Force, *A Report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President, Oct. 1982), pp. A-7, A-6.

[18] Richard Danzig, "Dinner Speech," in *Registration and the Draft*, ed. Martin Anderson (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1982), p. 110.

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new enlistees also suggest that they are capable of attending a representative sample of colleges.

As for socioeconomic status, even during the AVF's early years it was incontestable, reported Sue Berryman of Columbia University, that enlistees "do *not come from the more marginal groups* on any of four dimensions: family socioeconomic status, measured verbal and quantitative abilities, educational achievement, and work orientation."[19] Years later the Pentagon made much the same point: "While the socioeconomic status of recruits is slightly lower than the general population, today's recruits have higher levels of education, measured aptitudes, and reading skills than their civilian counterparts."[20]

The "G.I. Generation" Was Unique

As for the critics' accurate observation that fewer American political leaders today have served in the military, that largely reflects the passing of the World War II and Cold War generation, from which a very high percentage of young men were drawn into the military between 1941 and 1973. That generation was unique in American history, the only comparable one being that of the Civil War era. During most of the nation's history the military was rightfully small, and the number of national leaders who had served in it were few. No ill effects were obvious at the time: no Praetorian elite grew up among the military, nor did civilian leaders wantonly squander soldiers' lives.

Despite the endless, and endlessly ferocious, arguments over representativeness, the most important point may be how little conscription would affect the composition of today's force. New enlisted accessions fell from 405,650 in fiscal 1973 to less than half that today, or about 14 percent of the total force of 1.4 million. Since few draftees reenlist, conscription would primarily change the composition of this small, transient pool of new recruits. And even there the difference would be minimal. More than 3.8 million men and women turn 18 every year (that number will soon exceed four million). Assume a draft of men only: just 10 percent would end up in uniform, a far lower portion than in years past.

Such a small, selective sample would include only a few more college graduates and sons of the elite (along with the less qualified men whom the military currently rejects) than the current group of new enlistees. And if volunteers were still accepted—not to do so would be inane—the number of draftees could be as low as ten or twenty thousand annually. The overall change in the representativeness of the military would be virtually nil.

[19] Sue Berryman, *Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Underclass Army* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 4.

[20] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: FY 1997*, pp. 7-1 to 7-2.

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More Unconvincing Arguments

Still, some argue that a conscript force would be a more effective constraint on foreign policy adventurism. During the Kosovo war, a former aide to Lyndon Johnson, Joseph Califano, contended that "[t]he all-volunteer force has made it too easy for a president to order American troops and aircraft into wars and dangerous 'peacekeeping' adventures."[21] Actually, the AVF is a powerful constraint on militarism. During the Vietnam War conscription provided the Johnson and Nixon administrations with a ready supply of manpower to pursue increasingly unpopular policies. Only after years of mounting casualties did public opposition grow sufficiently to end the draft. Had the United States relied on a volunteer military, young men could have effectively halted the war by refusing to join.

Moreover, as noted earlier, the AVF represents mainstream America. Indeed, reliance on the reserves during the Gulf War immediately spread the impact of George Bush's decision to go to war to all sectors of society, including professional classes.[22] The public seems to accept the frequent deployments of recent years because they have, so far, generated few casualties, not because the troops involved are professionals.

In fact, the concern expressed by some of today's conscription advocates about maintaining Washington's new commitments in Bosnia and elsewhere suggests that they see the draft precisely as a means to continue unpopular and unnecessary deployments. Far from allowing political leaders to prosecute elitist wars without popular support, the AVF is starting to constrain officials who want to undertake such endeavors. Should significant casualties occur in Kosovo or elsewhere, potential recruits could reverse Washington's strategy by saying no.

The argument for a renewed draft would be more serious, albeit still unconvincing, if conscription were to be universal and justified by a genuine national security threat. But that case is impossible to make.[23] So only two arguments appear to have any force. One is that a draft is necessary to fulfill the growing U.S. commitments to Bosnia, Haiti, Macedonia, Somalia, Kosovo, East Timor, and who knows where else in the future. Today, soldiers are understandably less than enthusiastic about serving in such conflicts. The only criterion for such "humanitarian" intervention appears to be that no

[21] Joseph Califano, "When There's No Draft," *Washington Post*, Apr. 6, 1999.

[22] See, e.g., Doug Bandow, "The Volunteer Military: Better Than a Draft," *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing*, no. 6, January 8, 1991, p. 9.

[23] Some AVF critics propose universal national service, with the military but one component. Such a program would do nothing to enhance military preparedness, while creating a host of problems. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, "National Service: Utopias Revisited," *Cato Institute Policy Analysis*, no. 190, March 15, 1993; Doug Bandow, "Unnecessary and Un-American," *Orbis*, Summer 1990, pp. 371–84; Doug Bandow, "Rejoinder: A Bad Deal, A Flawed Ideal," *Orbis*, Summer 1990, pp. 392–97; Doug Bandow, "National Service: The Enduring Panacea," *Cato Institute Policy Analysis*, no. 130, Mar. 22, 1990.

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serious American interests are involved. Yet, even if there were merit to what Michael Mandelbaum has derisively called "foreign policy as social work," there is no justification for forcing young Americans into uniform to undertake it. For most of American history the only argument for compulsion was that a draft was necessary to preserve the nation from an external threat. Indeed, when Congress reinstated the draft in 1940, it limited the deployment of conscripts to U.S. possessions or the Western Hemisphere. In contrast, some advocates today are pushing coercion to sustain precisely the most frivolous of America's commitments. But young Americans have no duty to patrol a new colonial empire, mend failed societies, rebuild Humpty Dumpty states, or settle ancient and far-away quarrels. What better evidence is there that such conflicts are "not worth the bones of a single American rifleman" (to paraphrase Bismarck) than the refusal of free people in a free society to enlist for such duty?

Even Washington's more serious overseas commitments are no excuse for conscription. The United States maintains 100,000 soldiers in Europe even though the Red Army has gone home and Britain, France, and Germany each spend as much as or more than Russia does on the military. Japan is the globe's second-ranking economic power and faces no serious security threats, and South Korea's gross domestic product is nearly thirty times as great as North Korea's. It is hard to argue that a U.S. military presence is required at all in these regions, let alone a presence sustained by a draft.[24]

What we are left with is the contention that conscription promotes good citizenship, and of course it is true that Americans have important moral obligations to one another. But these duties are to other members of society, not to the state, and they are owed by *everyone*, not just by the young males most likely to be drafted. It is all too convenient for political leaders well beyond draft age to sit in the comfort of their congressional (or think tank, or newspaper) offices and pontificate about the duty of young people to sacrifice for everyone else.

A volunteer military, by contrast, correctly invites patriotic youth to join the military and sends the bill to old and young alike. That is the proper way for a republic dedicated to the protection of individual liberty to defend itself. Is military service nevertheless necessary to teach citizenship values? No, because values that have not been instilled during a person's first eighteen years through family, religion, community, and school are not likely to be implanted during a couple of years of forced servitude in the army. Nor should a democracy *want* the military to impose a particular set of values. The armed forces are a tool to defend a free society, not a mechanism to indoctrinate a free people.

Still, there is no gainsaying that the AVF suffers some problems with

[24] See, e.g., Doug Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1996).

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recruiting and retention, and such difficulties are likely to persist to some degree in the future. Pacific fleet commander Admiral Archie Clemins has said, "We're now finding out what an all-volunteer force costs when there is zero unemployment."[25] In a world in which America rides high and faces no obvious security threats, even the most patriotic are likely to see civilian jobs as a good alternative.

Fixing the AVF

What, then, should be done to help the military meet its personnel goals? Some obvious steps would include adding recruiters, increasing advertising, improving marketing, and expanding use of the Internet. Better screening and preparation of recruits might help reduce attrition, as would selected pay increases and attention to broader "quality of life" issues. The military is a tough life, especially for soldiers and their families stationed overseas.

But policymakers need to think creatively about how best to alleviate specific shortages. Increased use of civilian contractors and less stringent quality standards should be considered as means to reduce recruiting and retention pressures. Charles Moskos of Northwestern University suggests offering shorter terms of enlistment to draw in unmarried young people interested in a little adventure. In focus-group interviews, many young men objected to lengthy terms (four to five years) and the consequent "interruption of life." A downside of this proposal, though, is that short stints increase turnover, and thus recruiting and training expenses and unit disruption. Army spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Jamie Sullivan argues simply that it is not cost-effective.

Equally important, civilian society should speak well of the military and encourage military service. Indeed, just as some voters view community service, such as time spent in the volunteer fire department, as a criterion of election to office, so might they consider service in the military. A willingness to join the armed forces should not be the only or the most important factor in choosing political leaders, but voters concerned about representativeness in the armed forces could treat military service as one indication of a candidate's commitment to the larger community.

All these measures would help, but the challenge facing the military is more fundamental. A particularly contentious issue is preserving (or restoring) the military's unique culture. While the propensity of women between 16 and 21 to enlist remained unchanged between 1991 and 1994, that of young men dropped by a third.[26] Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center

[25] James Crawley, "Shortage of Sailors Erodes Navy's Readiness for Combat," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, Sept. 2, 1998.

[26] More recently, the propensity of women to enlist has fallen slightly, from 14 percent in 1996 to 12 percent in 1997. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1997*, p. 2-1.

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for Military Readiness, worries that "[t]here is something wrong with the changes in the culture of the military that is turning off young men, and young men are the primary market."[27]

The extent to which the military has lost what was once part of its fundamental appeal is a matter of debate. One issue is whether the military has become more an occupation than an institution—that it essentially hires soldiers in the way a construction company hires carpenters. Recruiting appeals seem to be directed more to self-actualization than to service to one's country. Another question is whether the services promote soldiers based on managerial skills rather than combat and leadership abilities.

Although some blame the AVF for "civilianizing" the military, it is inconceivable that the sort of conscript force so beloved by those who preach the virtues of a citizenry-in-arms could have been kept isolated from larger cultural currents in the United States. Moreover, it is peace, not voluntarism, that raises questions about career advancement and the preparedness of the military for war. Indeed, it was a conscript force that was badly mauled in the early days of the Korean War.

A related concern is the transformation of the military's mission from warfighting to operations other than war: peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and so forth. Such missions temporarily degrade the fighting capacity of military units and might have a longer-term corrosive impact on the armed services as an institution. As John Hillen, a member of the National Security Study Group and a former army officer who served in the Gulf War, observes: "I have yet to run into anybody who joined because they wanted to be a peacekeeper."[28]

Thus, policymakers should consider the essential attributes of military service that have for centuries led patriotic young people to risk their all on behalf of their fellow citizens. That requires serious review of recruiting appeals, promotion practices, training programs, service education, military missions, and much more. It might behoove the armed services to emphasize better how they are different from civilian work—"the real meaning of military service and the intangible personal growth attributes intrinsic to it," as one analyst put it.[29] There is obviously a market for tough service, as the Marine Corps's continued recruiting success proves.

Abolish the Imperial Foreign Policy, Not the AVF

Most important of all, Washington should return to a foreign policy suited to a republic, not an empire. In March 2000, the army announced that

[27] Brian Mitchell, "Is the Draft in Your Future?" *Investor's Business Daily*, Feb. 19, 1999.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Randy Shepard, "Post–Cold War Propensity Trends—A Marketing Assessment," paper presented at International Military Testing Association conference "Youth Attitudes Toward Military Service in the Post–Cold War Era," San Antonio, Tex., 1996 (Defense Manpower Data Center Report no. 97-001), p. H-12.

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it was limiting overseas deployments of active and reserve personnel to six months. But this change is not nearly sufficient. The deployments themselves, not their duration, pose the real problem, because what is at issue is not U.S. security, but that of Washington's allies and clients. The Cold War subsumed America's traditional reluctance to get entangled in overseas conflicts (and brought with it the only peacetime draft in U.S. history not presaging an imminent "hot" war). That involvement, with plans to fight two nearly simultaneous wars, continues today. However, the end of hegemonic communism—the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, global network of Soviet surrogates, and ideologically aggressive regimes such as Maoist China—has largely eliminated the threat to U.S. allies in Europe and East Asia. At the same time, America's populous and prosperous friends are quite capable of defending themselves from any conceivable threats in the near future.

Thus, Washington should be phasing out antiquated alliances and treaties and downsizing its forces accordingly. Such steps should be taken over time and in consultation with allies. But the United States should move from being meddler of first resort to balancer of last resort. The first line of defense should be provided by allied states, with a still powerful but smaller U.S. military in reserve for use against a hegemonic threat that cannot be contained by friendly nations.

Above all, the United States should drop its potpourri of New World Order commitments such as the attempts to build a nonexistent nation in Bosnia and settle a brutal civil war in Kosovo. Although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright claims that even she does not expect America to be "the world's policeman," as of March 1999 President Clinton had deployed U.S. forces more than forty-six times—almost four times more often than Bush and three times more often than Reagan. If the Europeans want to occupy the Yugoslav province of Kosovo, so be it. There is no need for the United States to take on such a neo-imperial role.

The Pentagon responds to such criticism of endless peacekeeping missions by arguing that soldiers actually appreciate them. It proudly reports that first-termers serving in Bosnia reenlist at the same level (57.6 percent) as those elsewhere in Europe (57.8 percent). It does not mention that those reenlisting in Bosnia collect a tax-exempt bonus and that mid-term soldiers in Bosnia reenlist at a noticeably lower rate, 70.2 percent compared to 76.3 percent. The *New York Times* has reported that "the combat readiness, morale and effectiveness of the troops appears to plummet after six months of duty."[30]

Potential recruits have much the same reaction. Focus-group interviews of young men indicate that among their most important qualms about joining the military is America's increasing role as international policeman.

[30] Chris Hedges, "Studying Bosnia's U.S. 'Prisoners of Peace,'" *New York Times*, Mar. 30, 1997.

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According to a study at the Defense Manpower Data Center, young people today "objected to being put in jeopardy to fight someone else's battles," and that parents, too, "generally were not supportive of this evolving role for the United States military."[31]

Even if only a minority of soldiers, potential soldiers, and their families are unhappy with the military's role, the impact on retention and recruiting will be significant. Indeed, in a force whose members are older, more often married, and have more children than those of the conscript military, such discontent is almost certain to rise. Should future peacekeeping enterprises such as Kosovo turn bloody, public dissatisfaction will explode, and the recruiting and retention problem will turn into a crisis.

Adjusting U.S. foreign policy is the best means to reduce pressure on American armed forces. With a smaller force less frequently deployed, the Pentagon would need fewer personnel, first-termers and careerists, NCOs and officers. George Wilson admits that this is an obvious alternative to his proposal for a selective draft, but argues that "nobody is talking seriously about doing that."[32] It is time Americans did, because it is time they remember that the purpose of their armed forces is to defend individual liberty. Conscription would be costly, especially to the military. But above all, it would destroy the very liberty it is purported to save.

[31] Anita Lancaster and Jerry Lehnus, "Declining Interest in Military Service: Qualitative Insights," paper presented at conference "Youth Attitudes Toward Military Service" (Defense Manpower Data Center Report no. 97-001), pp. A-3, A-6.

[32] Wilson, "Selective Draft Could Be Answer."

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Review Essays

The Rest of Reagan
by Harvey Sicherman

Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan. By Edmund Morris. (New York: Random House, 1999. 894 pp. $35.00.)

On November 5, 1994, Ronald Reagan addressed his fellow Americans for the last time. He told them that he had Alzheimer's disease, that he and Nancy hoped that acknowledging the affliction might inspire better understanding of it, and that he was aware of the heavy burden it would place on his family. Then he closed on an elegiac note: "I now begin the journey that will lead me into the sunset of my life. I know that for America there will always be a bright dawn ahead."

This letter, in Reagan's readable hand, is reproduced by Edmund Morris in *Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan* (pp. 665–66). Direct, concise, yet touching the deepest human emotions, the message proclaims Reagan's intellectual strength even as it announces the vanishing of it. And so, at least for Edmund Morris, Reagan rides off, enigmatic to the last, beyond his official biographer and all those who might wish to understand him.

The search for Reagan, however, is far from over. At 89, in thrall to the disease, he can no longer explain himself even if he were inclined to do so. Yet he remains at the center of two controversies, both of which speak to the future by referring to the past. The first is how to explain the most astonishing event of the twentieth century: the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union, a totalitarian superpower, after a violent career of seventy-four years. What part did Reagan's policies, and Reagan himself, play in the event that immediately freed the world from fear of Armageddon? The second is whether Reagan's foreign policy, in both the substance and the style of his leadership, offers any lessons to guide the United States through its current dilemmas, whether they be relations with China, the role of the military, or humanitarian intervention.

Dutch, fourteen years in gestation, should help to answer these

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questions. The author enjoyed unprecedented access to Reagan while he was president and thereafter to his presidential diaries and papers. The official imprimatur on Morris's work assured that the president's closest collaborators, beginning with his devoted wife, would talk to him. Moreover, enough time had elapsed to give perspective to the events of Reagan's era, while the end of the Cold War itself and the revelations of the Soviet archives allowed a more dispassionate view. Finally, many of Reagan's retired contemporaries were prepared to cooperate. But instead of being regarded as definitive, *Dutch* soon became a byword for the way a biography should *not* be done. It is worth a modest detour to find out why before examining the materials in the memoir that clarify Reagan and his record.

In 1979, Edmund Morris, although not trained as an historian, had become justly celebrated for a brilliant work, *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt*.[1] Evidently, Michael Deaver (a close Reagan assistant) and Nancy Reagan thought this a good precedent for an official biography, and a few years later Morris consented. After all, the Rise of Ronald Reagan was itself a dramatic tale: the son of an alcoholic emerges as a self-disciplined athlete; the athlete turns into the sportscaster; the sportscaster into the movie star; the movie star into the labor negotiator; the negotiator into corporate booster; the booster into politician; the politician into governor; the governor into candidate; the candidate into president; the president into leader of the free world and putative victor in the Cold War. But the choice of Morris, in the expectation of a "TR redux," fell flat.

The Roosevelt book presented a series of tableaux, each one illustrating a facet of TR's multifaceted personality. Materials fell ready to hand because Roosevelt had long been a fascinating subject whose fame endures to this day. Morris's gift was to "revive" his personality through the set pieces: a work of imagination sustained and coordinated by the facts.

Why could he not do the same for Reagan? Morris had been warned at the start that "what you see is what you get," but he did not want to believe it. Like most of the chattering classes (this writer included) he gravitated easily to witty, talkative types, presuming that their discourse prized conversation as an encounter between two intellects. Reagan was a famous talker, but his talk was not Morris's talk or, for that matter, a real conversation. Instead, it was a performance, the objective of which was to entertain and persuade, a one-way street measured, if at all, by Reagan's inner applause meter. "Offstage," as it were, there was no conversation beyond the ordinary. The author decides that the president was "an apparent airhead" (p. 579).

Even so, Morris would still not believe it. He set out to find the Holy Grail of Reagan's Essence, only to conclude that he had both Presence and Absence at the same time. Much of the book thus becomes a futile attempt to

[1] New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1979.

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fill the void of Reagan's "relentless banality" (p. 579) with Morris himself, a fictional character who allows the author to explore the nonexistent Reagan personality through his own. This device falsifies the work and confuses the reader, thus defeating the major objectives of biography, namely, to clarify the subject and sort out the facts. For Morris, only the personality matters, but he is unable to find it, and the bare facts of Reagan's inner life will not carry a book. Other space-wasting devices, such as the frequent, sometimes embarrassing descriptions of Reagan's physique or the odd flights into the poetics of nature, only serve to persuade the reader that Morris would rather not be writing this book or that he was just the wrong man for the job.

The alternative, of course, would have been to write "The Life and Times of Ronald Reagan." But Morris does not want to master those times, is clearly bored with many aspects of Reagan's politics, and is almost as resolved as his subject to avoid learning the details. As a consequence, the narrative tends to disintegrate when the fictional character disappears and the hard work of understanding Reagan's presidency comes into view. To compound the problems, those who hired Morris apparently thought that a biographer of Theodore Roosevelt must be a Republican, just the way Ronald Reagan believed that all military officers were Republicans. (Admiral William Crowe, his last chairman of the Joint Chiefs, not only testified against the Gulf War, but later endorsed Bill Clinton, who appointed him ambassador to the Court of St. James's.) Instead, Morris offers the ludicrous fiction about draft dodging and Berkeley, and refers to Henry Kissinger as an "aging conspiracist." It gets worse when Morris decides that, because Reagan does not discuss America's faults but Gorbachev is willing to talk about Soviet problems, the American is more of an ideologue than the Russian. He concludes: "Perhaps that's what we all privately fear: not godless communism, but practical Christianity, that blind belief in belief" (p. 548). "We all?" Could it be that Morris is (gasp!) a literary liberal, the very caricature that Reagan loved to lampoon in what Morris calls his "bromides"?

Reagan himself suspected something was wrong, because in 1992, after encountering Morris in Bush's White House (Morris thinks Reagan has forgotten him), he remarked that Morris must be waiting for him to die before he publishes the book. The Gipper will never read this one. Mrs. Reagan said only that she was "disappointed." Clearly, official biographies are not what they used to be. We are thus dealing with a book that arguably understands neither Reagan nor his times. But because we are also dealing with a great mass of assembled facts, all meticulously documented according to the author, we must see whether they shed any light on Reagan, his foreign policy, and how they shaped our world in the twilight of the Cold War.

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Reagan's Rearmament

Dutch, of course, is not only about foreign policy, nor primarily about public policy, but rather, as noted, about the author's vain search for a hidden Reagan. Still, the student of U.S. foreign relations will be interested in three areas of Morris's narrative. The first traces Reagan's strategy of moral and military rearmament, the ensuing tensions with the USSR, and the fourteen weeks in late 1983 and early 1984 that Morris calls "by far the most stressful" of Reagan's presidency. Among other events: the "evil empire" speech, the Strategic Defense Initiative, defeat in Congress for his Central America policy, a crisis in his foreign policy team, the Soviet shoot-down of a Korean passenger jet, disaster in Lebanon, the Grenada invasion, the first deployments of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, and the Soviet walkout from arms-control talks. It all ends with Reagan's determined search for summitry, which was to bring the historic encounters with Gorbachev.

What were the wellsprings of Reagan's policy? Morris spends some time on Reagan's conversion to staunch anticommunism, rooted as it was in his experiences with party members in Hollywood. This reviewer was present in the spring of 1992 when, upon receiving an award in his California office for his Cold War leadership, the former president recounted the oft-told story of his awakening to the communist ideology, especially its rejection of fair play and democracy. But Reagan had gone well beyond simple anticommunism. He had latched on to a strategy for defeating the threat that was a version of the original containment idea. As George Kennan's 1947 "X" article had explained, the Soviet Union was a state organized for conflict, if not war, and required tension abroad to justify repression at home. But if its expansion could be prevented or "contained," then the system, given its absurd economic arrangements, would implode sooner or later. The logical foreign policy, therefore, was one that mobilized American resources to outarm the Soviets, pressured their weak points, and forced them to abandon their futile war with the West.

To Reagan, winning the Cold War required rearming morally and militarily.

By 1981, at age seventy, Reagan's views on this matter were well settled. The sophisticated maneuvers of détente were for him a strategic blunder, for they had disarmed the West without fundamentally changing the Soviet Union. The essence of Reagan's foreign policy was the reassertion of the older idea that the Cold War was there to be won and could be won if America rearmed morally and militarily. The moral component was fundamental: to explain the nature of the struggle and to convince Americans of the righteousness of the cause. The military component, which demanded an ocean of money despite a stagflated economy, was essential to convince Moscow that America had the will and would have the tools to change the "correlation of forces" in favor of the West.

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Reagan's application of these ideas also relied upon an analysis of the Soviets' moral and material weaknesses. While the incoming administration was suitably alarmed about the U.S. position, it also possessed a good notion of Moscow's own troubles. These included the endemic corruption of the system, a Poland on the edge of rebellion, and above all, economic stress. Brezhnev's Soviet Union, arguably at the apex of its international power in 1981, was a military giant with atrophying feet. Its hard currency had to be spent on food imports; its industrial system relied on huge and hugely inefficient factories using the methods of the 1930s; cheap raw materials had been exhausted; and the influx of surplus labor to the cities, which depopulated the countryside, was over.

Moscow's military strength had thus been expanded to the maximum, and beyond the maximum, of what its economy could sustain. The Soviet Union also faced hostile states on virtually every border. During the 1970s, Moscow had been forced to field a million-man army, backed up by nuclear weapons and a costly logistics system, against the Chinese. On top of this, a military revolution was in the offing that threatened to render obsolete the Soviets' numerical advantages in soldiers and nuclear missiles. (Israel's destruction of Syria's Soviet-designed air defense system in June 1982 offered a foretaste of what precision-guided munitions could do.) Reagan himself, far better than Morris's scattered references, summed up the situation:

> You had to wonder how long the Soviets could keep their empire intact. If they didn't make some changes, it seemed clear to me that in time Communism would collapse of its own weight, and I wondered how we as a nation could use these cracks in the Soviet system to accelerate the process of collapse.[2]

The Soviets React, But the Allies Go Along

Reagan's policy of "acceleration" in the race with the USSR was bound to offend a Kremlin that habitually screamed aggression whenever its policies were contested. But neither Moscow nor many U.S. allies were prepared for Reagan's combination of moral and military rearmament. In 1981–82, the president drew upon a widespread sense of alarm about the "hollowing" of U.S. defenses to put through budget increases unseen since the emergencies of 1940–41 or 1950–51. That he could do so despite recession and a Democratic Congress was a stunning demonstration of his political will and American industrial might.

Morris endorses the view that the military expansion turned the president's program for economic recovery, which cut taxes without reducing the rapidly growing social entitlements, into an engine of massive budget deficits. This caused considerable heartburn in the administration, especially

[2] Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 237–38.

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for David Stockman, the Republican "whiz kid" at the Bureau of the Budget. Morris clearly disapproves of Reagan's sometimes cavalier treatment of the young Stockman as the president sides time and again with the voracious Pentagon. But the charge that Reagan uniquely saddled future generations with debt is overblown—every major U.S. military buildup was financed with borrowed money. The point is that Reagan saw himself in Franklin Roosevelt's shoes: Americans were stricken by malaise, on the defensive abroad, and wondering about their values and future at home. And like FDR, he was going to gain the future by retrieving from the past, in his own person, America's confident optimism. Morris acknowledges this point while leaving one with the feeling that things were not really that bad.

In 1981–82, Reagan had also managed to get his way with U.S. allies. He reaffirmed the decision to deploy Pershing II intermediate-range missiles in Europe unless the Soviets were willing to withdraw their already-deployed SS20s, which threatened to negate NATO's strategy for rapid reinforcement in event of a conventional war in Europe—the key link at ground level between the European armies in place and the critical American reserves crossing the Atlantic. The European leaders, faced with growing public resistance to the missiles, took Reagan's measure and found him, well, very American. After the first G-7 summit in July 1981, only four months after the president had come within an inch (literally) of assassination, he performed in his usual breezy way. Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Schmidt, and François Mitterand, all true conversationalists of the sort Morris loves, soon detected Reagan's essentially different nature. Relying on the notes of Jacques Attali, Morris quotes Mitterand as telling Schmidt:

> This is a man without ideas and without culture . . . but beneath the surface you find someone who isn't stupid, who has great good sense and profoundly good intentions. What he does not perceive with his intelligence, he feels by nature (p. 443).

What Morris fails to note, however, is that Mitterand had reason to think well of Reagan's good sense: he had already gotten the president's reluctant agreement not to protest too loudly at the presence of Communists in his government. The great Florentine (as Mitterand was called in Paris) assured him that the Communist ministers would soon kill the party with the public. (So it was: the Communist vote in the next parliamentary elections plummeted, never to recover.)

This "good sense" also governed Reagan's acceptance of Nixon's great legacy, the unspoken alliance between the United States and the People's Republic of China. After a period of dangerous uncertainty over the Taiwan issue, Reagan signed off on the August 1982 communiqué that promised a diminished military supply to the island if Beijing pursued peaceful reunification. Defenders of Reagan have claimed that he negated the communiqué in his own mind if not on paper. But Morris, who has but three references to China in the whole book, spends two pages explaining how

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Reagan came to accept Nixon's deal back in 1972 (and even served as a special envoy to Taipei to explain America's "realities"). Curiously, he misses the drama and significance that attended Reagan's reluctant reencounter with this issue ten years later as president. The communiqué dashed the hopes of Moscow (and others) that his militant anticommunism would deprive the United States of the strategic benefit of the Sino-Soviet quarrel in the name of ideology.

By 1983, Reagan had also had a foretaste of the trouble his strategy would breed. In the 1950s, Churchill defended the rearmament of the West with the slogan "We arm to parley." This had always been a strong if risky element in fighting the Cold War; the very potential for decreased tensions tended to lower support for military spending, but in the absence of determined diplomacy the public became skittish over the purpose of the military buildup. Morris shows that at the very outset, Reagan wanted to "parley" with Leonid Brezhnev, but the Soviet leader was already decrepit, though he lingered for two years before his death allowed the KGB director, Yuri Andropov, himself ailing, to assume power.

Meanwhile, tensions rose, but Moscow's policies were not changing. Reagan's opponents at home and abroad mounted campaigns to "freeze" nuclear weapons at current levels or at least prevent the deployment of the Pershings. But the president was more cautious about using U.S. military power than his rhetoric implied.

Reagan's presidency was notable for its chaotic national security operation.

Reagan had foresworn direct confrontation with Cuba and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua because the Pentagon, full of militant rhetoric but extremely reluctant to use force, was unready for a test of strength. The alternative—CIA director William Casey's covert action in support of the contra army—proved a contradiction in terms, hurting the administration in Congress and eventually badly damaging Reagan himself. In another region of potential U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the alliance with Israel's Menachem Begin had nearly come asunder over the Lebanese invasion, leaving a U.S. Marine force in harm's way. Meanwhile, Moscow had surmounted the dangerous Polish crisis late in 1981 by getting the Polish army to do the job of suppression, conceding to General Wojciech Jaruzelski some political autonomy in the process.

Reagan had no intention of changing his approach. If the Soviets were stubborn, then he would increase the pressure, thereby demonstrating that he marched to quite a different drummer than many of his administration's officials. On March 8, 1983, he crossed a line in the moral campaign. Having described the communist ideology two years earlier as "another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written," he now called the Soviet Union "the focus of evil in the modern world." Then on March 23, as part of a reiteration of his policy for dealing with the USSR, he launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

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This was an original Reagan variant intended to fix what he thought was a major flaw in the strategy of pressuring Moscow in the nuclear era. Again, Churchill caught its essence in 1955 when he described the "Balance of Terror" that paradoxically might keep the West and the Soviets from destroying each other. He had warned that until the West had a substitute deterrent, it would be fatal to dispense with the nuclear weapons that were the military heart of the balance.

The United States and the Soviet Union increasingly relied on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with hair-trigger alerts. Each side made elaborate calculations of how many of these weapons could survive a first strike by the other side, and how many were needed to destroy the aggressor in retaliation (Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD to his critics). When Moscow and Washington began to experiment with—and even to deploy—defenses against such missiles in the late 1960s, both sides agreed on an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to restrict the competition to ICBMs. While Morris makes much of the imaginary aspects of Reagan's SDI dream—a missile-proof bubble over North America—and his questionable scientific advice, Reagan was in fact tackling the matter on two levels. He funded the newest classes of U.S. land- and sea-based missiles and then proposed, through SDI, to render the Soviet missiles "impotent." Reagan wanted to break up the balance of terror by negating the Soviet side of it and clear the way to a "nuclear-free world."

The "No Hands" Presidency

After a triumphant spring, however, the administration went downhill fast. Congress had already passed the Boland Amendment prohibiting the CIA from trying to overthrow the Sandinistas. Despite a Reagan address to a joint session of Congress asking for $600 million in aid, the House Intelligence Committee voted on May 3 to ban all covert funding. Although temporarily restored by the Senate, this was a sharp slap at what would later be called the Reagan Doctrine aimed at pressuring Soviet clients by aiding their domestic opponents ("freedom fighters").[3] It set off the scramble that would eventually become the "contra" part of the Iran-contra scandal. Finally, by way of setbacks, Reagan faced in late July 1983 the possible resignation of his second secretary of state, George P. Shultz, after less than a year in the job.

This episode illustrated a notable feature of Reagan's presidency—its

[3] Although dubbed a doctrine by the columnist Charles Krauthammer (*Time*, Apr. 1, 1985, pp. 54–55), it was never called that *inside* the administration, and Lou Cannon argues persuasively that it was a tactic rather than a new strategy in and of itself. See *Reagan: Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). For a good discussion of how such actions fit the overall strategy of "pressuring" Moscow, see Joseph Shattan, *Architects of Victory* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1999).

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chaotic national security operation. Every president has a unique operating style, born of his personal predilections and political pressures. Franklin D. Roosevelt was famous for the "left-hand/right-hand" maneuver whereby various officials left the Oval Office with conflicting signals, the better to preserve the president's freedom of action. Eisenhower, to use Fred Greenstein's phrase, practiced a "hidden hand" style of leadership, his avuncular smile and golf course outings disguising his very real manipulation of policy behind the scenes while cabinet officials took the flack. Reagan, it has been said, was the "no hands" president, hence the confusion was real, not a deliberate ruse, and his officials acted in their own cause, not necessarily his. This "no hands" approach derived from another of Reagan's common-sense ideas that unfortunately could not work well in the Byzantine byways of Washington. "Citizen Reagan" knew he was not an expert in any field except politics and Hollywood, and lacked any interest at all in matters beyond his mantras of American goodness, communist badness, a strong defense, big government's dangers, and the virtues of lower taxes for both freedom and growth. How, then, to run the government?

The answer was to recruit talented people, let them do what they thought should be done within the mantras, and let Reagan do what he did best, which was to decide on a few major goals and persuade the public to support them. This "give me the script, fellas" approach put a big premium of consensus within the Family of Reaganauts. But what if the "fellas" could not produce the script? Reagan hated discord in his presence and hated even more to decide in favor of one official over another unless the issue was of paramount importance. During his first term, he counted on the troika of Michael Deaver, Edwin Meese (both veteran California courtiers), and James A. Baker III (George Bush's man, who knew how Washington worked) to develop the script, spare him from discord, and discharge the lesser decisions. In particular, Reagan wanted his national security adviser to avoid the notorious fighting between the White House and the State Department that, in his view, had disfigured the Carter and Ford presidencies.

It did not work out that way, especially in foreign policy. Secretaries of state must rely very heavily on their presidents as they navigate between the rocks and whirlpools of international issues that affect many bureaucratic fiefs and almost always cost the White House precious political capital. Thus did Reagan's first secretary of state, Alexander Haig, soon fall afoul of the "no hands" system in spite of the president's respect for his advice. Morris quotes Reagan's diary on Haig: "It's amazing how sound he can be on complex international matters, but how utterly paranoid with regard to the people he must work with" (p. 462). Haig, a veteran of orderly chains of command and the intellectual rigors of Kissinger and Nixon, *was* paranoid about others' mixing up his signals. (Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, for example, at a delicate moment in the Lebanese War, said on national television that unless the president said it himself, it was not foreign policy.) The general's

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way of doing things produced too much friction with the courtiers who for various reasons wanted him down or out, and the strife ultimately was too much for the president. But Morris catches only part of the story when he ties Haig's departure too closely to the Lebanon fiasco, and his recounting of myriad rumors about Haig's temper is seriously undermined by a grotesque inaccuracy. After relating the odd sequence in which Reagan read to Haig a note accepting a resignation letter Haig had not even sent (true), he writes, "Haig spent the next couple of hours tearfully drafting the requested letter" (p. 463). But the cited source, William P. Clark, was not in the secretary of state's office that Friday afternoon, and, as an eyewitness who *was* in the room, I can state that this never happened.

Morris thus lends himself to the idea that the problem was really Haig's personality. But Shultz's demands a year later indicate otherwise. Shultz was a placid, deliberately low-key man who kept his own counsel and could never be accused of grandstanding a meeting or having an overbearing personality. He, too, was beset by mixed signals from freelancing officials at the NSC and Defense Department, the main reason for his threat to resign that summer day. Who could advocate the president's policy if the president never cleared up the signals?

The pressure to produce the script under these circumstances fell upon the national security advisers, and almost all of them cracked under it: Reagan went through six of them in eight years. In the summer of 1983, he was on his second, William Clark. A Californian known as "the judge" and often depicted as a kind of "son" to Reagan, he was noted for his careful demeanor, judicious proceeding, and total devotion to the president. He had served Haig initially as the secretary of state's human link to Reagan but, after the veteran analyst Richard Allen failed to make the grade, Clark became national security adviser and played a key role in Haig's final undoing.

Shultz's anger that July day proved that Clark had not been doing an important part of his job, namely, to spare Reagan such confrontations. But it was worse than that. A new issue of *Time* magazine sported Clark on the cover and contained an article by Maureen Dowd depicting Clark as the man in charge of foreign policy. This time, Morris is rather good at describing the sequel. Nancy Reagan took upon herself, as she had done in the past, to protect "Ronnie" from those who would be famous at his expense. He quotes Nancy as telling Shultz that "Clark ought to be fired" (p. 490). By August 8, Shultz had won Reagan's agreement to hold two regular weekly meetings in the *absence* of Clark. Thus, at the very moment of his apparent public triumph, Clark's real influence ended.

What followed became a pattern whenever Reagan had to make a change in his crew: a flood of rumors, critical press stories, the official's own sense that he had lost the president, and—inevitably—some remark by Reagan to the effect that the slipping official "could have his job as long as he wants it." By that time, of course, who *would* want it? On October 13, Clark

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was made secretary of the interior in recognition of services past and his interests in western land use.

Morris then describes the brief but violent struggle to replace Clark. An attempted double-play by Baker and Deaver (Baker moving to the NSC and Deaver to chief of staff) met resistance from Weinberger, Casey, U.N. ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and others—inspired by Clark (p. 499). Reagan, who had already agreed to the switch, reversed himself under pressure, crushing Deaver and leaving Baker's foreign policy ambition unrequited until 1989, when he became George Bush's secretary of state. Instead, on October 17 the deputy, Robert "Bud" McFarlane, became Reagan's third national security adviser. So Reagan, with his wife's help, evaded the personal and political costs of losing another secretary of state while putting the NSC system in the hands of a technical rather than political appointee, an apparently small price to pay. But he did not, and never would, alter the basic terms of the "no hands" presidency. And McFarlane was only number three out of six.

Morris's narrative suffers here from undue reliance on the Clark-Weinberger view of things. Those two are inevitably depicted as either principled or straightforward, and except when "Dutch" himself is critical of them, Morris never utters a discouraging word. This shows itself in his depiction of Shultz, who complains bitterly that he was able to see the SDI speech only when it was nearly complete. "Being by nature baggy of eye, suspicious of surprise, and thin of skin . . . on four days out of five Shultz was a delightful person. . . . Only on the odd day, when his vanity was bruised (often by some slight so minor as to be imperceptible) did the Secretary suddenly become a stone-faced sulk . . ." (p. 475). Here again Morris tries to explain the disorder in the national security system as the consequence of a personality problem. He either does not understand the way such a system should work or has swallowed somebody else's line to the effect that Reagan, when faced by Shultz, caved in at the expense of a devoted public servant (i.e., Clark). And after stating the obvious—that Clark could no longer function—Morris still depicts him as *choosing* to resign (p. 499). Here, as noted earlier, Morris's refusal or inability to master the ways of government makes him easy prey for a one-sided, even contradictory, version of events.

Escalation, Disaster, and Recovery

On July 4, 1983, Reagan received a letter from the new Soviet leader, Andropov, which gave the president the occasion to reiterate his desire to parley. Morris at last provides a real insight when he compares Reagan's original draft response to the one eventually sent. The president wanted to reiterate his zero-option proposal on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), but his staff persuaded him that this might suggest an unwillingness to deploy

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at a critical moment when the Europeans, especially German chancellor Helmut Kohl, were making political headway on the subject. A bureaucratic draft went out instead.

Whatever business Reagan might have transacted with Andropov evaporated when, on August 31, 1983, the Soviet air force shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007, killing all 269 people aboard (including sixty-one Americans), after the plane veered off course over Sakhalin Island. On September 5, Reagan, in an Oval Office address, called it "an act of barbarism . . . born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights, the value of human life, and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations." It was "the Soviet Union against the world." After a month of dithering and a cover-up in which Moscow claimed the plane had been spying, Andropov accused Reagan of a "militant psychosis" and "extreme adventurism" (p. 498). Worse, U.S. intelligence revealed that the Soviet hair trigger in this case had been ordered by Andropov himself, and that the Kremlin actually feared an American first strike was imminent (p. 494).

Before all this settled in, however, the misbegotten adventure in Lebanon ended in disaster. On October 23 a suicide bomber with ties to the Syrians blew up the U.S. military barracks at the Beirut airport, killing 241 Marines. Morris quotes Reagan's angry diary entries when, earlier in the year, a car bomb had killed dozens of Americans, including the top CIA man in the region, at the U.S. embassy. Perhaps suspecting that the diary might become public or perhaps out of an old-fashioned propriety, Reagan's curses on the terrorists were never fully spelled out: h—l or d—n and never the Lord's name in vain—a curious habit given the president's inexhaustible pleasure in off-color jokes.

Simultaneously, Reagan had to decide what to do about a tragicomic Marxist coup on the small Caribbean island of Grenada, where an armed Cuban work battalion was constructing an airport capable of handling heavy military traffic. Over Margaret Thatcher's objections to military action (the island belonged to the British Commonwealth, and its governor-general had appealed first to London), Reagan, on the night before the Beirut bombing, authorized the Grenada invasion partly to undo the Cubans and partly to rescue several hundred American medical students who might become hostages. Despite some military fumbling, the Grenada operation ended well, and Reagan's faith in America was rewarded when the returning students kissed American soil. The Beirut operation was by comparison calamitous. As John F. Lehman Jr., then secretary of the navy, discovered, the Pentagon's retaliatory bombing of Syrian positions employed antiquated tactics that resulted in the loss of two planes and the capture of a pilot, later released under the embarrassing auspices of Jesse Jackson.

Morris's account of these incidents is not very useful except that he reinforces what was known at the time. Weinberger and the joint chiefs wanted out of Lebanon; Shultz and McFarlane persuaded Reagan to use the

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rhetoric of "national interests." Through insufficient force reluctantly applied, however, the United States could not carry the day. In recounting the Lebanese events, Morris again offers mostly the Weinberger-Clark perspective, resulting in a serious omission concerning the famous telephone call from Reagan to Begin when the Israelis, at General Sharon's command, resumed bombardment of Beirut in early August. On the 12th, according to Reagan's diary, after hearing a description of the carnage, the president called Begin: "I told him that it had to stop or our entire relationship was endangered. I used the word holocaust deliberately [and] said the symbol of his [*sic*] was becoming a picture of a 7 month old baby with its arms blown off." Morris notes that McFarlane was astonished by Reagan's vehemence and "so, apparently, was Begin, who called back within minutes to say that the attack had been stopped" (p. 465).

Had Morris paid more attention to Shultz's account, however, he would have known that the matter was more complicated. Begin had *already* ordered an immediate cease-fire during an earlier cabinet meeting, but Shultz had been told that the Israelis were still bombing, and he urged the president to speak directly to the prime minister. Since he had already given the order to stop, Begin was no doubt astonished at Reagan's call. So after checking with the military, he called back to reassure Reagan that indeed the Israelis had ceased their fire. Deaver, however, planted in the media the image of Reagan on the telephone commanding Begin to halt. This no doubt encouraged Arab leaders to believe that Begin could be ordered around by Reagan, but he could not. On September 1, when Reagan, at Shultz's initiative, put forward a peace plan that outraged Begin, the Arabs did not line up to support it. Amidst diplomatic confusion it came to nothing.

Eventually, Shultz, who had started out an antagonist to Israel over Lebanon, became a staunch friend. All of this, however, is way beyond Morris, who tries to settle the credit-taking over the Reagan phone call in a footnote. Faced with the prospect of a Syrian war, Reagan agreed to "redeploy" the surviving U.S. troops out of Beirut, Lebanon slipped into the Syrian grasp (where it remains today), and American prestige suffered a blow from which it did not recover until the Gulf War. Reagan does not seem to have understood, or was not bothered by, the Pentagon's deliberate reluctance to support his policy in Lebanon. As Shultz put it archly: "Cap Weinberger and the Pentagon were extremely wary and reluctant to use the formidable capabilities in the Department of Defense."[4]

In the midst of these struggles, a truly momentous event occurred with the most far reaching consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations. Despite large public demonstrations, the West German Bundestag voted on November 22 to deploy the Pershings, and the missiles were fielded the very next

[4] George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), p. 84.

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day. The Soviets promptly walked out of the arms control negotiations at Geneva, and Washington was suffused with gloom. These events precipitated the "fourteen weeks" crisis, which Morris again attempts to explain in psychosomatic terms. He depicts Reagan from mid-September to the end of 1983 as a rapidly aging man with "steadily atrophying powers of concentration" (p. 495). The Soviet walkout, which in Morris's view might have nudged the world toward a nuclear confrontation, was interpreted by Reagan himself as a sign that the Russians could not handle the American buildup (p. 498). But was Reagan wrong? Despite a highly sophisticated attempt by Moscow to intimidate the West on the deployment, the allies had held together. Reagan had bought Haig's argument that the INF presented a true virility test and if NATO could pass it, then the stage would be set for real negotiation. After all, the only thing a decade of relentless military buildup had earned Moscow was that American missiles were now five minutes away instead of fifteen minutes away.

Morris interprets Reagan's redoubled interest in a summit meeting in 1984 as the product of both election-year politics and a realization that his moral and military rearmament "had helped bring the world close to war in 1983. For what was Andropov's increased alert along Soviet borders but a reaction to Ronald Reagan's military build-up and deliberately provocative rhetoric?" (p. 495). Reagan himself subscribed to the view that he had overdone it, writing in his own memoir that the more experience he gained, "the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries, but as political aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike. . . . Well, if that was the case, I was even more anxious to get a top leader in a room alone and try to convince him we had no designs on the Soviet Union, and Russia had nothing to fear from us."[5]

Once more, Morris misunderstands the case, but this time he has plenty of company. Those among Reagan's entourage who feared a negotiation with the USSR tended to portray their hero as somehow manipulated by the would-be appeasers around Shultz: how could you negotiate with an "evil empire"? Others, eager to condemn Reagan for an unnecessary buildup that endangered world peace, interpret his interest in negotiations as a sign that retroactively they were right.[6] In fact, Reagan was just maddeningly consistent. He had always been "arming to parley," and the INF deployment, SDI, and conventional buildup despite recession only proved beyond any shadow of a doubt that he meant to change the "correlation of forces." To be sure, this was bound to anger Moscow, but now that the "correlations" were indeed changing, the Soviets had no choice but to take him seriously. And if there was a worrisome delay, it can be explained by the arcane rituals of Soviet

[5] Reagan, *An American Life*, pp. 588–89.

[6] Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), pp. 270–73, discusses the CIA's information on Soviet apprehensions as presented to Reagan in December 1983.

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succession politics. As Reagan said later of the Soviet leaders, "They kept dying on me." And they did. Andropov succumbed in February 1984 to kidney disease, and the remainder of that year brought little change as his successor, the ailing Konstantin Chernenko, approached his own death. It was only on March 11, 1985, that an effective partner appeared in the form of Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Haunted House

This brings us to the second major set piece of interest to foreign policy students: the Reykjavik Summit. By this time, Morris himself was "in the loop" as much as he would ever be. Though unsalaried and not cleared for national security, he was nevertheless always "around," much to the amusement or chagrin of various presidential aides. He accompanied the president to Geneva on November 19, 1985, but could only add impressions of the first exchanges between Reagan and Gorbachev, mostly riffs on body language and scenery. He also quotes Reagan's diary entry describing his impression of Gorbachev as "highly effective," but still holding basic Soviet goals, a man who wanted arms control because he wanted to reduce the burden on the Soviet economy. He would have us believe that he eavesdropped on the Geneva exchanges themselves only to be pushed away by a nervous Russian security guard (pp. 562–63). What really fascinates him is Gorbachev's violincello voice—Morris later gave a cassette of Rachmaninoff's cello sonata to the Soviet leader "as a souvenir of how you sounded at Geneva"—but Gorbachev said he preferred Tchaikovsky (p. 822)!

When it comes to the main course, Morris does not deliver, pronouncing himself surprised and frustrated that Reagan would "blank out on events closed to me" and that he, Morris, did not have "access to high affairs of state" (p. 580). It would have been grossly irresponsible of Reagan to tell his appointed minstrel national security secrets. But this is still no excuse for Morris's not mastering the essential issues, especially well after the administration was history and very little was secret anymore.

Following the Geneva summit, both sides had agreed to meet regularly, but Gorbachev then floated the idea of a "base camp" *before* the next scheduled summit in Washington. Given the choice of London or Reykjavik, Reagan picked Iceland's capital. After the considerable tensions of the Daniloff affair (the Soviets had seized an American journalist to swap for a Soviet spy), the Soviet leader was anxious for a discussion that need not be detailed, but would demonstrate political will.

Reagan, who read this as a sign that Gorbachev was taking him seriously, agreed to the Reykjavik summit of October 11–12, 1986, which many regard as the great set-piece encounter of the Cold War. To Reagan enthusiasts it was his finest hour as he escaped Gorbachev's "ambush" on

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SDI. To Reagan's critics it was a huge opportunity squandered by an ignorant man. Gorbachev, too, has depicted it as a decisive point when the Cold War was turned down the road to its end.

Morris makes much of the dramatic and bleak scenery around Reykjavik, trying to pump the thunder of a Norse saga into the matter and adding much pop philosophy about "land plates" grinding, Christians vs. pagans, human rights vs. tribal values, and other silliness (p. 593). But he was not there—he had been bumped for lack of space by Chief of Staff Don Regan—so he had to stimulate his imagination especially hard. A better case can be made that the scene was fit for a comic opera. The weather was bleak and depressing; the view was one of oil refineries and dirty glaciers. Höfdi House, site of the summit, was widely believed to be haunted. Her Majesty's government had given up its lease on the mansion in 1952 because heavy objects had a habit of falling from ceilings and walls with no apparent cause.

Reagan himself later regarded the summit as an elaborate trap laid by Gorbachev to force him to give up SDI, which he resolutely refused to do. But Gorbachev's objectives actually ran well beyond SDI, and he almost achieved them. The new Soviet position laid down before a surprised American delegation on Saturday, October 11, emphasized the president's favorite theme—abolishing nuclear weapons, beginning with the Americans' zero option for the theater weapons recently deployed in Europe. All classes of nuclear weapons should be reduced by 50 percent, short-range missiles frozen, and nuclear tests banned.

Reagan and Gorbachev both sought to abolish nukes, but for different reasons.

What appealed to Reagan above all was the abolition of nuclear weapons. This was a side of the president that his advisers ignored, but he was deadly serious about lifting the threat of Armageddon from the American people. He would argue with Gorbachev that he wanted to return to the safety of his youth, when death did not come from the sky. Earlier in the year, Reagan's imagination had been excited by the infamous Chernobyl accident, which the Soviets handled initially with the usual lies and bluster. Morris makes the astonishing claim that Chernobyl precipitated breakaway movements in the Ukraine and Belarus, "the first meltdown of Soviet Communism," as if these regions (Ukraine in particular) had cheerfully embraced Soviet rule before the accident. But for Reagan, the fact that Chernobyl meant "wormwood" in Ukrainian triggered his memory of Revelation 8: 10–11, the burning star that poisons the waters.

A non-nuclear world, however, was not a goal unique to Reagan or Gorbachev. It had been a staple of Stalinist propaganda for a simple reason: if the West were stripped of nuclear weapons, then the Red Army would become the most powerful military force on the European continent. The non-nuclear talk therefore had always made the NATO partners nervous.

Conventional superiority was an unspoken aim of Gorbachev's reductionist talk. The spoken aim, however, was to get Reagan to give up

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SDI—confine it for a decade to the "laboratory"—until the reduction programs were carried out. Reagan, who until this topic came up had seemed totally passive, rose to the challenge. Morris quotes Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister: "Suddenly he [*sic*] flare up, crisp, engaged. When you touch raw nerve, Reagan's flare will fill the room" (p. 596).

Reagan later repeated his argument to Morris, with "a look of goofy benevolence." If both sides agreed to reduce weapons toward zero, than SDI would be a kind of post-reduction guarantee against cheating or a rogue power. The United States, promised Reagan, would even share ballistic defense technology with the Soviets. Gorbachev refused to believe it, insisting instead that SDI would just take the arms race into space, whereupon the meeting adjourned. On October 12, Gorbachev upped the ante to make specific the abolition of all weapons, not just missiles, to let the Europeans keep their own arsenals, and to reduce conventional forces, but held firm on no SDI testing outside the lab. "It's laboratory or nothing," said Gorbachev. Said Reagan after consulting with Shultz: "The meeting is over."

As they parted, Reagan accused Gorbachev of laying a trap, and the latter responded with a grandiloquent error: "Mr. President, you have missed the unique chance of going down in history as a great president who paved the way for nuclear disarmament." Reagan rejoined: "That applies to both of us. . . . You could have said yes." Later, Gorbachev had another thought for the Icelandic prime minister: "But there will be more coming out of this meeting than anyone realizes. For the first time in forty years, both great powers tried to eliminate all nuclear weapons. This is the beginning of the end of the Cold War" (p. 599).

From Iceland to Germany

What should one make of Reykjavik? Reagan and Gorbachev both thought they had failed, and yet both succeeded. Reagan remained faithful to his pledge that he would ease the danger of nuclear war through SDI and an improved deterrent, working eventually toward the "zero nuclear world" of his dream. Gorbachev, through the zero option in Europe, sought to reduce the Western nuclear forces that offered an increased threat to the USSR. And, indeed as was always the case in the Cold War, Germany proved to be the theater of the most significant transaction.

Gorbachev's statement should be taken with a heavy grain of salt. The idea that the Cold War was really about the nuclear threat had long been central to Soviet propaganda. Reagan himself reminded Gorbachev that the two sides armed because they mistrusted each other's objectives, not the reverse, and that was indeed the key to understanding the Soviet position. Gorbachev sought to trade yesterday's weapons (the abundant Soviet missiles) against tomorrow's (the new American bombers, Minutemen, and

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potentially SDI). He had apparently concluded that the Soviet economy was too weak to support an even more intense arms race plus his reforms, so the Americans had to be diverted from developing another generation of technology.

The Soviets were therefore vitally interested in seeing that this phase of détente would "speed up" their economy through an infusion of Western credits and so-called structural reform and simultaneously ease the strain of military competition. Again, this was reasonable, not radical, and could very well give the Soviets a strategic advantage. That is why Mrs. Thatcher, horrified at the thought of a non-nuclear world or even of the zero option in Europe, hastened to Washington after the summit to lecture Reagan on Churchill's old proposition that it would be folly to discard nuclear deterrence unless something equally effective could be put in its place. Unlike Dutch, Maggie (and her European colleagues) knew first-hand the horrors of "merely" conventional war.

But as McFarlane told this reviewer, he had spent hours reminding the president of the crucial link between nuclear and conventional forces for NATO, only to realize that this mattered less for Reagan than the idea of lifting the nuclear shadow once and for all. NATO was thus spared a serious, perhaps terminal, crisis thanks to Gorbachev's determination to deprive Reagan of the hypothetical SDI! In the aftermath, Shultz decided that on the next go-round the United States should argue for a reduction to minimal deterrents, not the elimination of *all* nuclear weapons. Thus, in the end, the serious business flowing from Reykjavik impacted Germany most of all. It was no accident, as they used to say in Moscow, that the major outcome of the summit was the eventual removal of both U.S. and Soviet theater nuclear forces from Europe.

Neither was it an accident that Reagan's own preferred set piece was not the derring-do amid the ghosts of Höfdi House, but his dramatic demand in Berlin on June 12, 1987: "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!" Morris, misreading as usual, considered this occasion "too staged, the crowd too small and well-primed, to make for genuine drama. . . . What a rhetorical opportunity missed. He could have read Robert Frost's poem on the subject" (p. 624). In this case, as in others, the old actor had a surer sense of the significance of the scene than his would-be biographer. Not thirty months later, Mr. Gorbachev displaced the Stalinist regime in East Germany, opened the Wall, propelled German reunification, and marked the beginning of the end of the state Lenin founded.

The Iran-Contra Fiasco

That brings us to the third and least happy aspect of the Reagan foreign policy record. Even as Reagan was enjoying his post-Reykjavik pop-

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ularity, he and the NSC inadvertently set another stage for a play in multiple acts, which was to last until 1992 and encounter an increasingly hostile audience. This was the Iran-contra scandal that at bottom involved sending American weapons to the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for the release of several hostages held by Iranian-controlled terrorists in Lebanon. The Iranians also paid $20–30 million, some of which was diverted secretly to the contras in Central America.

Morris offers a signal service by toting up the transactions, which began in September 1985 and ended in October 1987. Three hostages had been released and $31 million in military hardware sent (especially the wire-guided anti-tank TOW weapons), but six new hostages had been taken and one killed. The damage to Reagan's "moral reputation" was "incalculable" (p. 621).

The affair itself seemed an unlikely event. Jimmy Carter's bungling over a previous set of hostages in the American embassy had turned Iran into the third rail of American foreign policy. There were laws against commercial or military trades with terrorist states, which could be set aside only through written authorization by the president. Reagan himself subscribed to the notion that negotiating for hostage release was a slippery slope. Better to hit the bastards hard before the hostages were taken, as he had done in Grenada.

There was another important reason not to bother with hostages in Lebanon. Ever since the civil war there had descended into an orgy of massacre and reprisal, Americans had been warned away from the country. Those who remained did so of their own volition, including clergy, academics, a few businessmen, and the occasional spy. Only the last had a good claim on Washington's aid.

What could conceivably have overridden such a monumental pile of obstacles? How could Reagan and his "stand tall" administration break his promise never to bargain with terrorists? On November 18, 1986, a day before the press conference when Reagan's honesty collapsed all the half-fibs he had been urged to tell, Morris questioned the president on his motives and rationale. He found his man angry at the press, but Morris bore into the point: "What made you tip over the brink?" After a wandering conflation of various elements, Reagan finally puts it in unmistakable language:

> [W]hat if you found a fella over there that came to us with a plan of rescue and said, "I can rescue the hostages, I can get them out, but there's going to be a cost associated that's more than I can do. . . ." Now, are you paying ransom? Or are you *hiring* someone to get your hostages out for you? And I think of this thing that we did was kind of in that framework (p. 611).

Reagan, as Morris points out accurately, would never alter this view of events, even if the Tower Investigation Commission reduced him to incoherence. Morris had seen him this way before, over the ill-considered visit to the Bitburg cemetery in 1985, when the president convinced himself that the SS

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veterans buried there were victims of Nazism, too. On that occasion, Reagan had faced paralysis when he could not reconcile the political rationale for going (support for Chancellor Kohl) with his innate sense of justice. He had resolved it in his own mind by interpreting the pressure on him not to go as an attack on presidential authority. In the Iran-contra case, especially after the details leaked of the diversion of funds, he could not regain his balance, and his attempt at humble charm ("when I make a mistake, it's a beaut") fell flat.

The truth is that Reagan had a stubborn, passionate desire to redeem the hostages and just overlooked, or looked beyond, the obstacles. The Iranians were hired to do the job. The rest of the details mattered little. His diary is unenlightened and his memory unreliable. "What did the President forget, and when did he forget it?" became the joke (p. 620), although Judge Lawrence Walsh, set loose for five years and with $50 million by the special prosecutor's law, was never convinced of Reagan's imprecision.

If the president was possessed of a bad idea, why did the NSC, cabinet, and chief of staff not warn him off? McFarlane, the national security adviser who boosted the scheme, possessed the courage and skill to evaluate the business and end it if necessary. Never happy with State's tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, he saw in the initiative a possible opening to those in Tehran who wanted a better relationship with the West. But by the time he detected the Iranian fraud, he was out of office for other reasons, caught in the usual vise between State and Defense. Later, at the president's behest he took the awful chance of flying into Tehran. This had its comic moments, including the Israeli cake with a key and the assortment of middle men, con men, and mendacious mullahs at the airport. The affair turned tragic, however, when in February 1987 McFarlane convinced himself that he had neglected his duty in not stopping the thing, and attempted suicide.

As for John Poindexter and Oliver North, they epitomized what the columnist Joe Alsop once called the union of the "phony-tough and the crazy-brave." Casey's CIA ("independent as a hog on ice," Shultz said of it) played a murky role, and Casey took its secrets to his grave, while the otherwise efficient chief of staff, Don Regan, proved uncomprehending and evasive. Finally, Shultz and Weinberger ("fighting like old Rottweilers, out of sheer habit"), though livid in their rare joint opposition to the Iran initiative, did not threaten to resign. Soon Morris is gleefully cataloging "a landscape littered with moribund Reaganites" (p. 619) and quoting the Tower Report: "The NSC system will not work unless the President makes it work" (p. 621).

By this time, Morris has tired of his narrative and substitutes page after page of contemporary notes, some illuminating, some just overheated. An example of the latter stems from the transition between the hapless Regan and the new chief of staff, former senator Howard Baker. James Cannon, Baker's helper, hears "such horror stories about the President's recent performance" that he suggests Reagan be observed at the cabinet meeting of March 2, 1987, "with a view of invoking Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Sec. 4

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(Presidential Disability) if he proved to be disoriented" (p. 622). But "the depressed, somnolent . . . president, moving with his usual fluid grace," gives off "waves of benign power. Even before they sit down they realize that the Gipper is back. . . . The Twenty-Fifth Amendment is shelved" (p. 623).

So Morris, weary of all the policy business, returns to his real quest for the inner Reagan, or rather the decay of the outer Reagan, which he evidently hopes will allow the inner man to surface. It never happens. Soon we are back to hearing of Reagan's gaffes at the signing of the INF Treaty in Washington, of "cozy chats" about Armageddon, and at length of Reagan's paean to freedom, delivered to students at Moscow State University before a huge, stony bust of Lenin. "They know he is talking nonsense," opines Morris, "but they forgive him *because they know that his heart is good*" (p. 636, emphasis in original).

The Rest of Reagan

As Reagan's presidency ended, Morris made one last cast for his fish. On January 9, 1989, he asked Dutch to summarize the "seminal events": Reagan cited the tax-reduction program and "evil empire—I meant it!" He then expounded briefly on his relationship with Gorbachev: "I told him, right out, one thing: an arms race you can't win." Was the Soviet Union still an evil empire? "It was evil, until he—until this one man [Gorbachev] made all the difference." And what frightened him the most? Nothing, really. "The most difficult thing to do in this position . . . is to order young Americans into action, knowing the risks" (p. 643). Inevitably, the Morrisesque question followed. He had been at the Canadian embassy where the departing ambassador, Allan Gottlieb, told Morris that Reagan was "the most enigmatic character of modern times" and applied Samuel Johnson's comment, "the more you explain it, the less you will understand it." Told this, Reagan was genuinely surprised: "That's me? I think I'm an open book!" (p. 644).

At this point, we must close the Morris book using what he has provided in order to find the "rest of Reagan," the role his foreign policy played in the demise of the USSR, and what his legacy offers the future. To repeat the questions raised at the outset, did the Reagan policy matter much to the downfall of the USSR, or was it rather, as Strobe Talbott and others have argued, dangerous and unnecessary?

In deciding these issues, we ought to apply the facts not only as known now but as known then, discarding the cruel tendency to charge statesmen with ignorance when they could hardly have known otherwise. No one, for example, could have concluded based on information in 1980 that the Soviet Union was foreordained to dissolve a decade later, just as no one in 1960 could have said that the United States would be mired in an Asian war with a stagflated economy in 1970. What we do know is the following course

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of events. In 1980, the Soviet Union was an aggressive, expanding power with important military advantages over its numerous enemies. Five years later, a reform-oriented leadership took power, emphasizing economic and ideological change while simultaneously seeking a breather from military competition with the West. And five years after that the Soviet Union dissolved from within.

Was all of this a purely domestic act, the inevitable shriveling of a fatally stricken organism? The most reasonable answer is that the Soviet weaknesses manifest in 1980 and after were aggravated by pressure from the West. Morris's book reinforces the view that Reagan sought to compel strategic choices in Moscow. Reagan would prove, through American moral and military armament, that the Soviets could not enjoy a favorable correlation of forces much longer. And when he launched an emergency arms buildup (despite recession) and deployed Pershings in Europe (despite domestic opposition), he found the Soviets unable to match the former and unwilling to go to war over the latter.

As for Gorbachev, he intended neither to forfeit a leading Soviet role nor to dissolve the empire itself. He had, as Gromyko described him, "a nice smile with iron teeth." His objective was to rejuvenate the USSR, and he needed time and money, not arms or adventure. If that meant jettisoning ideology or trading yesterday's weapons to prevent tomorrow's from being built, then so be it.

The Soviets had made this kind of choice before (during earlier periods it had been known as the New Economic Policy, the Khrushchev thaw, and détente), but this time the oscillation proved fatal. "Glasnost," "perestroika," and nostalgia for the young Lenin did not produce a workable political philosophy or an effective economic policy. The peoples under Soviet rule sensed gradually that the regime had lost its nerve to kill. In this sense, Reagan's approach, not original with him, turned out to be the right one: deprive the regime of its capacity to intimidate abroad and it would lose its capacity to intimidate at home, as people awakened to the idiotic deprivations of the system. In sum, Reagan forced the Soviets to choose a course less dangerous to the West. But the Reagan policies did not guarantee the demise of the USSR. Gorbachev, the Communist Party, the bungled coup-makers, and Boris Yeltsin, among others, deserve the credit for that. And so does George Bush, for helping to ensure that the final act—including the "tearing down of the wall"—would be peaceful.

As for Reagan himself, he did not know much, but he knew enough. He did not do all of the policy, but it could not have been done without him. More than most presidents, he had an extraordinary will to attain those things that mattered to him, and, fortunately for the American people, they were things that mattered most to the national interest. Possessed of a religious certainty that people could do good and that the United States was destined to do better, he knew that the nation's incomparable resources could only be

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effective if the national will could be invoked. Moral and military rearmament marched hand in hand.

Morris, of course, offers many instances where Reagan did not know much. The other side of the president's iron will when it came to the things that mattered was a shocking lack of will or even interest concerning things that *should* have mattered. But then Reagan *was* an open book, less like Teddy Roosevelt than General Ulysses S. Grant, in whom General John Schofield spied an "extreme simplicity—so extreme that many have overlooked it . . . unmindful that simplicity is one of the most prominent attributes of greatness."[7] Through the complicated swirl of events, Reagan shone through as an amiable American playing himself, full of optimism and fair play, possessed of essential truths, and determined above all to serve the people and protect their interests. Translated into foreign policy, this meant "arm to parley" and tell the truth about democracy and tyranny.

Finally, what can be learned from Reagan for our times and our problems? The struggle over foreign policy in the Republican Party today reproduces some of the strains in his own administration and doubtless reflects broad fissures in the American body politic. Some want U.S. power to remake the world in a crusade for democracy, and the Gipper's rhetorical flights offer the prooftexts of the faith. Others see the caution of the man in practice, his reluctance to use military force and his negotiations with the "evil empire" as the guideposts for a much more restrained enterprise. Then there are those who invoke a "Reagan Foreign Policy" to launch a new cold war, but they lack an opponent of Soviet stature. The Chinese are just not up to the part, at least not yet. In short, these arguments tell us much more about our times than Reagan's legacy.

Still, Reagan does have important things to tell us, a kind of cautionary tale. American foreign policy needs both military and moral power, and a president who summons only the one or the other runs the risk of coming up short on both. Leaders lead, and they do not seek in complexity a cause for inaction. They must offer direction even if the supporting footnotes fail to pass muster with the chattering classes, and give guidance to capable officials whose footnotes do pass muster. Above all, foreign policy must express what is dear to our hearts and our heads, but rest always on the knowledge that action, especially military action, must be prudent. These aphorisms express the rest of Reagan, who spoke his own epitaph in his farewell address: "We set out to change a nation, and we changed the world."

[7] James B. McPherson, "The Riddle of the Victor," *The New Republic*, Feb. 21, 2000, pp. 43–44.

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The Provocative Power of the Papacy
by Christopher M. Gray

A History of the Popes, 1830–1914. By Owen Chadwick. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 614 pp. $135.00.)

Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII. By John Cornwell. (New York: Viking, 1999. 430 pp. $29.95.)

Pope Gregory VII, 1073–1085. By H. E. J. Cowdrey. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 743 pp. $150.00.)

Saints and Sinners: A History of the Popes. By Eamon Duffy. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997. 326 pp. $40.00; $18.95, paper)

Witness to Hope: The Biography of John Paul II. By George Weigel. (New York: Cliff Street Books/HarperCollins, 1999. 992 pp. $35.00.)

In late March 2000, the world watched while Pope John Paul II managed to awe the Jews, Christians, and Muslims who occupy the Holy Land. In a region rife with bitter feuds and hatreds, he promoted peace and reconciliation while humbly apologizing for past Christian persecution of Jews and Muslims and defending the human rights of Palestinian refugees. Even cynical, hardened observers of the Holy Land's tragedies found themselves soothed by his witness for hope. When John Paul II began his reign in 1978, the papacy seemed a medieval irrelevance unable to affect Cold War politics or modern materialistic culture. In two short decades, the Polish pope demonstrated how much power, not just influence, the papacy can exert on human events.

"The papacy is the oldest, as well as arguably the most influential, of all human institutions," according to historian Eamon Duffy (p. vii). The pontiffs have not only given us our calendar, they have affected the fate of empires, spiritual life, and culture (viz., architecture, painting, and music) for two millennia. Likewise, Byzantine, Orthodox, and Protestant churches and countries defined themselves for centuries in opposition to the papacy and Roman Catholic Church. The papacy has exerted this great influence because it renders its ultimate loyalty to God, not to Caesar. No other world religion has so fiercely resisted the claims of secular states to total control of their subjects' lives.

John Paul II, perhaps the dominant public figure of our time, upholds this Catholic tradition of protecting human rights. He insists on "the dignity of the human person" because every man and woman is made in God's image.

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Many journalists, and not a few historians, find themselves baffled by this human rights activism. They can understand the pope's resistance to communist dictators, but not his resistance to right-wing tyrants. These journalists and historians were raised to regard the Catholic Church as a citadel of reaction, and they remember the Church's past association with Latin American dictators, General Franco in Spain, and its concordats with Mussolini and Hitler. However, the ghosts of many emperors, barbarian generals, kings, presidents, and prime ministers could testify how the Catholic Church acted as anything but an upholder of the status quo. Thus, John Paul II is a man of paradox. He has innovated by restoring the Church's long historic role of holding Caesar accountable, and the five recent books under review suggest that the Western intelligentsia is beginning to notice.

The Popes as Prophets of Human Rights

Eamon Duffy is a Cambridge historian of early modern English Catholicism. His prize-winning *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400–1580* won acclaim as the best book ever written on the English Reformation.[1] Duffy, a practicing Catholic, wrote *Saints and Sinners* as a companion volume to the six-episode 1998 A&E television series of the same name, and in it he narrates and analyzes the history of the papacy from Peter to John Paul II. The six chapters and accompanying television episodes relate the papacy's place in world history over the last two millennia. Both productions discuss the papacy from three different perspectives: as the biographies of the 264 men who served as popes and anti-popes; as an idea developing and changing over time; and as an institution developing and changing over time. The book and the television series also use beautifully reproduced works of art and architecture to illustrate and emphasize their themes.

If the cover and illustrations of *Saints and Sinners* are excellent, the text is better still. Duffy compresses his deep learning into limpid sentences. He does a magnificent job of synthesizing and distilling centuries of papal scholarship and then imposing his own interpretation based upon Cardinal Newman's theory of development.[2] Unlike Newman's moralistic Liberal associate, Lord Acton, Duffy prefers to understand rather than judge the popes. Newman's notion of development over time enables Duffy to analyze how different popes responded to the challenges and demands of their historical circumstances. Duffy also demonstrates how many of the popes explicitly modeled their principles and conduct on historical memories of distinguished predecessors. Thus, Gregory I, "the Great," modeled himself on Leo I, "the

[1] New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992.

[2] John Henry Newman, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (London: Longman's, 1845), various editions now available.

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Great," and both Gregory VII nine centuries ago and John Paul II today modeled some of their conduct on Gregory I.

Fair and scrupulous, Duffy tries to balance his frank assessments of individual popes, the papacy as an idea, and the papacy as an institution. The popes' personal virtues and vices are carefully explored, but the author balances this task by assessing each pope's contribution to papal ideas and institutions. Thus, some personally virtuous popes undermined their office with ill-considered reforms while other corrupt popes surprisingly performed good deeds. Finally, Duffy adds value to the book by including a superb bibliography of the best papal historical scholarship in several languages. In sum, *Saints and Sinners* now joins J. N. D. Kelly's *Oxford Dictionary of the Popes* as the best general introductions to papal history in English.[3]

Duffy begins by tackling the most important theme, which is how and why the bishop of Rome achieved primacy over what would become the largest religion in the world (over one billion souls). He begins by citing the texts from the Gospels of Matthew and John wherein Jesus confers primacy on Peter among the apostles: "Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it" (Matthew 16: 13–23); and thrice commands Peter, "Feed my lambs, feed my sheep" (John 21: 15–17). These passages, according to most early Christian interpretations, established Peter as Christ's vicar on earth, and since Peter and Paul, the "apostle to the Gentiles," were both martyred in Rome during Emperor Nero's persecution of Christians in the mid-60s A.D., the Eternal City enjoyed a special status in Christian eyes. Christian communities outside Rome began to refer their disputes to, and seek spiritual advice and money from, the Roman Church as early as the second century. Duffy shows how, by a complex process of trial and error, the Roman Church and some churches outside Italy began to defer to the bishop of Rome, or pope (based on the Latin word for father), by the middle of the third century.

The decline and fall of the western Roman Empire accelerated this process of empowering the pope, as the feeder and protector of Christ's sheep. After Rome's sack by the Visigoth barbarians in 410, the papacy inherited the protective functions the empire could no longer discharge. Leo I (440–61), a Roman aristocrat, clearly articulated the claims of papal primacy over the "Catholic" (universal) Church. Leo saw himself speaking and acting in Peter's stead: "[I]f anything is rightly done and decreed by us, if anything is won from the mercy of God by our daily supplications, it is of his work and merit whose power lives and whose authority prevails in his See" (p. 33). Leo I also developed the idea that man can be gradually reformed from his sinful state thanks to God's incarnation in Jesus. And so the Church associated today with original sin first espoused the notion so dear to post-Enlightenment

[3] Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

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secular reformers, to wit, that while men and societies cannot be perfected, they can and must be improved.

Leo I seemed to demonstrate that man's beastly behavior could be reformed when, in 452, he persuaded Attila the Hun to refrain from attacking Rome and instead withdraw from Italy. Attila marveled at Leo's courage and self-assurance, and seemed to recognize that he exercised an invisible and mysterious power. Three years later, the Vandals attacked Rome. Once again, Leo came forth to protect his sheep and received some concessions from the Vandal commanders that minimized the damage to Rome. And even as the western empire decayed, Leo asserted his control over the bishoprics of North Africa, Spain, and Gaul, and refereed disputes in the Eastern Church, earning his reputation as the first universal pope.

Pope Gelasius (492–96), while not so commanding a personality as Leo, surpassed him in theoretical terms and drew a firm distinction between the "authority" of priests and the mere "power" of kings. Gelasius argued that while the two normally operated in distinct spheres, the authority of the Church over mens' souls was ultimately superior to the power of kings over mens' bodies. Gelasius's distinction raised the possibility that the priestly power could legitimately depose the earthly power if the latter became unduly oppressive to human souls (pp. 38–39). Gelasius's argument was used by later popes to resist the abuse of human rights by earthly rulers.

Gregory the Great (590–604) invoked the two-powers argument to preserve and expand his flock. A Roman aristocrat and prefect of the city, Gregory withdrew from public life to enter the cloister and was happy as a monk until the Church, desperate for his great abilities, unanimously elected him pope. Duffy does not exaggerate when he writes, "Gregory was unquestionably the greatest Pope of late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages, and arguably the greatest Pope ever" (pp. 56–57). Gregory faced a situation of total breakdown of imperial order and partial breakdown of ecclesiastical order. The barbarian Lombards ravaged and pillaged Italy, Rome suffered from famine, pestilence, and fiscal breakdown, and the eastern Roman Empire and Church in Constantinople played mischief with their western counterparts. Gregory responded magnificently to the crises. In 592–93, he simultaneously bribed and converted the Lombards by paying them tribute and sending missionaries among them. He restored order in Rome, reorganized its estates and finances, built new defenses, recruited an army, and directed the Church to assume the western empire's former duty of feeding the poor. He also stood up to the Byzantine emperor's bullying by proclaiming: "There is this difference between the kings of the barbarian nations and the Roman emperor that the former have slaves for their subjects, the latter free men. And therefore, in all your acts, your first object should be the maintenance of justice, your second to preserve a perfect liberty" (p. 50).

Gregory also asserted papal primacy through evangelization, sending St. Augustine of Canterbury and forty monks to England. He was gambling

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that England was ripe for Christianization, and he was proven triumphantly correct. He authored many letters, sermons, and hagiographies explaining in practical terms how clergy and laity should conduct themselves, and himself offered the example of a saintly, energetic pastor. Alas, his successors were unable to replicate his genius. Circumstances compelled the popes to turn to the French Carolingian dynasty for help against Lombard invasions and Byzantine expansion during the late eighth century. By anointing and crowning Carolingian king Pepin the Younger and his son Charlemagne as emperors, the papacy received a rich patrimony of land, but surrendered much of its spiritual authority to the Holy Roman emperors. What is more, the papacy now constituted a state as well as a Church, and the lucrative papal lands, held from 754 to 1870, bedeviled its claim to represent God rather than Caesar.

During the ninth and early tenth centuries, the papacy entered its darkest age, worse even than the era preceding the Reformation. Most of the popes were preoccupied with the Italian politics of the papal patrimony, not with feeding Christ's sheep. Italian families vied to elect their relatives to the papacy, and bribery, bargains, and even murder became acceptable methods of winning St. Peter's keys. Simony (the attainment of clerical office by sale, bribery, or secular influence) and unchastity plagued the clergy throughout the West. The flagrant abuses in Rome prompted calls for reform from the provinces, and the monastic Cluniac movement joined forces with the Holy Roman Empire to clean house in Rome.

In 1049, the Holy Roman emperor and German king Henry III helped install his cousin, the reform-minded Bishop Bruno of Toul, as Pope Leo IX. This move eventually produced three historic turning points: a half-century of vigorous reform leading to a papal monarchy prepared to depose oppressive rulers; the ideology that justified the Crusades against Muslims and heretical Christians; and a revolution in relations between Church and state that gave birth to our modern legal and state systems. If Henry III had been able to foresee these drastic changes, he might well have turned a blind eye to papal corruption.

Hildebrand, a young Cluniac monk when Leo IX became pope, was most responsible for these drastic changes. Leo IX summoned the young monk to Rome because he was already renowned for his wise counsel to Pope Gregory VI. Unlike Leo IX and many other reform clerics, Hildebrand came from a humble Tuscan background and owed his rise entirely to merit. While serving as archdeacon, the chief administrator of the papal diocese, and papal legate, Hildebrand guided Leo IX and his four successors in radical Church reform, diplomacy, war, and charity. Most historians of this Papal Revolution conclude that he was the driving force in the papacy two decades

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before becoming pontiff himself in 1073.[4] Like his hero Gregory the Great, whose name he took as pope, Hildebrand excelled in many areas, but preferred the role of God's humble servant, and managed to live up to Gregory's model while leaving a revolutionary legacy of his own.

The Medieval Roots of Western Liberty

H. E. J. Cowdrey has devoted half a century of study to the life and times of Hildebrand, the man who became Pope Gregory VII (1073–85). An Anglican minister and Oxford historian, Cowdrey has authored several fine monographs exploring the contexts of the Gregorian Reform,[5] and now culminates his career with a long, meticulous, and measured biography of the pope who evoked fiery love and condemnation from contemporaries and nineteenth-century nationalistic historians alike. Cowdrey's researches of Hildebrand's pre-papal life reveal a man well qualified to exercise power during a time of reform and controversy. Because he was long familiar with the most powerful princes and holiest sages of his time, from Ireland to the Holy Land, the humble Hildebrand experienced no qualms laying down God's law to them once he was pope. He and his allies turned the law, especially the sacred canon law, into a tool for reforming a corrupt civilization. Canon law offered an orderly and rational means to tame and regulate princes and priests who abused power and refused to submit to Christian codes of virtue. If princes and priests disliked the rulings they received in canonical courts, they could appeal their cases to the papal court, known as the "curia" from the time of Gregory VII's protégé, Urban II (1088–99).

The medieval papacy promoted human rights, but only for believers.

This Gregorian reform met with bitter and violent resistance. Both the papal and imperial sides used war and propaganda to decide which of them was to rule the Church. Gregory VII's epic confrontation with Emperor Henry IV is usually misunderstood as merely a contest over lay investiture—the nomination of Church officials, including bishops, by secular princes. Gregory certainly opposed the practice, but he was hunting for bigger game than that. His radical reform aimed to bring the Holy Roman emperor down to a status lower than the lowest priest. After Gregory excommunicated and

[4] See Duffy, *Saints and Sinners*, pp. 90–94; Gerd Tellenbach, *Church, Kingship, and Lay Investiture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1940); Walter Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1962); Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Medieval Papacy* (New York: Harcourt, 1968); Karl Morrison, *Tradition and Authority in the Western Church, 300–1400* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969); Carl Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); and Harold Berman, *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).

[5] *The Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); *The Age of Abbot Desiderius: Montecassino, the Normans, and the Papacy in the Late Eleventh Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); *Popes, Monks, and Crusaders* (London: Variorum, 1984).

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deposed Henry IV, the emperor was reduced to a barefoot penitent in the snow begging the pope for absolution outside Canossa castle in January 1077. It seemed Gregory VII had won. But revolutions beget counterrevolutions, and Henry eventually mobilized enough allies to challenge Gregory's authority again and, despite a second excommunication in 1080, drove the pope out of Rome to die in exile in 1085. Yet even while dying, Gregory foresaw that his Papal Revolution would win.

Pope Urban II's proclamation of the First Crusade against the Muslim infidels in 1095 represented that triumph. In less than half a century, the Catholic clergy changed its status from that of a Holy Roman imperial dependency to a sovereign and self-sustaining international institution. The papacy and its clergy were now able to inspire the entire medieval West, with its myriad local feuds and rivalries, to wage together a holy war in the Levant. Gregory VII's dream of liberating Christians in the East from the infidel Turks became a reality just a decade after his death, under his devoted follower Urban II. To be sure, we should regard the Gregorian ideology of the crusade with deep reservations, given the bloody results and moral ambiguities it produced, but it bespoke the papal accomplishment of creating both a clergy independent of Caesar and a sophisticated legal system that limited Caesar's jurisdiction.[6] By seeking the "freedom of the Church" from secular jurisdiction, Gregory VII created the modern Western notions of civil society, separation of church and state, the rule of law, and human rights. Harold Berman elsewhere credits Gregory with introducing to the West "the experience of revolution itself. In contrast to the older view of secular history as a process of decay, there was introduced a dynamic quality, a sense of progress in time, a belief in the reformation of the world."[7]

The Papacy Confronts Secular Revolution

The Papal Revolution led to a papal monarchy in the late Middle Ages, which in turn registered great achievements in culture and law while also presiding over inhumane persecutions of Muslims, Jews, and heretics. Thus did Innocent III (1198–1216), whose reign was the summit of the papal monarchy, sponsor the new order of gentle Francis of Assisi and at the same time decree the extirpation of the Albigensians and the wearing of distinctive insignia by Jews and Muslims. Hence, while the papacy promoted human rights, it did so at that time only for believers in good standing. Likewise, the papacy's continued involvement in Italian politics and wars caused even devout Catholics to loathe it. Two great Florentine writers, the fourteenth-century poet Dante Alighieri and sixteenth-century historian Francesco Guic-

[6] Berman, *Law and Revolution*, chaps. 2–3.
[7] Ibid., p. 118.

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ciardini, sketched damning profiles of corrupt popes (whom they personally knew) that are impressed on educated minds even today. Dante's caricature of Boniface VIII in *The Divine Comedy* and Guicciardini's portrait of Alexander VI in his *History of Italy* offered potent ammunition for the Protestant reformers to come. As Geoffrey Barraclough concluded, "The medieval papacy ended in bankruptcy."[8]

Of course, the papacy reformed itself yet again during the Counter-Reformation. But unfortunately, this time reform impelled a retreat into a siege mentality that lasted for 400 years. Preserving the papacy from the Protestant challenge took precedence over all else, *including* human rights (although some popes were moved to advocate on behalf of Amerindians and African slaves ruled by Catholic colonial powers). The wars of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic conquests, in turn, prevented the papacy from ruling its Italian lands and caused two popes to be imprisoned. How the popes adjusted and reacted to the advent of modern, secular ideology and the all-powerful states it threw up was the subject of Owen Chadwick's superb history, *The Popes and European Revolution*.[9] This 1981 volume won the Wolfson Award, the British equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize, and Chadwick established himself as the finest historian of the post-1789 papacy in any language.[10] He is an ordained Anglican priest and served as the former Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge. Like Eamon Duffy, Chadwick is much influenced by Cardinal Newman's approach to church history. He reads six modern European languages, understands the nuances of both intellectual and diplomatic history, writes with an infectious staccato style, and treats heavy subjects with charity and dry humor.

Chadwick now follows up his earlier monograph with *A History of the Popes, 1830–1914*, which studies the reigns of four popes who battled the dominant trends of their time: Gregory XVI (1830–46), Pius IX (1846–78), Leo XIII (1878–1903), and Pius X (1903–14). They were besieged by European nationalism, liberalism, scientism, materialism, and traditional anticlericalism, and it was during their reigns that the Catholic Church became further stereotyped as reactionary in politics as well as theology, a stereotype, Chadwick observes, that "was not typical of its past."[11] Pius IX and his two successors watched as the papal lands were conquered and absorbed into the new Italian monarchy until, after 1870, the popes became "prisoner[s] in the Vatican" (p. 226). After eleven centuries of ruling most of central and northeastern Italy, the papacy found itself confined to a tiny area comprising the Vatican and Lateran palaces and St. Peter's Cathedral in Rome.

[8] Barraclough, *The Medieval Papacy*, p. 196.

[9] Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

[10] See Chadwick's *Britain and the Vatican During the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); *The Victorian Church*, 2 vols. (London: Burns and Oates, 1966–1970); and *Newman* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

[11] Chadwick, *The Popes and European Revolution*, p. 610.

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Chadwick's four popes reacted differently to these worldly reverses and their duties to feed Christ's sheep. Gregory XVI, a monk, was well educated and well meaning, but found European politics incomprehensible. He did condemn slavery and the slave trade in 1839 and conferred bishoprics on the newly independent Latin American countries, but failed to advance human rights for his Irish, Polish, and Italian co-religionists, and indeed completely ignored the brutal Russian repression of the 1831 Polish uprising (pp. 409–10). By common consent a failure, Gregory XVI "died as the most unpopular of Popes" (p. 60).

Pius IX, or Pio Nono as he was universally known, was elected partly on his reputation as a liberal who favored the unification of Italy. That proved ironic when his bitter experiences in the revolution of 1848 transformed him into the symbol of uncompromising reaction. Chadwick (unlike Pius IX's bitter enemy Lord Acton) eschews all Whig bias and tries to understand this longest-reigning of all pontiffs on his own terms. Thus, Pius is notorious for proclaiming the *Syllabus of Errors* in 1864, which condemned liberalism, progress, religious freedom, and the modern world generally. Yet Chadwick demonstrates not only that many of the syllabi proved prophetic, but that Pius did not even draft the famous sentence asserting the pope's privilege not to reconcile himself to progress, liberalism, and modern civilization. A warm, pastoral man of limited intellectual understanding, Pius was nonetheless the first pope to be known by his flock on a mass basis, encouraged many devotional cults, stimulated overseas missions, and heroically resisted national churches that refused to submit to Rome. In contrast to his predecessor, he also defended fiercely the human rights of the Poles during and after their uprising of 1863, cementing a loyalty among Poles that would have profound future consequences (pp. 417–31).

Pio Nono's most fateful confrontation was with the new German state and its chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. A dispute emerged over a papal ambassador in 1872, whereupon Bismarck bellowed, "Have no fear, we are not going to Canossa, either in body or in spirit," to the cheers of Protestant German opinion (p. 261). Pius IX retorted that God might just strike the chancellor down, and thus was ignited the notorious *Kulturkampf* of the 1870s and 1880s, during which Bismarck tried systematically to stamp out Roman Catholicism's "corrupting" influence in Germany through coercive legislation and imprisonment of clergy.

But Bismarck's strategy backfired, and Chadwick relates how grassroots resistance by Catholic Germans and Poles took the form of riots and fierce cultural counterattack. Imprisoned bishops became heroes, *Kulturkampf* laws were flouted with the pope's encouragement, and Pio Nono's picture hung in German and Polish households. Ludwig Windthorst, a dwarfish, hunchback lawyer—and parliamentary genius—rallied the Catholic Center party in the Reichstag and successfully obstructed government assaults on freedom of worship. German and Polish Catholics achieved solidarity resist-

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ing the *Kulturkampf.* So Bismarck was compelled to "go to Canossa," but such was his hatred of Pio Nono that he waited until Leo XIII became pope in 1878 before giving up the *Kulturkampf.* Leo, a much better diplomat than Pius, saved Bismarck's face by giving the German state approval over Church appointments in 1880, and gradually settled the *Kulturkampf.*

In Chadwick's view, Leo XIII loathed modernity just as fiercely as Pius IX, but fought it with superior style and skill. He paid tribute to human dignity in various ways. He rewarded Roman Catholicism's greatest contemporary thinker, John Henry Newman (whom Pio Nono had suspected of heresy for supporting freedom of conscience), with a cardinal's hat. He opened up the Vatican archives to historical research in 1883. He wrote an encyclical in 1885, *Immortale Dei*, that "accepted that governments might rightly, to avoid worse evils, tolerate religions that were not Catholic" (p. 293), and he authored the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891) that enabled Catholics to organize democratic parties and join labor unions. Leo's most poignant act was to sell the last papal warship, the *Immaculate Conception*, moored in the French port of Toulon, symbolizing that the papacy's kingdom was now entirely devoted to the next world.

Pius X, the last of Chadwick's subjects, also found it necessary to oppose modernity. He was a saintly and pastoral man (canonized in 1954) who lacked any experience in diplomacy and scholarship. He went too far in condemning all modernist Catholic intellectuals in 1907, but he did protest the persecution of the Church in Portugal, champion the rights of Poles and Irish, and ease the strain between the Vatican and the Italian government. He also began a new codification of canon law aimed at further centralizing and unifying Church conduct. The outbreak of World War I grieved him and contributed to his death. In sum, Chadwick's magisterial history revises the liberal Whig outlook that condemned the nineteenth-century papacy as an agent of reaction, repression, and obscurantism.

Pius XII, "Hitler's Pope"?

Unfortunately, John Cornwell, who knows and thanks Chadwick in his book, continues to adhere to the Whig stereotype. His *Hitler's Pope*, though a bestseller, is a poorly researched, unbalanced, and misleading biography of Pius XII. Cornwell, a Cambridge journalist colleague and friend of Eamon Duffy, recycles several myths about Pius XII and contributes some new ones of his own invention. First, he follows playwright Rolf Hochhuth's 1963 charge that Pius XII was cynically indifferent to Hitler's massacre of the Jews, then adds to it by claiming that Pius XII helped to provoke the First World War with his Serbian meddling and then undermined German Catholics' resistance to Hitler in the 1930s. Chadwick's *Britain and the Vatican During the Second World War* meticulously examined the evidence and

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found that, while Pius helped many Jews escape, he probably should have issued a public condemnation of the Holocaust. Cornwell scorns Chadwick's "systematic attempts to exonerate" Pius (p. 285), but nonetheless leans heavily on Chadwick as an authority.

Fortunately, several eminent scholars (including Chadwick) have devastated Cornwell's arguments and research and even questioned his honesty.[12] Istvan Deak, a Hungarian Jewish survivor of the Holocaust, criticized the pontiff's general policy, but also provided evidence of Pius XII's personal interventions to save Jewish lives. All of these scholars agree that Cornwell gets many facts wrong (e.g., calling the Protestant Hungarian Admiral Horthy a Catholic, implying that Hitler and Pius liked each other, and suggesting that the pope had the power to prevent the Holocaust). Indeed, Deak takes Cornwell to task for neglecting to criticize Pius XII's silence over the Nazi massacre of *Catholic* clergy in Poland and for failing to credit him with supporting Christian Democratic parties in postwar Western Europe and resisting Soviet oppression in Eastern Europe.

Even more may be said. So far, no reviewer has mentioned that Cornwell cannot read German. How then can he seek to revise the standard version of papal relations with Germany? Cornwell also inaccurately smears Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar as a fascist (pp. 272, 360). He was not a fascist, but a traditionalist Catholic authoritarian who continued to support Great Britain and the United States even at the apex of Hitler's conquests. Salazar's Portugal also provided the safest Continental haven for European Jewish refugees.[13] In 1973, his protégé, Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, permitted American jet transports to land and refuel in the Azores during the Yom Kippur War when America's other Continental NATO allies refused to provide the same courtesy. Thirdly, Cornwell attacks Catholic canon law as repressive. If he knew anything about the history of canon law, he would recognize how it has protected human lives as well as ordering them. Cornwell's worst smear is his ridiculous effort to compare Pius XII with John Paul II. Cornwell, who appears to be an embittered lapsed Catholic, seeks to undermine John Paul II's moral authority by discrediting his effort to canonize Pius XII.[14]

[12] Istvan Deak, "The Pope, the Nazis, and the Jews," *New York Review of Books*, Mar. 23, 2000; W. D. Rubenstein, "The Devil's Advocate," *First Things*, Jan. 2000; Owen Chadwick, "Was Pius XII 'Hitler's Pope'?" *The Tablet*, vol. 253, 1999; John Lukacs, "In Defense of Pius," *National Review*, Nov. 22, 1999.

[13] Salazar's governmental philosophy was partly modeled on Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum*. See *Current Biography*, 1952, pp. 509–10. Also see Israel Gutman, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 657–58, 1280, 1381–82; and H. V. Livermore, *A New History of Portugal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), chap. 12.

[14] See *Hitler's Pope*, pp. ix, 8, 82, 168, 272, 363–70; and the Letters column of *First Things*, Apr. 2000.

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Witness to Hope

Which brings us up to John Paul II, perhaps the most consistent and effective advocate for human dignity and human rights in the world today. He is the first Slavic pope, the first non-Italian pontiff since Dutchman Hadrian VI's brief reign (1522–23), and widely regarded already as one of the half-dozen greatest popes of all time. His first act may have been his most symbolic, when (like John Paul I) he eschewed the papal coronation ceremony, thereby declaring to the world that, in George Weigel's words, "the Church was not a Church of power, but a Church of evangelical witness" (p. 262).

It is difficult to write the life of this still living "witness to hope," as he calls himself. Fortunately, Weigel possesses many qualities permitting him to do just that. He is a practicing Roman Catholic, an American, and a former seminarian who works as a lay theologian at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C. He enjoyed extensive personal access to John Paul II in order to write this biography, having first come to the pontiff's attention after publishing *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism*, which portrayed the pope's role in ending Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.[15] The pope was impressed by Weigel's understanding of how the Polish Church offered an alternative culture, based on Roman Catholic Christianity and Polish literature, to the imperial Soviet culture of atheistic materialism.

John Paul II is already regarded as one of the greatest popes ever.

The scriptures, both as Gospel and literature, loomed large to the young Karol Wojtyla growing up in Poland. Weigel shows how he pursued acting, playwriting, poetry, and philosophy along with his religious vocation during Poland's World War II agony. Wojtyla perceived that Catholic Poles preserved their civil society from Russian, Nazi, and Soviet imperialism by keeping their literature and faith intact. Unlike many Catholic Poles, however, Wojtyla observed the same practice of honoring literature and religion among Polish Jews. He became painfully familiar with evil while watching the Nazis murder 20 percent of the Polish Catholic clergy and 90 percent of Poland's three million Jews. Nor did his country's persecution end with World War II: Soviet "liberators" imposed their totalitarian control after driving the Nazis out. Cardinal Adam Sapieha, the aristocratic leader of Poland's underground Catholic Church and Wojtyla's religious mentor, saved many Jews by providing them with forged Christian birth certificates. And just as Gregory VII looked to his patron Leo IX as his model, so has John Paul II looked to Cardinal Sapieha. All these Polish experiences

[15] New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

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taught Wojtyla how to create and maintain an underground alternative civil society under totalitarian conditions.

Wojtyla supplemented these Polish experiences with graduate education in Rome in the late 1940s. There he imbibed Thomistic theology, the Spanish mystic saints Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross, and heavy doses of modern philosophy. Back in Poland he fell under the influence of Max Scheler, a German existential philosopher who stressed the irreducibility and dignity of personhood. If one listens to John Paul II's language, the phrase "dignity of the human person" recurs constantly. This concept, borrowed from Max Scheler, is John Paul II's concrete criterion for assessing what is morally right.

Wojtyla's rapid promotion to bishop and archbishop, based on his pastoral achievements, allowed him to advance Scheler's concept of dignified personhood. At the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) he played a key role in drafting and passing the declarations on religious liberty and tolerance for other faiths, especially the Jewish faith. He also became notorious for assisting Paul VI with *Humanae Vitae*, the unpopular 1968 papal encyclical that reaffirmed Catholic opposition to contraception. Since becoming pope, he has vocally opposed all international "family planning" and abortion initiatives aimed at controlling population by coercive methods.

Paul VI took note of this brave and brilliant Polish archbishop and let it be known that if his successor was not to be Italian, he hoped Wojtyla would be the choice. John Paul II's election, in other words, was not the victory of a dark horse. On October 21, 1978, he indicated his intent to be "universal pastor of the Church," a new title he gave himself. Probably no pope since Gregory VII saw his ministry in such universal terms. He further proclaimed Christ's words to the apostles, "Be not afraid," and urged the Church: "Open wide the doors for Christ. To his saving power open the boundaries of states, economic and political systems, the vast fields of culture, civilization, and development. Be not afraid. Christ knows 'what is in man.' He alone knows it" (p. 262).

This invitation to open the doors of the world with the language of love seemed utterly utopian when it was uttered at the height of the Cold War. Yet John Paul II set out immediately to fulfill that promise of evangelizing the world, and he frightened the Soviet politburo with his return visit to Poland in 1979. Soviet fears were justified when the Solidarity labor movement emerged less than a year after that journey. John Paul II also traveled to the United Nations in 1979 and argued for the creation of political communities "in which there can be *fully safeguarded the objective rights of the spirit, of human conscience and human creativity, including man's relationship with God.*" He insisted "political leaders had to attend to that historical dynamic" (pp. 348–49; emphasis in original).

John Paul II fully adumbrated in his 1979 U.N. speech the mission he has pursued for his entire papacy. A man utterly without fear, as Yugoslav

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dissident Milovan Djilas said of him (p. 864), he has continued to bear witness for human dignity on six continents in spite of an assassination attempt, relentless media attacks, griping from the papal curia, old age, and Parkinson's disease. He has assaulted both Soviet Communism and Western consumer capitalism for demeaning the human spirit. He has set records for traveling, speaking to the largest open-air audiences on several continents, and becoming the most familiar and possibly most beloved figure alive. He has authored global bestsellers, seen a play of his turned into a movie, met and argued regularly with the world's leading scholars, and canonized a record number of saints.

When John Paul II began his ministry as "the universal pastor to the Catholics of the whole world" (p. 596), Soviet totalitarianism seemed the main enemy of the human spirit. He did much to undermine the Soviet empire by encouraging the emergence of an alternative civil society. Now he believes "the culture of death" represented by abortion, euthanasia, and despair needs to be confronted with a culture of life that affirms "the value of existence, the value of creation and of hope in the future life" (p. 862). His recent visit to the Holy Land confronted the despair its inhabitants feel about being able to live together in peace.

Weigel has written a fine biography that tackles all of the big issues and is especially effective at analyzing how John Paul II's theological and philosophical ideas apply to his language and policies. *Witness to Hope* is written in a well-paced, muscular style that manages to convey the energy of its protagonist. If the book has any weakness, it is due to the author's relative unfamiliarity with John Paul II's Polish background and with military history. Weigel does not know Polish and is unable to provide the inside grasp of Poland provided by great scholars like G. H. Williams and Norman Davies.[16] Likewise, Weigel makes the outrageous claim that the Red Army could have marched to the English Channel in 1920 if General Pilsudski's Polish Army had not defeated it in the Battle of the Vistula (pp. 17–18). Trotsky's ragtag Red Army would have been easily defeated by the crack Allied forces then occupying the Rhineland if the seasoned German Freikorps in the Baltic had not beaten it beforehand. But these peccadilloes aside, Weigel must be saluted for writing a biography of John Paul II that easily surpasses those produced by Tad Szulc, Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, and Jonathan Kwitny. *Witness to Hope* communicates how John Paul II has lived the Lord's injunction to Peter to "feed my sheep," and realized the Catholic Church's age-old charge, so often betrayed in the past, to stand for the rights of all humankind.

[16] See G. H. Williams, *The Mind of John Paul II*, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1981); and Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

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
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
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